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ABSTRACT

RURAL HOSPITAL SYSTEM AFFILIATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
HOSPITAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 2004-2008
By Mark Doughton Swofford, Ph.D., MHA, FACHE
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011
Major Director: Stephen S. Mick, Professor, Department of Health Administration

The formation of multi-hospital systems represents one of the largest structural
changes in the hospital industry. As of 2008, system affiliated hospitals outnumbered
stand alone hospitals 2511 to 2167 and the percentage of system affiliated rural hospitals
has increased dramatically from 24.8% in 1983 to 42.2% in 2008 (based on AHA data for
non-federal acute care general hospitals). The effects of system membership on hospital
performance have been of great interest to health care researchers, but the majority of
research on multi-hospital systems has either focused exclusively on urban facilities or
pooled urban and rural facilities in the same sample, and thus failed to allow for potential
differences in membership effects between urban and rural hospitals. The result is that
the effect of system membership on rural hospital performance has remained largely
unexplored, creating a gap in the body of health services research.
The objectives of this study are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this
study is intended to be a deliberate empirical application of contingency theory, which is
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the one major organizational theory that seeks to explain variations in organizational
performance as its fundamental purpose. Empirically, this study seeks to explore the
relationship between rural hospital system membership and rural hospital performance,
taking into account the environment of the rural hospital and the structure of the multihospital system to which it belongs.
The study sample consists of 1010 non-federal, short-term, acute care general rural
hospitals with consistent system membership and critical access hospital (CAH) status
from 2004 to 2008. Hospital economic performance is represented by the dependent
variables of hospital total margin and a productive efficiency score calculated using Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Four contingent pairs containing measures for
environmental munificence, system membership, the presence of local system partners,
the presence of hierarchical system partners, and CAH status, were used to measure a
hospital’s fit between environment and structure. Regression analysis was used to
determine the relationship between hospital performance and the fit between a hospital’s
environment and its organizational/system structure. Results of the analysis indicate that
hospitals with a better fit have significantly higher total margins, but results for
productive efficiency were largely insignificant.
Given the lack of research focused on the effects of rural hospital system
membership and the infrequent use of contingency theory in recent health services
research, this study offers important findings and methodological examples to the field of
health services research.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The Study Problem
The evolution of rural hospitals from stand-alone facilities predominantly owned by
local government organizations to the increasingly system-affiliated facilities that exist
today is largely a story of resource munificence. When the Hill-Burton Act made
resources plentiful after World War II, the number of rural hospital foundings increased
dramatically (Williams & Torrens, 2008) and as resources diminished during the 1980s
and 1990s, a large number of rural hospitals either closed (Drain et al., 2000; Ozcan &
Lynch, 1992; Lynch & Ozcan, 1994) or entered into inter-organizational relationships to
increase their access to scarce resources (Moscovice & Stensland, 2002b). These interorganizational relationships included contract management agreements, network
affiliation, and merger with or acquisition by multi-hospital systems. And while the
development of such inter-organizational relationships has been well reported (Alexander
& Morrisey, 1987; Mick et al., 1993; Mick & Morlock, 1990; Yarbrough & Powers,
2006), the effects of these changes in organizational form, specifically multi-hospital
system membership, on rural hospital performance are not clear.
The formation of multi-hospital systems represents one of the largest structural
changes in the hospital industry. Formed largely through mergers and acquisitions,
whose rates peaked in the mid-1990s (Cuellar & Gertler, 2003), hospital systems may
1
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significantly affect member hospital performance by providing greater management
expertise, access to capital, improvements in health information systems, and
rationalization and consolidation of services. As of 2008, system affiliated hospitals
outnumbered stand alone hospitals 2511 to 2167 (based on 2008 AHA data for nonfederal acute care general hospitals), and the effects of system membership on hospital
performance have been of interest to health care researchers. However, the majority of
research on multi-hospital systems has either focused exclusively on urban facilities
(Trinh et al, 2010; Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Rosko & Proenca, 2005; Rosko et al, 2007)
or pooled urban and rural facilities in the same sample (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Melnick
& Keeler, 2007; Bazzoli et al., 2000; Carey, 2003; Capps and Dranove, 2004; Chumaitov
et al., 2009), and thus failed to allow for potential differences in membership effects
between urban and rural hospitals. The result is that the effect of system membership on
rural hospital performance remains largely unexplored. Therefore the purpose of this
study is to address this gap in the literature by examining how multi-hospital system
membership affects rural hospital performance.
Specific Aims of the Study
The objectives of this study are both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, this
study is intended to be a deliberate empirical application of contingency theory, which is
the one major organizational theory that seeks to explain variations in organizational
performance as its fundamental purpose. Empirically, this study seeks to explore the
relationship between rural hospital system membership and rural hospital performance,
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taking into account the environment of the rural hospital and the structure of the multihospital system to which it belongs. Both of these objectives are reflected in the specific
aims stated below.
Several existing empirical studies of the relationship between multi-hospital system
membership and hospital performance either use an indicator variable to designate
system membership or use an existing typology to categorize the system relationships.
The studies that use an indicator variable to represent system membership have failed to
consistently find a significant relationship between system membership and hospital
performance (Rosko et al., 2007). Considering that hospital systems vary in both
strategy and structure, this is not surprising, and more recent studies use the Bazzoli et al.
(1999) taxonomy to try and account for these differences in strategy and structure.
Studies using this typology have found significant relationships between system
membership / system characteristics and efficiency (Carey, 2003; Rosko et al, 2007),
financial performance (Bazzoli et al, 2000), and quality (Chukmaitov et al., 2009). But
most of these studies either focused exclusively on urban hospitals (Trinh et al, 2010;
Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Rosko & Proenca, 2005; Rosko et al, 2007) or pooled urban
and rural hospitals together (Bazzoli et al, 2000; Carey, 2003; Chukmaitov et al., 2009)
and thus failed to allow for potential differences in membership effects between urban
and rural hospitals. Further, it is unclear if the Bazzoli et al. (1999) typology, which was
developed using data from both urban and rural hospitals, is appropriate for analyzing the
effect of system membership on rural hospital performance. Although the Bazzoli et al.
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(1999) taxonomy has been empirically supported by the results of several studies
(Bazzoli et al., 2006), criticisms related to geographic dispersion and local clustering
have been raised about the taxonomy (Luke et al, 2004), and there is evidence that rural
hospital clusters are distinctly different from urban hospital clusters (Kania, 1993).
Moreover, Hannan & Freeman (1977) argue against using fixed taxonomies, noting that
categories should not be a priori, but should fit the research problem at hand. To this end
the first specific aim for this study is to categorize the rural hospital systems and clusters.

Specific Aim 1: Categorize rural hospital system affiliations based on geographic
proximity to other system hospitals and differences in size / hierarchy of system
hospitals.

As noted by Alexander & Amburgey (1987), a good taxonomy will help reduce a
complex data set to a more comprehensible and parsimonious form as well as facilitate
hypothesis generation for empirical studies. Thus the intent of the first specific aim is not
to criticize or refute existing taxonomies, but rather to categorize the rural hospitals in the
sample solely based on differences in the structure of the multi-hospital system
affiliations. Preliminary analysis of rural hospital data indicates that there are two
important characteristics related to multi-hospital system ties. The first is geographic
proximity to another hospital within the same system. Geographic proximity makes the
coordination and centralization of logistic and clinical services possible. When a rural
hospital is isolated, only administrative services (accounting, claims processing,

5
marketing, etc.) may be centralized, but when another system hospital is close, logistic
services may be centralized (medical supply distribution, laundry service, etc.), and it
becomes possible to coordinate and centralize clinical services as well. However, the
centralization of clinical services also requires a hierarchy to exist between the proximate
facilities – i.e., one facility needs to be a referral center for the other. Thus, the second
important characteristic for the categorization is hierarchy, which means that a significant
difference may exist between the rural hospital and another proximate system hospital in
terms of scope of services and inpatient capacity.
Once the rural hospital system affiliations have been categorized, the next step is to
use the categories to analyze the effect of rural hospital system affiliation on hospital
performance. If system affiliated rural hospitals represent the creation of a new form of
rural hospital through the mechanism of adaptation (Yarbrough & Powers, 2006), then,
according to population ecology, the next process which should occur is the selection of
one organizational form over another (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989; Aldrich, 1999).
This process should be evident in terms of hospital performance, because the
organizational form that best “fits” the environment should outperform the other
organizational forms. And there is some indication that system affiliated rural facilities
may fit the rural environment better than stand alone facilities. In recent years for-profit
rural hospital systems have reported large profit increases (Galloro & Piotrowski, 2002),
and there is evidence that investor-owned chains are targeting rural facilities that
essentially enjoy a monopoly-like position in their community / market (Greene, 2002).
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However, not all rural hospital markets are the same; they may differ substantially in
terms of important characteristics such as resource munificence and proximity to other
rural or urban markets. Therefore, analysis of the effect of rural hospital system
affiliation on rural hospital performance must use a theoretical framework that accounts
for the degree of fit between the environment and the structure of the multi-hospital
system. Contingency theory offers just such a framework.

Specific Aim #2 – Analyze the effect of rural hospital system affiliation on rural
hospital performance using a contingency theory framework to account for
environmental and system differences.

Contingency theory will be used to determine how well the structure of the multihospital system affiliation fits the rural hospital environment, and then the degree of fit
between environment and organizational structure will be used to predict performance
differences among hospitals. All else being equal, hospitals with a higher degree of fit
should outperform hospitals with a lower degree of fit.
However, inter-organizational relationships are not the only significant adaptation in
rural hospitals. Perhaps just as significant is the conversion of rural hospitals to Critical
Access Hospitals (CAHs) under the Rural Hospital Flexibility Program (Flex program)
that was part of the Balanced Budget Amendment of 1997. As of 2008, two-thirds of all
rural hospitals had converted to CAH status, allowing them to receive cost based
reimbursement from Medicare (2008 AHA data). This is a financial boon for rural
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hospitals that qualify, and research shows that CAH conversion is associated with
increased revenues, expenses, and margins (Li et al, 2009a), and that rural hospitals
converting to CAH status increased their profitability more than other hospitals during
the BBA implementation period (Younis, 2006). However, cost-based reimbursement
has also hurt CAHs by removing the efficiency incentive inherent to the PPS system, and
thus CAHs have been shown to have greater cost inefficiency than rural PPS hospitals
(Rosko & Mutter, 2010). Ultimately, the conclusion that may be drawn from this
literature is that CAHs are different from other rural hospitals, and thus CAH status must
be taken into account when researching the effects of system membership on rural
hospitals.

Specific Aim #3 – Test whether CAH status moderates the effect of system affiliation
on performance.

To accomplish these specific aims, the proposed research will use a longitudinal
non-experimental design to categorize the types of rural hospital system relationships that
currently exist, and then examine the effect of system membership on rural hospital
performance. Data will be collected from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
hospital survey, the Area Resource File (ARF), and Medicare Hospital Cost Report
Information System Minimum Data Set (HCRIS MDS) for all non-federal rural hospitals
in the United States from 2004 to 2008. Financial performance and DEA-derived
hospital efficiency scores will be used as the dependent performance variables to assess
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the effect of system membership. Combinations of independent and control variables
will be used in the analysis to address specific questions regarding the effect of hospital
system type on efficiency, the effect of system type on financial performance, and the
interaction of specific rural hospital structural features with system type.
Scope and Analytic Approach of the Study
The proposed study uses a non-experimental design with multiple cross-sections.
The study population consists of all non-federal, acute care rural hospitals within the
United States from 2004 until 2008, and for the purposes of this study, the term “rural
hospital” includes all non-metropolitan statistical area hospitals (i.e. the sample includes
both micropolitan and non-core/rural areas under the CBSA definitions). So from here
forward all references to “rural hospitals” refers to hospitals in both micropolitan and
non-core areas. The study links data from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals, the
Medicare Hospital Cost Report Information System Minimum Data Set (HCRIS MDS),
and the Area Resource File (ARF) in order to match organizational characteristics,
environmental characteristics, and financial performance information for each rural
hospital.
In contingency theory, specific organizational characteristics are not directly related
to performance. Rather, organizational performance is attributed to how well an
organization’s structure fits the nature of its environment, and performance differences
among organizations may be explained by differences in “fit”. The organizational and
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environmental characteristics taken from the AHA survey and the ARF will be used to
calculate the degree of “fit” between the organizational structure and the environment.
This study focuses on economic performance, which is conceptualized as the
financial performance and productive efficiency for each rural hospital. The financial
performance measure will be taken directly from the HCRIS MDS, and the productive
efficiency performance measure will be a DEA efficiency score calculated from variables
in the AHA survey data. In accordance with Donaldson’s (2001) recommendations for
empirically testing contingency theory relationships, there is a time lag between the
dependent performance variables and the organizational and environmental
characteristics. The measure of fit will be calculated using data from 2004 and the
dependent performance measures will be taken from 2006, 2007, and 2008. Both
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and a Tobit regression model will be used to test
the relationship between performance and “fit”. OLS will be used to regress financial
performance on “fit” and a Tobit model will be used to regress productive efficiency on
“fit”.
Significance of the Study
This study contributes to the body of health services research in several ways. First,
on a theoretical level, this study is an empirical application of contingency theory. At
one time, contingency theory was the dominant organizational theory for studying
organizational design and performance (Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Drazin and Van de Ven,
1985; Scott, 1990), but it fell out of favor with organizational researchers in the mid-
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1980s. Although contingency theory has not completely disappeared from health
services research, it is difficult to find health care organizational studies that use it
explicitly as the theoretical framework. The majority of studies either use another major
organizational theory (resource dependence, transaction cost economics, and institutional
theory appear often), choose to use micro-economic theory, or provide no theoretical
framework. However, contingent thinking underlies a great deal of the work that is
published about health services organizations and could benefit the field of health
services research if it was used explicitly. This study is an attempt to use contingency
theory explicitly, following the recommendations of its most ardent supporter, Lex
Donaldson (1995, 2001).
Second, this study is meant to inform federal policy makers on the viability of rural
hospitals and access to care in rural communities. Recent federal legislation (the Flex
program) indicates that federal policy makers are interested in ensuring access to care for
rural communities. In order to do this effectively, they must understand how system
affiliations affect the viability of rural hospitals. The results of this study will help to
indicate if system membership improves or decreases the financial viability of rural
hospitals.
Finally, this study will begin to examine the interaction between multi-hospital
system membership and CAH status. It is estimated that the CAH program costs the
federal government $1.3 billion in Medicare payments each year (Rosko & Mutter,
2010). This additional cost is the difference between what CAHs are paid under the
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current cost-based reimbursement system and what they would be paid under the
Prospective Payment System. This extra revenue is intended to ensure the continued
operation of rural hospitals, but if system membership can achieve this objective by
providing rural hospitals with greater access to critical resources, then the added expense
of the Flex program may be unnecessary. Further, CAH status and system membership
appear to influence hospital efficiency in opposite directions (Rosko & Mutter, 2010;
Harrison et al., 2009; Ozcan & Luke, 1993; Rosco & Proenca, 2005), suggesting that
system membership could restore the efficiency incentive that is lost when CAHs switch
from PPS to cost-based reimbursement. If either of these cases is true, then policy
makers may consider adjusting the Flex program criteria or the reimbursement levels to
encourage or require system membership for CAHs. However, it is unknown how
system membership interacts with CAH status. More information about the effects of
system membership and the interaction of system membership with CAH status will help
the federal government determine the appropriate certification criteria for CAH status and
appropriately adjust the CAH reimbursement rates.
Organization of Subsequent Chapters
The remaining chapters of this study provide detailed information regarding previous
literature that is pertinent to the problem, the conceptual framework for the study, the
analytic methods used in the study, the results of the data analysis, and discussion of the
results in the context of the stated hypotheses and conceptual framework. The
subsequent chapters are organized in the following manner:
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Chapter 2 summarizes previously published literature that is pertinent to the study
problem, and identifies the gaps in the literature which are addressed by this study.
Background information is presented on the development of rural hospitals in the United
States, research and commentary on multi-hospital systems, and other empirical work on
rural hospitals. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework for the study, and discusses
how this framework was derived from contingency theory, constructs from Industrial
Organization Economics, and the writings of Michael Porter on industry clusters and
redesigning health care delivery organizations. At the end of Chapter 3 the hypotheses
that are derived from the conceptual framework are presented.

Chapter 4 presents the

research methodology for this study. It includes the study design, the data sources for the
study, the study sample, independent, dependent and control variable measures, and the
analytical approach used to test the stated hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the results of
the analysis including both descriptive and inferential statistics. Finally, Chapter 6
discusses the results of the study within the context of the stated hypotheses and also
comments on the theoretical implications of the study. At the close of the chapter,
potential policy implications, study limitations, and suggestions for future research are
offered for consideration.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a summary of the literature on rural hospitals and multihospital systems that is relevant to this study. The chapter begins with some background
information on rural hospitals and how they have evolved over the past century. Then
rural hospital affiliations with multi-hospital systems and the conversion of rural
hospitals to critical access hospitals are presented as important structural changes in the
rural hospital population. Next, empirical studies examining the effects of multi-hospital
system affiliation and CAH conversion on hospital performance are presented and
discussed. The discussion on the effects of multi-hospital system affiliation begins with a
review of research that has been done on hospitals in general, since most of the empirical
literature does not specifically focus on rural hospitals. Then the discussion is narrowed
to the writings and empirical work that examine system effects in rural hospitals. The
literature on multi-hospital systems is then critiqued and summarized. Finally, empirical
works on the effects of CAH conversion are presented, and the ways in which CAH
conversion and system membership may interact are postulated. The chapter closes with
a synthesis of the existing literature that identifies the gap which this study addresses.
Background
The Evolution of Rural Hospitals in the United States
For the purpose of this study, rural hospitals are defined as those hospitals that are
13
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outside of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). This is a common definition that has
been used in health services research on rural hospitals (Cordes, 1983; Mick & Morlock,
1990; Reardon, 1996; Hart et al., 2005), and allows comparison of this study to previous
work on rural hospitals. In general, rural hospitals are substantially smaller (107 vs 289
beds on average according to 2008 AHA survey data), are more likely to be not-for-profit
(Wang et al., 2001b), have less access to capital (Alexander & Amburgey, 1987), have
lower occupancy rates, and are more reliant on Medicare reimbursement (Cleverly, 1989)
than urban hospitals. These differences are attributable to the conditions under which
rural hospitals developed and the nature of the rural areas that they serve, which have
higher rates of poverty, are less economically diverse, and have higher percentages of
people over the age of 65 (Reardon, 1996).
At the beginning of the 20th century, rural hospitals were small proprietary
organizations operated by a physician out of his home (Madison & Bernstein, 1976).
Much smaller than urban hospitals, rural hospitals had a difficult time attracting
physicians, and there was a noticeable quality difference between rural and urban
hospitals. Urban hospitals were supported by larger populations of paying patients, had
access to the latest technology, and benefited greatly from the Flexner Report, which
consolidated control of medical education into large urban universities (Reardon, 1996).
Rural hospitals could not compete with their urban counterparts, and many of them
closed during the Great Depression. This trend would continue through World War II,
until federal government intervention reversed the decline of rural hospitals.
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The expansion of rural hospitals in the 20-year period after World War II (Alexander
& Amburgey, 1987) increased access to medical care for rural communities, and created
the infrastructure that delivers core medical services to the estimated 50 to 60 million
rural citizens in the United States (Mick & Morlock, 1990; Hart et al., 2005). In many
cases these rural facilities were built with federal matching funds made available by the
Hospital Survey and Reconstruction Act of 1946 (more commonly known as the HillBurton Act) in communities that lacked sufficient resources to develop a hospital on their
own (Torrens, 1980). Assistance under the Hill-Burton Act was limited to non-profit
organizations; as a result the population of rural hospitals, which was largely proprietary
prior to World War II, became predominantly non-profit (Reardon, 1996). Once
constructed, these hospitals became symbols of community identity and pride (Ermann,
1990), and even though they lacked the size and patient volume of larger urban hospitals,
cost-based reimbursement, national economic prosperity, and increased insurance
coverage due to the creation of Medicare and Medicaid ensured the success and survival
of rural hospitals through the mid-1970s (Reardon & Reardon, 1995).
However, in population ecology terms, the small size and generally limited scope of
services of rural hospitals gave them a small niche width (Yarbrough & Powers, 2006)
and made them vulnerable to changing levels of environmental resources (Hannan &
Freeman, 1987). So as the cost of health care increased rapidly and the federal policy
focus shifted from one of increased access to one of cost containment, rural hospitals
were adversely affected. The creation of the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983
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and the emergence of managed care in the 1980s and 1990s lowered overall hospital
reimbursement in an effort to encourage efficiency and hold down health care
expenditures. These changes represented a decline in available resources for all
hospitals, but significant differences between rural and urban hospitals made changes to
health care financing particularly harmful to rural hospitals (Chan et al., 1999). The
result was an unprecedented number of hospital closures in the 1980s and early 1990s
that affected rural hospitals disproportionately (Drain et al., 2001; Reardon, 1996,
Yarbrough & Powers, 2006).
Between 1980 and 1992, 389 rural hospitals closed (Reardon, 1996), and closure
rates for rural hospitals were markedly higher (29% from 1985-1988) than those for
urban hospitals (Drain et al., 2001). High rural hospital closure rates were very
concerning to both federal policy makers and rural health care providers, and prompted
several studies by health services researchers (Sager, 1983; Mayer et al., 1987; Williams
et al., 1991; Ozcan & Lynch, 1992; Lynch & Ozcan, 1994; Slomski, 1995). Initially
many of them hypothesized that rural hospital closure rates were related to Medicare
and/or Medicaid payments (Sager, 1983; Mayer et al., 1987; Williams et al., 1991),
hospital inefficiency (Ozcan & Lynch, 1992), or low profit margins (Slomski, 1995).
However, those hypotheses were largely unsupported. It was determined that there was
no difference in the efficiency of closed and open hospitals (Ozcan & Lynch, 1992), and
that low profits were not a cause of closure, as many rural hospitals were actually more
profitable than comparable urban facilities (Slomski, 1995), and results linking Medicare
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and/or Medicaid payment shares to closure were mixed (Sager, 1983; Mayer et al., 1987;
Williams et al., 1991).
The one consistent finding that did emerge from these empirical studies was that
rural hospital closures were largely determined by hospital characteristics such as small
size and low inpatient demand / volume. Ozcan & Lynch (1992) noted in their efficiency
study that low inpatient demand (specifically discharges per bed of 21-22 or less) was
linked to increased risk of closure. Expanding on this point, they note that the increased
risk of closure remained even if hospitals maintained efficiency by cutting costs. This
finding was supported by Slomski (1995), who noted that low inpatient volume--not low
profit rates--was the primary factor related to hospital closure. Thus the increased
vulnerability of rural hospitals to closure was primarily a factor of hospital characteristics
like small size and low occupancy, which may be linked to overall environmental/area
munificence in rural communities (Lynch & Ozcan, 1994) indicated by declining
Medicare reimbursement, weak rural economies, aging facilities, and competition from
nearby rural and urban hospitals (Trinh & Begun, 1999).
Faced with diminishing resources and the threat of closure, many constituencies
questioned the role of rural hospitals and their financial viability in the future (Moscovice
& Rosenblatt, 1985a). Researchers focused on the strategic activity of rural hospitals
(Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b; Smith & Piland, 1990; Mick et al., 1993; Trinh &
Begun, 1999; Trinh & O’Connor, 2000), trying to discern what, if any, strategy could
ensure their preservation. Although research at the time noted that the strategies
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employed by the population of rural hospitals was not uniform, and strategic activity was
absent in nearly one-third of rural hospitals (Mick et al., 1993), the perspective of time
allows us to see the most widespread and beneficial strategies clearly. Often, changes in
organizational strategy result in changes to organizational structure (Zuckerman, 1983),
and indeed this is the case in the rural hospital population. The two most notable changes
to rural hospital structure over the past 40 years are the increase in multi-hospital system
affiliations and the conversion to critical access hospitals. These two strategic
adaptations and their relationship to rural hospital performance are discussed in the next
two sections.
Rural Hospital Affiliation with Multi-Hospital Systems
Multi-hospital systems are defined as two or more hospitals owned, leased, or
managed by a single corporate entity (Mick & Morlock, 1990). They are distinct from
hospital networks and other voluntary consortiums in that the hospitals are unified
through some form of common ownership (Shortell, 1988; Bazzoli et al, 1999), and are
generally identified as a horizontal integration strategy rather than a vertical integration
strategy that involves linking organizations along the continuum of health care (Luke et
al, 1995; Mick et al, 1993).
Early in the 1980s, affiliation with multi-hospital systems was identified as a
potential strategy to improve the financial viability of rural hospitals (Moscovice &
Rosenblatt, 1985b). During the period 1983 to 1988, over 69% of all rural hospitals
pursued at least one horizontal or vertical integration strategy, with multi-hospital system
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membership identified as one of the top strategies pursued (Mick et al., 1993).
Descriptive studies revealed that system affiliations increased dramatically in the 1970s
and 1980s, but these affiliations included a mix of common ownership (i.e., the rural
hospital fully becoming a member of the system), leased facilities (where the system
leases the rural hospital), and contract management arrangements under which the rural
hospital retained greater autonomy (Lewis & Parent, 1986). Rural hospitals needed and
wanted the resources that multi-hospital systems could provide, but were hesitant to
completely trade their autonomy for access to these resources. Thus the majority of them
initially entered into affiliations that were less constraining than common ownership.
However, as economic challenges persisted and rural hospitals were disproportionately
affected by the PPS (Smith & Piland, 1990), an increasing number of rural hospitals were
willing to surrender their autonomy. This is evident by the percentage of rural hospitals
that are members of a multi-hospital system. In 1983, 24.8% were part of a system
(Lewis & Parent, 1986) and in 1994 that number had increased to 36.4% (Reardon, 1996)
and has continued to increase in the current century with 40.7% part of a system in 2004
and 42.2% in 2008 (calculated from AHA data).
However, simply tracking the percentage of rural hospitals that are members of
multi-hospitals systems does not tell the full story. It is also informative to examine the
types of systems that are acquiring rural hospitals and the location of the rural hospitals
that are most likely to be part of a system. First, the majority of systems that own rural
hospitals are non-profit systems. Due to the restrictions of the Hill-Burton legislation,
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rural hospitals built in the 20 years after World War II were predominantly non-profit
institutions owned by either local government or religious entities. This remains largely
unchanged today, when nearly 89% of all rural hospitals are non-profit institutions. Early
system affiliations reflected this bias, and before1980, secular and religious non-profit
systems were the largest players in the rural hospital sector. This trend reversed itself for
a short period, when in the 1980s the majority of new system affiliations were with forprofit systems (Lewis & Parent, 1986), but this trend did not continue. Today, out of all
rural hospitals that are members of multi-hospital systems, slightly less than 25% are
members of for-profit systems (calculated from 2008 AHA data). While this percentage
is nearly twice as high as the percentage of rural hospitals that are for-profit, indicating
that for-profit multi-hospital systems have made some inroads into rural markets, the vast
majority of rural hospital system affiliations remain with non-profit systems.
Second, the likelihood that a rural hospital will be owned by a multi-hospital system
differs substantially by geographic region and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
statistical area. Looking at the nine census divisions, rural hospitals in the Mountain
division are most likely to be owned by a multi-hospital system and those in the Middle
Atlantic and New England divisions are least likely to be part of a system (Reardon,
1996; Lewis & Parent, 1986). Although the percentage of rural hospitals belonging to a
system has increased in each division over the past 30 years, the difference among
divisions has remained consistent. Rural hospital system membership also varies by
OMB statistical area, which may be seen by dividing the system owned hospitals into
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OMB metropolitan, micropolitan, and non-core statistical areas. Looking at all of the
non-federal general hospitals in the United States, there are 2,652 hospitals in
metropolitan statistical areas, 846 hospitals in micropolitan statistical areas, and 1,180
hospitals in non-core areas (areas not designated as either metropolitan or micropolitan).
Of these, 62.4% of the hospitals in metropolitan areas (commonly referred to as urban)
are part of multi-hospital systems, 50.2% of hospitals in micropolitan areas are part of a
system, and 36.4% of the hospitals in non-core areas are part of a system (calculated from
2008 AHA data). This clearly shows that multi-hospital systems are more active in areas
with larger populations, and multi-hospital system affiliation is more likely for rural
hospitals in micropolitan areas than for those in non-core areas. However, numerically
the number of system-owned rural hospitals is virtually identical in micropolitan and noncore areas (425 to 430 respectively).
Conversion to Critical Access Hospitals
A more recent structural change in the rural hospital sector is the conversion of rural
hospitals to critical access hospitals. Contained in the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of
1997, the Rural Hospital Flexibility Program was created to prevent the closure of rural
facilities and thus protect access to health care in rural communities (Dalton et al., 2003).
The primary way that it accomplished this was by establishing the criteria for rural
hospitals to be designated critical access hospitals (CAHs). Under the initial criteria in
the 1997 legislation, rural hospitals had to be geographically isolated (35 miles by
primary road or 15 miles by secondary road from another hospital), operate a full time
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emergency department/room, operate no more than 15 acute care beds, and all patient
stays had to be less than 96 hours, in order to receive CAH designation. In return,
hospitals that qualify are reimbursed on a cost basis for Medicare patients instead of
receiving PPS rates. This modification to reimbursement rates greatly reduced the
financial uncertainty rural hospitals faced under PPS (i.e., that they had to meet average
DRG costs with low patient volume) making this an attractive program to rural hospitals.
Additionally, states were allowed to waive the geographic isolation requirement if they
deemed a hospital a “necessary provider,” thus many more hospitals had an opportunity
to participate in the program.
Subsequent legislation amended the qualification criteria allowing even more
hospitals to participate in the Flex program. The Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act
(BBRA) of 1999 changed the length of stay requirement to the average LOS of all
patients (rather than each patient stay) must be less than 96 hours and allowed states to
designate some urban hospitals as “rural” if they met all of the CAH criteria, thus some
CAHs are actually located in MSAs. The Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
(BIPA) of 2000 extended the cost-based reimbursement to cover on-call physician
charges, and the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 increased the number of
acute care beds a CAH can operate from 15 to 25, increased the cost-based
reimbursement rate to 101% of costs, but also made the geographic isolation requirement
stricter by removing the option for states to waive this requirement. This last change was
effective in 2006, creating a deadline for many hospitals to convert to CAH status.
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Initially, response to the Flex program was slow as hospitals waited for more
information and implementation guidelines about the legislation. But after the first two
years, participation in the program was tremendous, with over half of all rural hospitals
converting to CAH status between 1999 and 2005 (MedPAC, 2005). However, the
majority of CAHs did not meet the geographic isolation requirement (only 18% are more
than 35 miles by primary road from another hospital) (MedPAC, 2005), and the stricter
enforcement of this provision slowed conversion to CAH status when it went into effect
in 2006 (MedPAC, 2006). Thus today the percentage of rural hospitals designated as
CAHs is 51.8%, which is very similar to the figures in 2005.
Similar to system membership, the distribution of CAH conversions is not uniformed
across the rural hospital population, and is skewed along both organizational
characteristics and geographic location. The primary organizational characteristics that
separate CAHs from non-CAHs in the population of rural hospitals are hospital size and
Medicare payer mix. When measured by bed size, CAH hospitals are significantly
smaller than non-CAH rural hospitals (Dalton et al., 2003). Additionally, rural hospitals
that converted to CAH status have a higher percentage of Medicare patients than nonconverting rural hospitals (61% to 49%, respectively) (Rosko & Mutter, 2010). Both of
these differences are understandable considering that one of the criteria for CAH
designation is to operate no more than 25 acute care beds, and the advantageous
reimbursement CAHs receive applies to Medicare patients.
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Geographically, CAHs are more prominent in the central census divisions and in
non-core statistical areas (based on 2008 data). Looking at the nine census divisions, the
West North Central division has the highest percentage of CAHs and the New England
and Middle Atlantic divisions have the lowest percentage of CAHs. There is also a
significant difference in the percentage of hospitals designated as CAHs in micropolitan
and non-core areas. In micropolitan areas only 26% of all hospitals have converted to
CAH status, while in non-core areas over 70% of hospitals have converted.
Summary of the Background of Rural Hospitals
Identified by their location in non metropolitan statistical areas, rural hospitals are
primarily non-profit hospitals built with federal matching funds from the Hill-Burton Act
and owned by local government or religious entities. Rural hospitals provide critical
hospital services for approximately 60 million citizens across the United States, and thus
their financial viability is important to ensure access to health care. As a group they
enjoyed relative prosperity for the 30-35 year period after World War II, but began to
struggle as federal health policy shifted focus to cost control. Implementation of the PPS
affected rural hospitals disproportionately, and many of them struggled and closed during
the 1980s and early 1990s. Financial uncertainty and the threat of closure lead to
strategic action by rural hospitals and regulatory intervention by the federal government,
the result of which was significant structural change to the population of rural hospitals.
Since the mid 1980s, rural hospital affiliations with multi-hospital systems have increased
markedly, and during the 1990s the federal government created the Flex program which
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allowed rural hospitals to convert to critical access hospitals in order to receive more
favorable reimbursement. Today over 42% of all rural hospitals are owned by a multihospital system, and nearly 52% of all rural hospitals have converted to CAH status.
These are the two most significant structural changes in the rural hospital population in
the past 50 years, and the effects of these changes deserve the attention of health service
researchers. However, these changes did not occur uniformly across the population of
rural hospitals. Significant differences in system membership and CAH conversion are
apparent along organizational and environmental variables, which must be considered in
empirical analysis of the effects of system membership and CAH conversion.
Empirical Studies on the Effects of Multi-Hospital System Membership
The concept of regional health systems that rationally organize medical care among
multiple facilities dates back to the 1920s Dawson Report, which proposed such an
organization for the British health system (Luke, 1992). The organizational concepts
recommended in the Dawson Report are similar to those proposed for organizing health
care systems in this country (Donabedien, 1972) and involve establishing a hierarchy of
services and organizations in a “hub and spoke” configuration to serve a specific region /
population. Such a system would have a large tertiary facility at the center offering a
wide array of services including high technology and sub-specialty services. Smaller
organizations are arrayed on the periphery of the system offering primary and secondary
services to local residents. When more complex services are required, these smaller
organizations refer the patients to the larger tertiary facility in the center. Such rational
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organization of health services, which in most cases was conceptualized as the product of
centralized planning (Luke, 1992), would prevent duplication of services, reduce excess
bed capacity, and save cost for a centrally budgeted health care system.
In the United States, multi-hospital systems formed largely through mergers and
acquisitions, the rates for which peaked in the mid-1990s (Cuellar & Gertler, 2003), are
primarily a product of economic / market forces rather than centralized planning by
government organizations. Comprised of a mix of religious, secular non-profit, and forprofit investor owned entities, the number of multi-hospital systems in the United States
has grown rapidly since the 1960s (Alexander & Amburgey, 1987), and represents one of
the largest structural changes in the hospital industry. Even though these multi-hospital
systems were not centrally planned, it is possible that they can reduce the duplication of
services and excess capacity in much the same manner as centrally planned systems.
System advocates and some health services researchers believe that multi-hospital
systems provide member hospitals specific advantages over free standing hospitals,
which include an increased chance of survival and opportunity for growth, cost savings
associated with economies of scale, and increased access to capital financing and human
resources (Zuckerman, 1983; Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b). Multi-institutional
arrangements are thought to be particularly important for rural hospitals, the small size
and limited service offerings for which make them particularly vulnerable to
environmental changes (Yarbrough & Powers, 2006). However, the results of empirical
research trying to show the advantages of system membership have not been clear, and
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led some early system researchers to conclude that the promises of multi-hospital systems
were unfulfilled (Shortell, 1988).
This section examines the empirical work on the effects of multi-hospital system
membership. First, the body of literature examining multi-hospital systems and empirical
works that analyze their effects on member hospitals are presented and discussed. Then,
because the majority of recent work on system membership has been done on urban
hospitals or hospital samples containing both urban and rural facilities, the discussion
will be narrowed to focus only on those writings that address rural hospital system
membership / affiliation. Finally, the work will be summarized and critiqued with
emphasis placed on theoretical and methodological issues that will be addressed in this
study.
Multi-Hospital Systems and Their Effects on Member Hospitals
In 1946, only 5% of hospitals belonged to multi-hospital systems, and all of these
were Catholic or secular not-for-profit systems (Alexander & Amburgey, 1987). Then in
the 1960s the first investor-owned multi-hospital systems appeared on the scene (Shortell,
1988), and by 1979 one-quarter of all hospitals were part of a multi-hospital system.
Distinguished from health networks and other forms of strategic alliances by common
ownership, the influence of multi-hospital systems has continued to grow, and the most
recent AHA hospital survey shows that nearly 56% of all U.S. hospitals are part of a
multi-hospital system (2008 AHA Annual Survey). This dynamic restructuring of the
hospital industry has not escaped the scrutiny of health services researchers who have
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exerted considerable effort trying to conceptualize and quantify how system membership
affects the performance of individual hospitals.
Largely based on the ideas that system membership provides individual hospitals
with improved financial and administrative management, gives them better access to
financial capital, and creates economies of scale (Carey, 2003), research on system
membership has posited that system hospitals should outperform non-system hospitals.
However, early empirical work using a binary variable to represent system membership
failed to produce consistent results (Rosko et al., 2007), and lead to the conclusion that
multi-hospital systems have not met expectations (Shortell, 1988) associated with greater
efficiency, reduced costs, economies of scale, and the integration of patient care and
clinical services (Zuckerman, 1979; 1983). This conclusion was primarily based on
system research that used pre-PPS data and emphasized static system characteristics such
as ownership, size, or regional location (Levitz & Brooke, 1985; Alexander & Shroer,
1985; Lynch & McCue, 1990; Coyne, 1985; Ermann & Gabrel, 1984), which Shortell
(1988) felt were insufficient to truly capture the nature of multi-hospital systems. As an
alternative, he proposed that researchers needed to focus on how systems functioned,
which he referred to as “systemness”. The concept of systemness included factors such
as common culture, integrated financial and strategic planning, centralized decision
making and support services, a system wide quality assurance program, and integrated
clinical services for systems that were geographically concentrated (Shortell, 1988).
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Over the next decade, research on the effects of multi-hospital systems continued
with some researchers continuing to do empirical work with a simple indicator variable
for system membership (Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Dranove et al, 1996), while several
others attempted to furthering the understanding of systems and how best to
conceptualize them (Gaynor & Wilson, 1999; Alexander & Amburgey, 1987; Kania,
1993; Luke, 1992; Reardon & Reardon, 1995; Bazzoli et al, 1999). This conceptual work
may generally be divided into two domains: attempts to categorize systems and create an
over-arching taxonomy, and the study of local system clusters and partnerships.
Early attempts to categorize systems and create a taxonomy that would be useful for
systems research were based on organizational characteristics like ownership and size
(Alexander et al, 1985), while others divided systems into large numbers of categories
and sub-categories (Lewis & Alexander, 1986) potentially too wieldy for researchers to
use. These attempts at creating a comprehensive taxonomy were criticized for not
capturing the essence of “systemness” (Shortell, 1988) and were not used widely by
researchers. Then in 1999, Bazzoli et al. produced a taxonomy that divided hospital
systems (and networks) based on their centralization, differentiation, and integration of
hospital services, physician services, and insurance services. The constructs of
centralization, differentiation, and integration were drawn from industrial organization
economics and organization theory, and the primary method for creating the taxonomy
was cluster analysis. The resulting taxonomy has five system types based largely on the
centralization of services within the system (shown in Figure 1), and was adopted by the
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System Type

Definition

Centralized Health System

Centralized systems centrally organize hospital services, physician arrangements, and
insurance products.

Centralized Physician/Insurance
Health Systems

These systems have centrally organized physician and insurance arrangements, but they
exhibit only moderate centralization in the delivery of hospital services

Moderately Centralized Systems

Moderately centralized systems give more autonomy to member hospitals with regard to
organizing hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance activity. They are
characterized by moderate levels of centralization for all types of services and
arrangements.

Decentralized Health Systems

These systems are characterized by a high level of decentralization. System members
provide a higher percentage of their services at the individual hospital level and are
characterized by decentralized physician and insurance arrangements.

Independent Hosiptal Systems

Independent systems have little differentiation of hospital services, physician
arrangements or insurance products. Centralization on all of these dimensions is low to
moderate. Hospitals operate independently.

Figure 1 – Taxonomy of Hospital Systems (Bazzoli et al., 1999)
AHA for use in their annual hospital survey data base. Fellow researchers appreciated
the conceptual and empirical rigor behind the taxonomy, and its inclusion in the AHA
database made it readily available to researchers using secondary data. As a result, the
Bazzoli et al (1999) taxonomy has been widely used for empirical research on hospitals
and multi-hospital systems (Bazzoli et al, 2000; Bazzoli et al, 2001; Carey, 2003; Rosko
et al, 2007; Chukmaitov et al, 2009).
Empirical work using the Bazzoli et al. (1999) taxonomy has produced significant
results pertaining to the quality, efficiency, and financial performance of hospitals.
Analysis of financial performance found that the financial performance of hospitals in
moderately centralized systems was better than that of hospitals in centralized systems,
but hospitals in systems with little differentiation and centralization of services had the
poorest financial performance of all (Bazzoli et al., 2000). Work on hospital cost
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efficiency using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), found that systems with centralized
physician/insurance services and decentralized health systems were more efficient than
the other types of systems (Carey, 2003; Rosko et al., 2007). Finally, empirical work
analyzing the quality of care produced significant results indicating that centralized
systems lead to better quality (Chukmaitov et al., 2009). So there is no clear consensus
as to which type of system performs best across multiple performance dimensions, but
empirical work using the taxonomy has consistently produced significant findings, which
is a marked improvement from studies that use a simple indicator variable. However, the
taxonomy has been criticized for aggregating market-level data about hospital and
physician service sharing to categorize entire multi-hospital systems at the national level
(Luke, 2006). Luke (2006) illustrates with some simple analysis that the taxonomy may
simply be a measure of the geographic dispersion of the hospitals within a system, and
advocates studying local system clusters, rather than relying on an over-arching
taxonomy of systems.
A review of the Bazzoli et al (1999) paper which introduced the taxonomy reveals
two reasons why the taxonomy may not be appropriate for this study. First, and most
importantly, the taxonomy was developed using a combined sample of urban and rural
hospitals, which may not accurately represent the rural hospitals within a given system.
Although each system is unique, in general urban system hospitals outnumber rural
hospitals two to one, and several systems consist of more urban hospitals than rural
hospitals. The system type in the AHA data set (the variable cluster code) is assigned
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using the methods and categories developed by Bazzoli et al (1999), which categorize
system centralization by aggregating clinical service sharing, physician service
arrangements, and insurance services at the system level. Systems which contain
predominantly urban hospitals will reflect the degree of centralization and service sharing
of the urban system hospitals and may not accurately reflect the reality of the rural
system hospitals. An example of this is the categorization of the Healthcare Corporation
of America (HCA). HCA is one of the largest multi-hospital systems in the nation, with
162 individual hospitals listed in the 2008 AHA data set. Of that 162, 148 of the
hospitals are located in a metropolitan statistical area and only 14 of them are in rural
areas. Thus the categorization of the system by the Bazzoli et al (1999) taxonomy would
be almost completely determined by the characteristics of the urban hospitals within the
system, and is not appropriate for studying rural hospitals which is the focus of this study.
Second, when the Bazzoli et al (1999) taxonomy measures service sharing; only the
centralization of clinical services is considered and the centralization of logistic services,
information technology, and other administrative services are not measured. Bazzoli et al
(1999) assert that their measure of service sharing is a proxy for centralized decision
making and service arrangements within a system in general, however a quick review of
how some of the systems in the AHA data set are categorized raise concerns with this
assertion. Multi-hospital systems such as Community Health Systems (CHS) and
LifePoint Hospitals are categorized as decentralized systems (cluster ID = 4 in the AHA
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data set), when in fact decision making within these systems is very centralized1.
Additionally, federal government hospital systems such as the Department of the Army
Health System, the Veterans Affairs Health System, and the Indian Health Service are
categorized as moderately centralized, decentralized, or independent respectively, when
in fact these are highly centralized systems with fairly rigid command and control
structures, and centralized information management, financial management, logistic, and
personnel functions. So while the Bazzoli et al (1999) taxonomy may be correct in
categorizing the centralization of clinical services within these systems, it does not fully
represent the centralization of decision making and non-clinical services within a given
system. The conceptual framework for this study posits that hospital efficiency and
performance are not only affected by clinical service sharing which primarily occurs
between hierarchical system partners, but also by the centralization of logistic and
administrative efforts by local system partners. For this reason, the methods for this
study do not include the use of existing taxonomies, but instead follow Luke’s (2006)
advice to focus on the characteristics of local system clusters, and how the presence or
absence of local system partners and hierarchical system relationships affect rural
hospital economic performance.
Local system clusters are groups of two or more hospitals owned by the same system
that are in close proximity to each other. Sometimes referred to as local health systems
(Luke, 1992) or locally concentrated systems (Cueller & Gertler, 2003), researchers who

1

This is based on personal discussions with CHS and LifePoint hospital CEOs and COOs at an American
College of Healthcare Executives (ACHE) seminar in Williamsburg, VA during the summer of 2009.
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analyze local system clusters note that geographic proximity creates clinical and strategic
interdependence among hospitals (Luke, 1992, Alexander & Schroer, 1985).
Independent hospitals that serve the same area or have overlapping service areas compete
for patients, bargain with the same employers and/or managed care organizations, and
often offer duplicate services (Trinh et al, 2008), which are not used to capacity. When
these hospitals are part of the same system, they may be managed as a cluster, which can
lead to increased market power, the centralization of common services, the reduction of
excess capacity, and the creation of economies of scale through clinical integration /
consolidation (Kania, 1993; Gaynor & Wilson, 1999; Luke, 1992). However, the extent
to which this occurs within a given system is not homogenous across different markets or
localities; thus, each cluster of hospitals should be examined independently when
performing research on multi-hospital systems. The hierarchical order among cluster
hospitals (sometimes referred to as a parent-child relationship) and the geographic spread
of the cluster (Luke, 1992) are important characteristics which may explain differences in
performance.
The concept of clusters has also been advanced by Michael Porter (1998, pg 197),
but in a much broader context, looking across industries and nations. Porter notes the
potential strategic advantage that organizations may achieve by clustering in specific
geographic areas. Although he primarily writes about clusters of organizations that
bridge industrial sectors and involve multiple input / output relationships, same-industry
clusters such as local hospital clusters are mentioned as a special type of cluster that
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produce goods that are consumed locally (i.e., patient care in the case of hospitals).
Whether or not clusters are comprised of diverse organizations or same-system
organizations, when interrelated organizations cluster together in a given locality, they
are able to capture the advantages of inherent interdependencies that come with shared
production, distribution, and information exchange. The clustered organizations create a
network, and the interests of individual organizations are combined to create shared
interests and a sense of community where the frequency and impact of interactions is
increased (Porter, 1998, pg 226). The result is that organizations that are part of a cluster
gain a competitive advantage that may result in increased productivity, innovation, and
economic value (Porter, 1998, pg 213).
Despite the potential benefits of local system clusters, the majority of multi-hospital
system research has focused on multi-hospital system characteristics as opposed to those
of the subunit clusters themselves, thereby leaving the effects of system clusters and local
partners largely unexplored (Cueller & Gertler, 2003). This is especially important for the
study of rural hospitals, many of which are inextricably linked to nearby, larger urban
hospitals by patterns of patient referrals, patient transfers, and the phenomenon of outshopping (when patients from a rural area skip their local hospital to seek care at a nearby
urban hospital). Such localized rural-urban relationships may be evident when clusters
are examined, but may not be reflected in studies that focus on system level
characteristics, which may be highly influenced by the amount of service sharing among
the urban hospitals in a given system.
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Recent empirical work has attempted to fill this gap by examining the efficiency and
financial performance of hospital clusters and/or member hospitals (Sikka et al, 2009;
Trinh et al, 2010). Differences in efficiency may be attributed to the degree to which a
local cluster resembles the regional health systems envisioned by the Dawson Report and
other system advocates (Luke, 1992; Donabedien, 1972), exemplified by hierarchical
order and the rational organization of clinical services (Sikka et al, 2009). Such
configuration facilitates cooperative behavior like the sharing / receiving of clinical
services, which is thought to affect individual hospital efficiency and financial
performance (Trinh et al, 2010). Findings from these studies, while very preliminary,
provide mixed results with regard to cluster configuration. For instance, Sikka et al
(2009) found that hierarchy among cluster hospitals significantly affected cluster
efficiency, whereas other cluster characteristics such as ownership, the number of
hospitals within the cluster, the presence of an academic medical center (AMC), or the
geographic spread of the cluster within the market area, might not be so important. There
is also the question of which cluster members benefit from geographic clustering – the
smaller more interdependent hospital members or the larger facilities where service
capacities are concentrated. Trinh et al (2010) found that the efficiency and financial
benefits associated with sharing clinical services accrues to the hospital that receives the
services from a system partner and not to the one that provides the services for system
partners. So at this stage, it appears that hierarchical order among hospitals within a
cluster is an important factor that may impact hospital efficiency and financial
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performance. Additionally, other factors, such as the proximity between same system
hospitals, and the differentiation among the hospitals in terms of size and scope of
services may indicate where the benefits of clustering will accrue.
In addition to the empirical work that uses the Bazzoli et al. (1999) taxonomy or
focuses on local system clusters, there are several other studies that have produced
significant findings related to multi-hospital system membership. The results of these
studies may be combined with the findings of some of the previously discussed studies
and grouped into five categories: market power, lower costs, efficiency, financial
performance, and the quality of care.
System Membership and Market Power
The horizontal integration of independent hospitals into hospital systems
concentrates market power, and allows hospitals that once competed with each other to
align strategically and use their combined size to negotiate with consumers (Luke, 1992).
Increased market power may potentially be harmful to consumers if hospitals use this
power to increase prices and limit patient choice by exerting monopolistic power
(Reardon & Reardon, 1995; Cueller & Gertler, 2005). Thus research in this area
addresses a relevant health policy issue - the tradeoff between cooperation and
competition - and raises anti-trust considerations within the hospital industry.
As expected, research analyzing the effect of system membership on market power
has produced consistent results showing that system hospitals are able to increase prices
more than non-system hospitals (Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Cueller & Gertler, 2005;
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Melnick & Keeler, 2007). Depending on the size of the system cluster, hospitals within a
same-system cluster were able to increase prices 17-34% more than non-system hospitals
(Melnick & Keeler, 2007), and increased prices resulted in higher profits for system
hospitals (Dranove & Shanley, 1995). These results are supported by studies of hospital
mergers which also show that hospital consolidation results in higher prices (Capps &
Dranove, 2004; Krishnan, 2001). In addition to higher prices, system membership also
resulted in increased volume of managed care patients (Cueller & Gertler, 2005) and
reputation enhancement which facilitated marketing and helped attract more patients
(Dranove & Shanley, 1995). More recently the relationship between hospital market
power and higher prices has been called into question by a study that found no significant
relationship between hospital market concentration (measured with a Herfindahl index)
and hospital prices (Moriya et al., 2010). But this study did not directly measure the
relationship of system membership to the ability to increase prices, which may be distinct
from the relationship of overall concentration to higher prices. Ginsburg (2010) found in
a study of eight metropolitan areas that wide variation in hospital prices existed within
and across metropolitan areas that could not be fully explained by hospital concentration.
Differences in perceived hospital quality, hospital reputation, and system membership are
likely reasons for within market price variation not related to hospital concentration
(Ginsburg, 2010). Thus there appears to be a clear and consistent positive relationship
between market power and system membership as reflected by higher prices which may
be linked to increased hospital profits.
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System Membership and Hospital Costs
Membership in a hospital system is believed to lower the production costs of
medical care because common services may be centralized, excess capacity may be
eliminated, and economies of scale may be achieved (Shortell, 1988; Gaynor & Wilson,
1999; Kania, 1993; Luke, 1992). However, research examining the costs of care (usually
measured as costs per discharge, costs per day, or costs per admission) has produced
mixed results. Further confusing the relationship between system membership and
hospital costs is the fact that some researchers refer to differences in hospital costs as
differences in efficiency (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Trinh et al, 2010). To summarize the
relationship between system membership and hospital costs, all studies which use some
sort of average cost as their dependent variable are included here.
Although not the same as systems, earlier work on hospital mergers showed that
hospital consolidation resulted in a 33% decrease in costs per adjusted admission.
However, when mergers and systems were examined together, it was clear that only
mergers resulted in decreased costs (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003). This conclusion is
consistent with other empirical findings that show no relationship between system
membership and hospital costs (Clement et al, 1997; Dranove et al, 1996; Dranove &
Shanley, 1995; Madison, 2004; Cueller & Gertler, 2005). It is notable though that with
the exception of Madison (2004), who examined the effect of local system partners on
AMI treatment, researchers used a simple indicator variable for system membership.
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More recent research focusing on the relationship between service provision at the
system level and hospital costs has produced significant results. Proenca et al (2005)
demonstrated that the sharing of services between system hospitals (i.e. the centralization
of services within a given cluster among same system hospitals) is negatively related to
hospital costs. Trinh et al (2010) found similar results, noting that hospitals which
received services from other system partners had lower costs per day and per discharge.
These results support the assertion that the rational organization of services facilitated by
system membership may lower hospital costs.
System Membership and Hospital Efficiency
Although efficiency may be measured in many different ways, this section
summarizes empirical studies that use either Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to measure hospital efficiency/inefficiency. DEA is a
non-parametric technique used to measure relative productive / technical efficiency, and
SFA is a parametric technique that estimates cost inefficiency based on a specified cost
function. Regardless of the technique used, there is evidence that system membership
does affect efficiency, but the effect is not homogenous for all systems. Thus system
type/attributes must be considered when analyzing efficiency.
Using DEA to examine the efficiency of a national sample of hospitals, Ozcan and
Luke (1993) found an association between non-system hospitals and low efficiency
scores, and showed that system hospitals and contract managed hospitals had higher
efficiency scores overall (Ozcan & Luke, 1993). Subsequent work using DEA scores to
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measure system efficiency took alternative approaches, including distinguishing systems
by using the Bazzoli et al. (1999) taxonomy (Carey, 2003; Rosko et al, 2007), analyzing
the provision of clinical services at the system level (Rosko & Proenca, 2005), and
focusing on the configuration of local system clusters (Sikka et al, 2009). Results from
these studies indicate that sharing services among geographically proximate hierarchical
system partners is positively related to hospital efficiency (Rosko & Proenca, 2005; Sikka
et al, 2009). However, the results from studies using the Bazzoli et al. (1999) taxonomy
do not suggest a clear linear relationship between system centralization and efficiency.
Rather, hospitals in systems with centralized physician/insurance services and
decentralized system hospitals were more efficient than hospitals in centralized systems,
and hospitals in independent systems were the least efficient (Carey, 2003; Rosko et al,
2007). This pattern is neither linear nor curvilinear, and indicates that the Bazzoli et al.
(1999) taxonomy of systems may not clearly represent a continuum from centralized to
decentralized. Or as previously mentioned may not clearly separate systems that
centralize clinical services from systems that centralize other types of logistic and
administrative services, or from completely decentralized systems.
System Membership and Financial Performance
Recent reports on the financial performance of multi-hospital systems show
improving operating profits, especially for for-profit systems (Galloro & Piotrowski,
2002). However, operating profits are only one measure of financial performance. Other
measures that are commonly used to assess hospital performance include return on assets,
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free cash flow, net revenues, and financial ratios that measure liquidity and profitability,
all of which may be affected by either increasing revenue and/or decreasing costs.
Empirical studies that seek to relate these financial performance measures to system
membership indicate that when system hospitals are compared to non-system hospitals,
system hospitals have higher net operating margins (Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Dranove
et al, 1996) and higher net revenues (Clement et al, 1997). Further, this performance
difference may be related to system hospital’s ability to increase prices (Dranove &
Shanley, 1995) and is more pronounced for system hospitals that receive services from
rather than providing services to system partners (Trinh et al, 2010).
System Membership and Medical Care Quality
Since the Institute of Medicine published its landmark reports on medical care
quality at the turn of the millennium, research on quality indicators has increased
dramatically. However, little research has been done that attempts to show that system
membership affects medical care quality. It is believed that system membership could
result in improved care quality by centralizing specialty services in facilities with
sufficient volume to maintain competency, increased use of clinical information systems,
and the sharing of expertise and best practices (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Chukmaitov,
2009) through system-wide quality assurance programs, which is one of the aspects of
“systemness” identified by Shortell (1988).
Initially, empirical work by Cueller & Gertler (2005) did not show any significant
difference in the quality of care between system and non-system hospitals, as measured
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by inpatient mortality, overused procedures, and adverse events. But like other
categories of empirical work previously discussed, system effects became evident when
researchers focused on system attributes. Emphasizing the importance of local partners,
Madison (2004) found that the mortality of AMI patients improved when small rural
hospitals joined a system with a proximate large urban partner. However, this effect was
not observed for urban hospitals with a local partner in the same MSA. Chukmaitov et al.
(2009) also found a system effect on quality when they used the Bazzoli et al. (1999)
taxonomy to analyze inpatient mortality for four medical conditions. They found that
systems which centralize clinical services provided higher quality care as measured by
inpatient mortality, and their findings support the use of the Bazzoli et al. (1999)
taxonomy as a continuum along the characteristic of centralization. And although the
results of two studies may not be held up as definitive, there appears to be some support
to the notion that the centralization of clinical services and the sharing of expertise among
system hospitals can improve medical care quality.
Summary of Research on Multi-Hospital Systems and System Membership
As membership in multi-hospital systems increased during the 1970s and 1980s,
researchers enumerated the potential advantages system membership offered to
individual hospitals (Zuckerman, 1979, 1983). But early research on multi-hospital
systems found little evidence to indicate that system membership positively affected
hospital performance, and lead to the conclusion that the advantages of system
membership had yet to be realized (Shortell, 1988). Another possibility was that a
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system effect really did exist, but was not apparent in health services research which
often used a simple indicator variable for system membership (Rosko et al, 2007). This
study addresses the latter concern. To address this issue, researchers have attempted to
develop comprehensive taxonomies to differentiate among different types of systems
(Alexander & Amburgey, 1987), or focused on specific system attributes which could
lead to greater efficiency, economies of scale, and increased market power (Kania, 1993;
Luke, 1992).
Conceptual work on multi-hospital system research lead to the creation of the
Bazzoli et al. (1999) taxonomy of networks/systems and to a greater focus on local
system clusters (Luke, 1992; Cueller & Gertler, 2003), which have become valuable tools
for systems research. Empirical studies employing the taxonomy (Bazzoli et al, 2000;
Carey, 2003; Rosko et al, 2007; Chukmaitov, 2009) or focusing on structural aspects of
local system clusters (Proenca et al, 2005; Sikka et al, 2009; Trinh et al, 2010; Madison,
2004; Rosko & Proenca, 2005) have clearly shown that a relationship between system
membership and hospital performance does exist. Research shows a consistent positive
relationship between system membership and hospital market power, efficiency, and
financial performance (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Melnick &
Keeler, 2007; Carey, 2003; Trinh et al, 2010; Ozcan & Luke, 1993; Rosko & Proenca,
2005; Rosko et al, 2007; Sikka et al, 2009; Dranove et al, 1996; Clement et al, 1997), and
there is some evidence to suggest that system membership lowers hospital costs and
improves inpatient mortality when clinical services are centralized and shared among
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local system partners (Proenca et al, 2005; Madison, 2004; Chukmaitov, 2009). The
centralization and sharing of clinical services among system hospitals, which is possible
for hospitals that are geographically proximate and have a hierarchical order, is critical to
realizing improved efficiency and financial performance (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Carey,
2003; Trinh et al, 2010; Rosko & Proenca, 2005; Rosko et al, 2007; Sikka et al, 2009).
However, the majority of research on multi-hospital system membership (and all of
the studies mentioned in the preceding section) either focused exclusively on urban
hospitals (Trinh et al, 2010; Dranove & Shanley, 1995; Rosko & Proenca, 2005; Rosko et
al, 2007) or pool urban and rural hospitals together (Bazzoli et al, 2000; Carey, 2003;
Chukmaitov et al., 2009) and thus fail to allow for potential differences in membership
effects between urban and rural hospitals. Research that does not focus on rural hospitals
has limited applicability to rural hospital research (Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b), and
thus it is important to focus on research that deals specifically with rural hospitals.
Rural Hospitals and Multi-Hospital System Membership
Examined against the backdrop of the tumultuous 1980s, multi-hospital system
affiliation was identified as one of several horizontal and vertical integration strategies
that rural hospitals may pursue to improve their chances of survival (Mick et al., 1993)
and was seen as a promising strategy for improving rural hospital financial viability
(Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b). Distinguished from other multi-institutional
arrangements by some form of common ownership, multi-hospital systems generally
have more centralized decision making and exert greater control over subordinate
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facilities than health networks or consortiums (Alexander et al., 2003), which are other
multi-institutional arrangements common in rural areas. Greater centralized control and
participation of the system headquarters in decisions regarding member hospital budgets,
service offerings, facility plans, and capital outlays (Alexander et al., 2003) led
researchers to believe that multi-hospital systems could help rural hospitals overcome
problems associated with obtaining critical resources in rural environments typified by
declining reimbursement, an aging and increasingly unemployed population, faltering
economies, and an inability to attract and retain medical professionals (Berry et al, 1987;
Ermann, 1990; Drain et al., 2000; Yarbrough & Powers, 2006). Research into the
potential effects of multi-hospital system membership on rural hospitals have generally
fallen into three categories: 1) descriptive and/or theoretical papers that describe the
presence of multi-hospital systems in rural areas, propose potential relationships between
membership and performance, and summarize previous empirical work; 2) empirical
studies that analyze system affiliations as their central research question; 3) empirical
studies whose primary focus is not system membership, but find significant system
effects in their analysis. All three types of studies are discussed below.
Descriptive, Theoretical, and Summary Papers
The majority of peer reviewed works on rural hospital system affiliation may be
classified as either descriptive or theoretical in nature. They include studies that describe
the different types and incidences of multi-hospital affiliations in rural communities
(Lewis & Parent, 1986; Reardon, 1996), highlight multi-hospital system affiliation as a
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strategy employed by rural hospitals to prevent closure and improve financial viability
(Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985a, 1985b; Smith & Piland, 1990; Seavey & Berry, 1986),
summarize previous empirical work on the effects of system membership (Moscovice &
Rosenblatt, 1985b; Mick & Morlock, 1990), or offer a prescription for rural system
affiliation / partnership (Grim, 1986; Zismer & Hoffman, 1995; Porter & Teisberg, 2006).
The purely descriptive studies chronicle the increasing number of system affiliated
rural hospitals and describe the types of affiliations that are most prominent (Lewis &
Parent, 1986; Reardon, 1996). Particular interest is paid to the increasing activity of forprofit, investor owned systems in rural areas during the 1980s (Lewis & Parent, 1986)
and concern that investor owned systems will eliminate excess capacity in or close rural
hospitals which they acquire (Reardon, 1996). However, the majority of system owned
rural hospitals are non-profit, and perhaps the more relevant assertions from these studies
are that systems are more likely to emphasize cost containment strategies, system
membership may help rural hospitals attract and retain medical and administrative
personnel, and system membership provides greater access to knowledge and resources
that help reduce costs and increase profits (Reardon, 1996; Lewis & Parent, 1986).
These assertions are more closely related to the hypotheses found in empirical
research and are mentioned as some of the reasons that rural hospitals would pursue
system affiliation as a strategic response to a challenging environment (Moscovice &
Rosenblatt, 1985a, 1985b; Seavey & Berry, 1986; Smith & Piland, 1990). Viewed as a
trade of autonomy for access to scarce resources (Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b,
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Zuckerman, 1983), several authors have examined rural hospital system affiliation
through the theoretical lens of resource dependence (Mick et al, 1993; Berry et al., 1987;
Alexander & Morrisey, 1989). Resource dependence theory postulates that when
organizations experience great uncertainty associated with obtaining critical resources,
they will respond by taking action to decrease uncertainty which may include altering
their relationships with other organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). All else being
equal, organizations would prefer to remain autonomous and obtain necessary resources
without becoming overly dependent on other organizations, but when they lack the
organizational power to obtain resources for themselves, they will trade autonomy for
access to scarce resources. Hesitant at first to give up local autonomy (Moscovice &
Rosenblatt, 1985b; Seavey & Berry, 1986) many rural hospitals joined local networks or
voluntary consortia (Broyles et al., 1998; Mick et al, 1993) or opted for less constraining
forms of system affiliation, such as contract management (Lewis & Parent, 1986;
Alexander & Morrisey, 1989). But as environmental uncertainty persists rural hospitals
are increasingly willing to trade their autonomy for access to scarce resources by joining
a system. The potential advantages of doing so are improved financial performance
(Smith & Piland, 1990), the realization of economies of scale, increased productivity,
better staffing, and improved access to capital financing (Moscovice & Rosenblatt,
1985b).
But summaries of previous empirical research conclude that these potential
advantages have not been realized by rural hospitals (Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b;
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Mick & Morlock, 1990) or throughout the hospital industry in general (Shortell, 1988).
Closer inspection of these summaries reveals that they actually reference only one
empirical study specifically about rural hospital system membership [Mick and Morlock
(1990) reference the Berry et al. (1987) study]. The other empirical works cited in these
summaries are studies with samples containing only urban hospitals or a mix of urban
and rural hospitals. Thus there appears to be a dearth of evidence supporting or rejecting
the proposed advantages of rural hospital system membership.
Additionally, the empirical work on rural system membership does not appear to
account for the recommendations of what may be called prescriptive writings on rural
hospital system affiliation and health system organization. These writings specifically
mention the potential benefits of rural hospitals partnering with nearby urban hospitals /
hospital systems (Grim, 1986; Zismer & Hoffman, 1995; Porter & Teisberg, 2006).
These authors assert that the most beneficial system relationships for rural hospitals are
those where rural hospitals that are in close proximity to an urban area join or create a
partnership with a hospital / system in that urban area. Such partnerships could benefit
rural hospitals and would include visiting specialty clinics, capital investments by the
urban partner in the rural hospital physical plant and clinical/information technology, and
collective managed care and HMO bargaining activities (Zismer & Hoffman, 1995).
Rural hospitals would not operate as isolated, stand-alone organizations, but would
become part of local / regional systems where the system could rationalize and centralize
hospital services, removing the bias toward local care which has lead independent rural
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hospitals to attempt to meet all of the needs of the local community (Porter & Teisburg,
2006). Such arrangements would be beneficial for both the rural and urban facilities, and
could result in greater financial stability, improved quality of care, and effective use of
health care resources for rural hospitals (Grim, 1986). These types of rural-urban
partnerships have not been explicitly considered in the body of empirical work on rural
system membership, which is fairly small.
Empirical Studies on the Effects of System Membership / Affiliation
Focusing only on those papers that deal specifically with rural hospitals reduces the
number of empirical studies on the effects of system membership to five: Berry et al,
1987; Halpern et al, 1992; Mick et al., 1993 and 1994; Trinh & Begun, 1999. Using both
pre-PPS (Berry et al., 1987) and post-PPS data (Halpern et al., 1992; Mick et al., 1993
and 1994; Trinh & Begun, 1999) these five studies examine the affect of system
membership on hospital performance and survival (Berry et al., 1987; Halpern et al.,
1992), system membership as one of several organizational strategies that may impact
hospital financial performance (Mick et al., 1993 and 1994), and system membership as
an organizational pressure that influences hospitals’ choice of cost containment or
revenue enhancement strategies (Trinh & Begun, 1999).
In 1987, Berry, Tucker, and Seavey published a study that examined the effects of
system ownership and/or management on rural hospital performance. Berry and Seavey
had previously published a descriptive study on the strategic responses of rural hospitals
in New Hampshire and Kentucky to the challenges they faced in the 1980s. In that study
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they identified multi-hospital system affiliation as a strategy that could improve the
viability of rural hospitals, and the next logical step was to explore the validity of that
observation through empirical research. Their 1987 paper used a national sample of rural
hospitals that they categorized as either being independent self-managed hospitals,
independent system-managed hospitals, or system owned and managed hospitals. Using
resource dependence theory as the theoretical framework, Berry et al. proposed that
hospital performance was determined by organizational characteristics, environmental
characteristics, and the adaptive strategy chosen by the hospital. Ownership by a multihospital system was identified as an adaptive strategy that was distinct from being
contract managed or remaining independent. The primary organizational characteristic
explored was size and several environmental variables such as per capita income,
physicians per 100,000 persons, the unemployment rate, and the percent of persons over
65 were used to judge the degree of support the local environment provided the hospital.
The primary performance measure was inpatient occupancy, and secondary performance
measures included JCAHO accreditation, average costs per admission and per patient
day, and services offered by the hospital.
The primary findings of the study were that hospitals in more supportive
environments performed better than those in less supportive environments, larger
hospitals (over 50 beds) performed better than smaller hospitals (under 50 beds), and that
there was no clear relationship between system ownership and hospital performance.
This conclusion about the effect of system ownership was largely based on the primary
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performance measure of inpatient occupancy, but there were some significant differences
in the secondary performance measures. System owned hospitals were more likely to be
accredited by JCAHO, had a shorter average length of stay (ALOS), had lower bed
staffing levels, and had higher costs per patient day but lower costs per admission than
independent self-managed and system-managed hospitals. Further, the authors also
found that system owned hospitals were located in more supportive communities
characterized by faster growing populations and fewer beds per 1,000 people.
Although the general conclusion by Berry et al. (1987) is that no system related
performance difference exists, it may be inferred from their results that system owned
facilities are more effective at controlling costs (fewer FTEs per bed, lower ALOS, and
lower cost per admission) than independent rural hospitals, and system affiliation may
help to enhance the quality reputation of rural hospitals (increased JCAHO accreditation),
which has traditionally been perceived as lower than that of urban hospitals (Reardon,
1996; Yarbrough & Powers, 2006; Li et al., 2007). These findings support the idea that
system membership could affect the efficiency and financial performance of rural
hospitals. Fewer FTEs per bed could directly affect efficiency measures, and a greater
emphasis on cost control could affect a hospital’s bottom line. Additionally, an improved
reputation for quality often signaled by JCAHO accreditation could lead to increased
patient volume by reducing the “outshopping” behavior of local residents.
Realizing that implementation of the PPS disproportionately affected rural hospitals
and threatened their financial viability; Halpern et al (1992) used post-PPS data to
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analyze the effect of multi-hospital system membership on rural hospital survival. They
proposed that affiliation with a multi-hospital system could be interpreted as a survival
strategy employed by struggling rural hospitals. Seeking to address methodological
issues which include failure to account for system type and the absence of environmental
/ organizational conditions that would favor system affiliation, the study pays particular
attention to the ownership of the system and conducts analysis to determine if hospital
characteristics moderate system membership effects.
The results of the study are stratified by system ownership type, separating the
effects of for-profit systems from those of non-profit systems. Using a Cox proportional
hazards model to estimate the likelihood of hospital closure, Halpern et al. (1992) found
that rural hospitals that join investor-owned systems are more likely to close than
hospitals that are not affiliated with a system. While this finding runs counter to the idea
that system affiliation provides access to scarce resources for distressed hospitals, the
researchers note that this may be attributable to the fact that investor-owned systems are
more aggressive at reducing excess hospital capacity and thus improving the operating
environment for all of the remaining hospitals. Additionally, the authors report
moderating effects for hospital size and prior performance, which show that large size
increases the likelihood that hospitals in for-profit systems will close and poor prior
financial performance decreases the likelihood that hospitals in for-profit systems will
close (Halpern et al, 1992). Making the assumption that large rural hospitals are more
likely to have excess capacity, these results somewhat support the author’s supposition
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that for-profit systems are more active at reducing excess capacity, and also indicate that
systems really do provide critical resources to hospitals that are in distress.
Another important finding from this study is that there is a selection effect for forprofit hospital systems. Realizing that affiliation with a multi-hospital system is a twoway decision requiring the consent of both the rural hospital and the system, Halpern et al
(1992) analyze their data to determine if there is a selection effect for hospital systems.
Although not specified as a directional hypothesis, the authors posit that the hospitals that
join systems may be systematically different from those that do not join systems. They
also recognize that this may be a function of the choice made by the rural hospitals (i.e.,
which hospitals choose to surrender their autonomy in exchange for membership) or the
multi-hospital system (i.e., which hospitals do the systems accept into their system).
Once again splitting the hospital systems by ownership type, the results of the analysis
reveal that there is no selection effect for non-profit systems, but poorer performing
hospitals are more likely to join for-profit systems (Halpern et al, 1992). However, there
are no data to indicate if this is a function of distressed hospitals choosing for-profit
systems that can supply resources or for-profit systems choosing poor performing
hospitals where they can improve performance quickly.
Mick et al. (1993 and 1994) examined multiple horizontal and vertical integration
strategies of rural hospitals, which included multi-hospitals system membership. Using a
resource dependence framework similar to that of Berry et al (1987), Mick and
colleagues first related various rural hospital strategies to the environmental
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characteristics of munificence, complexity, and dynamism (Mick et al., 1993) and then
analyzed the effect of the chosen strategy or strategies on hospital financial performance,
which was measured by total margin and current ratio (Mick et al., 1994). Multihospital
system ownership was one of four horizontal integration strategies (the other three were
group purchasing, voluntary consortia, and merger) hypothesized to be negatively related
to environmental munificence, positively related to environmental dynamism, and not
related to the complexity of the environment. The authors note that horizontal strategies
may offer hospitals located in areas with high turbulence (complexity) and scarce
resources (low munificence) a chance to achieve economies of scale, reduce redundant
services, and access greater managerial talent and capital investment (Mick et al., 1993).
However, the results of the first paper did not support the directional hypotheses relating
horizontal integration strategies to environmental munificence and complexity. Similarly
the second paper (Mick et al., 1994), which hypothesized that rural hospital strategic
management activity would positively influence financial performance, did not reveal
any widespread nor consistent relationship between hospital strategy and financial
performance. Further, the only significant coefficients related to multi-hospital system
affiliation indicated a negative short-term relationship between hospital current ratio and
the strategy of system membership. Thus the combined results of the two Mick et al.
studies do little to support the assertion that system membership effects hospital financial
performance.
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A somewhat different type of study is the paper by Trinh & Begun (1999), which
examines the effect of organizational and environmental pressures on rural hospital
strategy. Multi-hospital system membership is identified as one of two organizational
pressures (the other is non-government control) that potentially influence a hospital’s
choice of either cost containment or revenue enhancement strategies. The environmental
pressures that are measured in the study are the munificence and competition of the local
market and the Medicare reimbursement policy for the state in which the hospital
operates. The authors hypothesize that system membership and more restrictive
Medicare reimbursement will be positively associated with cost containment strategies
while munificence, competition, and government control are positively related to revenue
enhancement strategies. The results from the study support the hypothesized
relationships, and also indicate that organizational pressures like system membership
have a greater influence over rural hospitals’ choice of strategy than environmental
pressures. Trinh and Begun elaborate on this point by speculating that the actual
relationship between organizational and environmental pressures is more complicated
than portrayed in their model. Environmental pressures may first influence
organizational characteristics which then influence strategy (Trinh & Begun, 1999).
These findings support the work of Berry et al (1987) who also found a link between
system membership and cost containment, and suggest that environmental characteristics
and organizational characteristics must be considered simultaneously to assess the effects
of organizational differences like system membership on performance.
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Considered together, these five studies offer some support for a relationship between
rural hospital system membership and hospital performance. Even though the results of
Mick et al. (1993 & 1994) lead to the conclusion that no consistent relationship exists, the
other three papers indicate that system membership is associated with a greater emphasis
on cost containment and the reduction of excess capacity (Berry et al., 1987; Trinh &
Begun, 1999; Halpern et al., 1992), and Berry et al. (1987) found bed staffing and
accreditation effects that could contribute to a hospital’s efficiency and/or financial
performance. Additionally, there are more recent studies on rural referral centers (RRCs)
and rural hospital health information technology (HIT), which contain significant
findings related to system membership. These findings add to the evidence that supports
a link between system membership and hospital performance.
Other Empirical Studies on Rural Hospitals with Relevant Findings
Although not specifically focused on the effects of system membership, recent
papers analyzing the financial performance of RRCs (McCue, 2007) and the adoption of
HIT by rural hospitals (Menachemi et al., 2005) offer support for the assertion that
system membership positively affects rural hospital efficiency and financial performance.
Analysis of RRCs indicates that system owned hospitals had lower costs per adjusted
discharge and lower salary expenses (measured as a percentage of operating expenses)
than non-system hospitals. Because RRCs are a special type of rural hospital, these
results may not be generalized to the population of rural hospitals, but offer general
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support to the conclusion that system membership is related to a greater emphasis on cost
containment (Berry et al., 1987; Trinh & Begun, 1999).
Research on HIT adoption in rural hospitals reveals another way that system
membership may positively affect rural hospital economic performance. Citing a lack of
financial resources and access to capital for HIT investment (Bahensky et al., 2008), rural
hospitals have lagged behind their urban counterparts in the use of IT applications and
clinical technological devices (Culler et al., 2006). However, system owned rural
hospitals were significantly more likely to have information systems than their standalone counterparts, and were less likely to cite financial barriers as a reason for not
adopting HIT (Menachemi et al., 2005). This finding was supported by Li et al. (2008)
who noted that system membership was positively associated with electronic medical
record adoption in small hospitals, which are disproportionately rural. Greater use of
HIT in system owned rural hospitals indicates that system ownership does result in
greater access to capital resources / financing, which is often mentioned as a potential
advantage of system membership (Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b; Mick & Morlock,
1990; Mick et al., 1993). Further, increased use of HIT has been shown to improve
physician and nurse time utilization, increase provider productivity and lower staffing
requirements (Kaushal, 2006; Mekhjian, 2002; Evans, 2006; Hillestad, 2005). Thus
system membership may positively affect hospital efficiency through the mechanism of
greater HIT utilization.
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Summary and Critique of Systems Research
Research on rural hospital system membership includes descriptive and theoretical
works that chronicle the growing number of system owned rural hospitals (Reardon,
1996; Lewis & Parent, 1986) and describe the potential advantages that system
membership may provide (Moscovice & Rosenblatt, 1985b; Alexander & Amburgey,
1987; Zuckerman, 1983). Summaries of existing research generally conclude that these
advantages have not been realized (Mick & Morlock, 1990), but close examination of the
few empirical studies that do exist on rural hospital system membership provide some
support for the hypothesis that system ownership may positively affect rural hospital
economic performance through emphasis on cost containment, increased accreditation,
and more efficient staffing (Berry et al., 1987; Trinh & Begun, 1999). Additionally,
more recent studies on the financial performance of RRCs and HIT adoption by rural
hospitals support the cost containment and staffing findings of the previous studies
(McCue, 2007) and indicate that system ownership does provide rural hospitals greater
access to investment capital.
However, these results are based on only a few empirical studies, and the ones that
focus specifically on system membership are more than 10 years old (Berry et al., 1987;
Halpern et al., 1992; Mick et al., 1993 & 1994; Trinh & Begun, 1999). A review of The
Journal of Rural Health, the primary journal for rural health research, reveals that there
have not been any empirical articles specifically about rural hospital system membership
in 15 years. Two potential explanations for this are that early conclusions that system
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ownership did not affect performance discouraged other research, or that researchers
interested in structural changes to rural hospitals focused on conversion to CAH status,
which is a more recent and easily identifiable change in the rural hospital population.
Regardless of the reason, research on rural hospital system membership is dated and may
not adequately represent the current reality.
Additionally, the research that does exist does not reflect recent conceptual advances
in systems research that account for structural and functional characteristics such as the
centralization of common support services, the geographic proximity of system partners,
the presence or absence of hierarchical order among member hospitals, and the provision
of clinical services at the system level. Use of the Bazzoli et al., (1999) taxonomy and a
focus on local hospital clusters and system partners has produced more significant results
than previous work that used an indicator variable for system membership. However, it
may not be appropriate to use the Bazzoli et al. taxonomy to study rural hospitals. The
taxonomy was developed using a mixed sample of urban and rural hospitals, in which the
majority of system hospitals were in urban areas (Bazzoli et al., 1999). Therefore the
taxonomy may be overly influenced by the characteristics of urban hospitals / systems
which would limit its applicability to the rural environment. Further, empirical results
using the taxonomy do not clearly indicate if it represents a continuum of systems
ordered along the construct of centralization (Carey, 2003; Rosko et al., 2007;
Chukmaitov, 2009), making it difficult to form directional hypotheses using the
taxonomy. A better approach may be to apply the thinking of researchers that analyze
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local system clusters (Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Kania, 1993; Luke, 1992), by focusing on
the geographic proximity and hierarchical order of system partners that enable the
centralization and integration of clinical and support services.
Previous research on rural hospital system membership has also been criticized for
not considering the significance of economic, structural, and environmental conditions
that may determine when system affiliation is most appropriate (Halpern et al., 1992).
While it is common to use organizational characteristics in hospital research and the use
of resource dependence theory has lead to the inclusion of environmental factors (Berry
et al., 1987; Mick et al., 1993, 1994) in systems research, these variables have primarily
been employed as control variables, used to divide hospitals or systems into categories, or
combined with system membership to create interaction terms (Halpern et al, 1992).
Methodologically this allows researchers to better isolate the main effect associated with
system membership (control variables), stratify the main effect across the levels of a
given characteristic (categorization), or show that a main effect is moderated by a given
characteristic (interaction term), but does not show when system membership would be
most appropriate / beneficial. In order to predict and then show when system
membership is most appropriate, a contingency approach that matches different
combinations of environmental and organizational characteristics to system membership
should be used (Smith & Piland, 1990). None of the currently published studies on rural
hospital system membership use such an approach.
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Finally, the creation of the Flex program and the conversion of rural hospitals to
CAH status is a major structural change in the rural hospital population that has not been
considered by the existing research on rural hospital system membership. Most research
on rural hospital system membership was conducted prior to 1999, so the phenomenon of
CAH conversion was not addressed. Further, more recent studies of multi-hospital
systems tend to focus on urban hospitals where CAH status is not a significant issue.
However, in the rural hospital population CAH conversion is a significant issue that
affects the structure and financial performance of rural hospitals, and must be considered
in any study of rural hospital performance.
CAH Status and Multi-Hospital System Membership
Studies on the effect of CAH conversion have shown that conversion significantly
effects financial performance (Li et al., 2009a; Younis, 2006), the quality/safety of care
(Li et al, 2007), cost inefficiency (Rosko & Mutter, 2010), and production efficiency
(Harrison et al., 2009). Additionally, the presence of a CAH in a rural community has
been shown to effect patient flows and transfer rates between rural and urban areas (Basu
& Mobley, 2010; Wakefield et al, 2006). Thus CAH conversion has been shown to affect
the same dependent variables (efficiency and financial performance) that are used in this
study, and may significantly alter the interaction between rural and urban system
partners.
Looking first at the studies on financial performance, researchers have shown that
conversion to CAH status is good for a hospital’s bottom line. Conversion to CAH status

63
is associated with increased revenues, expenses, and profit margins (Li et al., 2009a), and
hospitals converting to CAH status increased their profit margins more than any other
type of hospital in the BBA implementation period (Younis, 2006). This makes intuitive
sense since a large percentage of CAH reimbursement is guaranteed to be at 101% of
costs. However, it is not completely clear how this could alter the effects of system
membership, which has been associated with increased profit margins (Trinh et al, 2010;
Dranove et al, 1996; Dranove & Shanley, 1995). System membership has been
associated with increased market power, which allows system hospitals to increase prices
more than non-system hospitals (Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Melnick & Keeler, 2007). But
CAHs have a much larger percentage of Medicare patients than non-CAH rural hospitals
(Rosko & Mutter, 2010), and Medicare reimbursement is fixed at 101% of costs. CAHs
have a smaller percentage of private pay patients for which they can negotiate payment
rates, and thus the positive financial contribution from price increases associated with
system membership may be smaller for CAHs than for other rural hospitals.
CAH status has also been shown to significantly affect hospital efficiency. Harrison
et al. (2009) used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the change in CAH
efficiency over a two year period (2005-2006). Using a windows analysis, the
researchers determined that CAH efficiency increased from 60% to 66% over the two
year period. However, they did not have a non-CAH comparison group in their study, so
it cannot be determined if this increase in production efficiency is greater or less than the
change in efficiency of other rural hospitals or all hospitals in general. A more recent
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study by Rosko & Mutter (2010) did contain a comparison group of rural PPS hospitals,
and compared the cost inefficiency of CAH hospitals to rural PPS hospitals over a multiyear period. Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), they found greater cost
inefficiency in critical access hospitals compared to PPS rural hospitals in a 34 state
sample. They offer this as evidence that cost-based reimbursement under the Flex
program essentially removes the efficiency incentives inherent in the PPS program and
leads to greater cost inefficiency (Rosko & Mutter, 2010). Thus, conversion to CAH
status leads to greater inefficiency while system membership has been shown to lead to
greater efficiency (Ozcan & Luke, 1993; Trinh et al., 2010; Rosko & Proenca, 2005;
Rosko et al, 2007). However, the mechanisms for these two effects are not completely
clear. Studies on rural hospital system membership indicate that system membership
leads to a greater emphasis on cost containment strategies, which is reflected in lower
costs per admission/discharge and leaner staffs (Trinh & Begun, 1999; Berry et al.,
1987), but studies on CAH efficiency did not clearly identify a mechanism that made
CAHs more inefficient than non-CAH rural hospitals. Rosko & Mutter (2010) simply
observe that inefficiency is positively correlated with the length of time that a hospital
has held CAH status. This leads them to conclude that cost based reimbursement
removes the incentive to control costs. But what is unclear is which logic will dominate
the behavior of a rural hospital that is both a member of a system and a CAH. If systems
really do stress efficiency and cost containment, then they could prevent the adverse
effect of cost based reimbursement on efficiency postulated by Rosko & Mutter (2010).
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Perhaps of more importance are the ways in which CAH status can potentially affect
the transfer behavior of rural hospitals and the flow of patients between rural and urban
areas. Prescriptive writings on rural hospital system membership have emphasized the
importance of connecting rural hospitals with urban partners and noted the ways in which
such partnerships could benefit both hospitals (Grim, 1986; Zismer & Hoffman, 1995;
Porter & Teisberg, 2006). If the rural hospital were a CAH, this relationship could be
even more beneficial.
In a study of rural hospital ICUs, Wakefield et al. (2006) found that CAHs had
greater transfer rates of ICU and non-ICU patients than non-CAHs. Thinking of a patient
transfer as a transaction between two organizations, Transaction Cost Economics theory
indicates that hierarchies (i.e. common ownership of the two organizations conducting
the transaction) are the preferred organizational form as transaction frequency increases
(Williamson, 1975). Assuming that most transfers would occur between hospitals of
different size (i.e., a smaller rural hospital would transfer to a larger hospital with more
services and inpatient capacity), it is logical to conclude that the increased transfer rates
of CAHs would mean that they gain the greatest benefit from a hierarchical relationship
with a proximate larger hospital, which would most likely be located in an urban area.
Thus CAH status may enhance the benefits of rural-urban partnerships.
There is also evidence that conversion to CAH status affects the bypass behavior
reported in many rural areas. Sometimes referred to as “outshopping”, the practice of
rural residents bypassing their local hospital reduces rural hospital patient volume and
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hurts their financial viability (Baldwin et al., 2008; Radcliff et al.; 2003; Saunders et al.,
2009). System membership has been shown to increase a hospital’s ability to market
itself and provides reputation benefits (Dranove et al., 1996; Dranove & Shanley, 1995),
which may help rural hospitals capture more of their local patients. This effect may be
magnified by CAH status. In a 2010 study, Basu & Mobley found that the presence of a
CAH reduced the bypass behavior of rural residents in California and New York.
Together, these findings may indicate an additive effect of system membership and CAH
status on bypass behavior. A significant reduction in bypass behavior could increase the
volume of patients treated at rural hospitals allowing them to become more efficient and
profitable.
Literature Synthesis and Gap Addressed by this Study
The formation of multi-hospital systems represents one of the largest structural
changes to the hospital industry over the past 50 years. As the number of hospitals
affiliated with systems increased, system advocates and health services researchers
asserted that health systems could instill some order to the patchwork of independent
hospitals and providers that constituted the health care industry in the United States.
Drawing on earlier writings that outlined the beneficial characteristics of centrally
planned systems, it was believed that multi-hospital systems could rationally organize the
provision of services and improve patient care by centralizing and integrating medical
services among the hospitals in a given region. However, empirical work found little
support to indicate that systems actually accomplished this.
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Still, when the PPS was implemented in the mid 1980s, disproportionately affecting
the reimbursement and financial viability of rural hospitals, system membership was
postulated to be a survival strategy for struggling rural hospitals. By providing greater
access to capital resources, leverage in bargaining with managed care organizations, and
assistance in securing necessary clinical and administrative staff, multi-hospital systems
could improve the performance and financial viability of rural hospitals. Yet, once again
there is not a lot of empirical research to support these claims. The few existing studies
that do examine the effect of system membership on rural hospitals indicate that system
membership results in increased emphasis on cost control, lower average costs per
discharge, and lower staff expenses. Additionally, more recent studies on RRCs and the
use of HIT in rural hospitals offer some support for the hypotheses that system
membership can improve financial viability and access to technology. But the majority
of these studies are more than 10 years old and may not accurately reflect the current
reality of the rural hospital population.
More recently hospital systems research has primarily focused on urban hospitals or
used national samples that mix urban and rural hospitals together. While the results of
these studies have limited applicability to the rural environment, it is important to note
that significant results have been obtained largely due to conceptual / methodological
advances that have not been applied to studies of rural system membership. The creation
of an over-arching taxonomy of systems and a focus on the configuration of local system
clusters have allowed researchers to find significant relationships between system
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membership and market power, efficiency, financial performance, and inpatient
mortality. But these tools have not been applied to the population of rural hospitals, and
it may not be appropriate to apply a taxonomy developed using a sample of urban and
rural hospitals to a study of purely rural hospitals. A preferred technique would be to use
the logic of local system clusters, which stresses geographic proximity and hierarchical
order among system partners, to the study of rural hospital system membership. A focus
on such system structural characteristics would facilitate the use of a contingency
approach which links environmental and organization/system structural characteristics
together to determine when system membership may be most beneficial to rural hospitals.
Additionally, due to the age of the existing studies of rural hospital system
membership, the effects of conversion to CAH status have not been considered in
systems research. Conversion to CAH status is a significant event that results in
structural and behavioral changes to rural hospitals, and may interact with the effect of
system membership on hospital financial and efficiency measures. Further, CAH
conversion affects rural hospital patient transfer rates and rural patient bypass behavior,
potentially enhancing the importance of urban-rural system partnerships advocated by
several writers.
Viewed as a whole, there is a clear gap in the body of research on multi-hospital
system membership. Research on the effects of rural hospital system membership is
dated, has not benefited from recent advances in the larger body of systems research, and
the important characteristic of CAH status has not been explicitly considered. This study
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seeks to address this gap in the literature by using a contingency theory framework which
considers the geographic proximity and hierarchical order of system partners as well as
CAH status, to focus explicitly on the effects of system membership on rural hospitals.

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual model for this study is based on contingency theory, and models
rural hospital performance as an outcome that is significantly affected by the fit between
the hospital environment and the structure of the system to which it belongs. This
chapter not only presents the conceptual model for the study, but also discusses the
theory on which it is based and the hypotheses which are derived from the model. The
first section of the chapter provides a brief overview of contingency theory and discusses
why it was chosen over other theories for this study. Next, the contingent relationships
which pair environmental/hospital contingencies with multi-hospital system structural
characteristics are presented and discussed. Then these contingent relationships are
aggregated and the complete conceptual model is presented. Finally, the hypotheses that
flow out of the conceptual model are stated.
An Overview of Contingency Theory
Contingency theory was developed in the 1960s to study questions related to
organizational performance (Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson,
1967). Sometimes referred to as structural contingency theory, it contains the basic
paradigm that organizational performance depends on an organization’s ability to fit its
structure to contingencies that reflect the situation of the organization (Donaldson, 2001).
Underlying this paradigm are three basic assumptions: 1) there is no one best way to
70
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organize for every situation; 2) different ways of organizing are not equally effective for
a given situation; and 3) for a given situation, the best way to organize depends on the
dominant environmental characteristic (Thompson, 1967). Thus contingency theory is
fundamentally different from universalistic theories that associate higher organizational
performance to the maximum level of a given environmental or structural variable
(Donaldson, 2001). Contingency theory argues that organizational performance depends
upon the degree of fit between environment and organization, which implies that
organizations with different structures may perform equally as well in different situations.
This makes the identification of contingent relationships that pair environmental
contingencies with organization characteristics central to contingency theory research.
One formulation of the theory, which grew out of industrial organization economics,
uses the constructs of complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence to describe the work
an organization performs and the constructs of differentiation, centralization, and
coordination to describe organizational structure (Scott & Davis, 2007). These constructs
are paired together in contingent relationships (complexity with differentiation,
uncertainty with centralization, and interdependence with coordination) and performance
depends on the degree of “fit” between the two sets of constructs. The basic directional
propositions are that greater complexity of inputs requires greater organizational
differentiation, greater uncertainty of inputs requires less centralized decision making,
and greater interdependence of work processes requires more coordination mechanisms
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to achieve integration of work effort. However, not all authors focus on these three
contingent relationships.
Donaldson (1995, 2001) asserts that the most prominent contingencies that must be
considered by an organization are environmental stability, organizational size, and
strategy. Once again, these three contingencies are paired with the organizational
characteristics of mechanistic structure, bureaucratic structure, and divisional structure, to
form contingent relationships. The directional propositions associated with these
contingencies are that environmental stability (often referred to as environmental
uncertainty) is negatively related to a mechanistic structure (Burns & Stalker, 1961),
organizational size is positively related to organizational bureaucracy (Childs, 1975), and
strategic diversification is positively related to a divisional structure (as opposed to a
functional structure) (Chandler, 1962). Although none of these propositions directly
contradicts the ones in the preceding paragraph, it is easy to see why the lack of
consistency among contingency theorists in terms of explicitly stated directional
propositions is one of the major criticisms of the theory (Schoonhoven, 1981). However,
what is more important than enumerating the various propositions that have been posited
by different authors is identifying the core ideas that underlie all correct statements of the
theory.
Summarized by Donaldson (2001), contingency theory contains three core ideas.
First, there is a relationship between contingency and structure. Regardless of the
contingency or contingencies identified in a given work, there is a theoretical relationship
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between a given contingency and its corresponding structural characteristic. Second,
contingency change causes organizational structural change. This is an important core
idea that relates to the notion of causality, and implies that contingency change occurs
before organizational structural change. Finally, the third core idea is that fit affects
performance. Performance is not determined by the level of one or more environmental
or organizational variables, but by how well the level of the organizational variable fits
the environmental contingency. Thus the calculation of the degree of fit or congruence
between organizational structure and environmental contingency (or contingencies) is
central to empirical work using contingency theory.
Casting aside specific contingent relationships and focusing on these three core ideas
results in a much more general statement of the theory that says that organizational
performance depends on the degree of fit or congruence between the dominant
environmental characteristic(s) and the structure of the organization (Donaldson, 1995;
Scott & Davis, 2007). The specification of the contingent relationships and the definition
of performance are left up to the researcher, and depend on the organization being
studied. This allows researchers to tailor the theory to a specific research problem or
question, and is one of the advantages of using contingency theory as the theoretical
framework for this study. Additional advantages of using contingency theory rather than
other prominent organization theories such as resource dependence, population ecology,
or transaction cost economics, are its focus on performance, its depiction of
organizational leaders as rational actors, and the central role of the concept of “fit”.
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Focus on Performance
Searching through the organizational theory toolbox, contingency theory is the only
theory explicitly developed to explain variations in organizational performance.
Although other major theories have been used to study organizational performance, a
quick look at the origins of these theories reveals that they were developed to address
fundamental questions other than performance. Transaction cost economics seeks to
explain why organizations exist instead of just markets (Williamson, 1975, 1981).
Institutional theory focuses on why organizations are the same (Dimaggio and Powell,
1983). Population ecology examines the role of inertia and environmental selection to
explain the birth and death rates within a population of organizations (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977). Resource dependence focuses on how organizations manage
interdependent relationships to secure necessary resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
While all of these theories are open theories that consider the interaction of the
organization and its environment, none of them were developed to explain why some
organizations perform better than others.
Contingency theory is different. It was specifically developed with organizational
performance in mind (Donaldson, 2001). Faced with the reality that organizational
performance varies within a given industry, researchers and theorists were left with one
of two choices: 1) to conclude that performance differences were completely random; or
2) that variations in performance are not random and can be explained. Considering that
the goal of organization theory is to reduce the complexity of the empirical world through
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explanation and prediction (Bacharach, 1989), theorists clearly chose the second option
and developed contingency theory, which has been the dominant organizational theory
for studying organizational design and performance (Tosi and Slocum, 1984; Drazin and
Van de Ven, 1985; Scott, 1990). So in a study of rural hospital performance, it is most
appropriate to use the one theory that was developed to study organizational performance
rather than adapting another organization theory to this purpose.
Room for Agency
Contingency theory acknowledges the role of organizational leaders and allows
room for the idea that their actions may significantly have an impact on organizational
performance. As opposed to other major organization theories, which minimize the
importance of organizational leaders / actors (population ecology and institutional theory)
or attribute their actions to goals other than increasing organizational performance/
efficiency (resource dependence), contingency theory portrays organizational leaders as
rational actors who modify the structure of the organization to achieve better
performance. It is important to note that this does not mean that organizational leaders
are prescient or omniscient. Indeed they are “boundedly rational” (March and Simon,
1993) but to the extent that they understand the environment and can identify ways to
adapt organizational structure, they will choose the best alternative in order to improve
performance.
This notion of rational actors is contained in the “structural adaptation to regain fit”
(SARFIT) model proposed by Donaldson (1995 and 2001). The SARFIT model posits
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that organizations actively seek to maintain fit with the environment by adapting
organizational structure. When the degree of fit is high, organizational performance is
high and the organizational structure is stable. As the environment changes, fit worsens,
organizational performance declines, and, once performance has declined a noticeable
amount, organizational leaders will take action to change the organization and regain fit.
This is a cyclic process that is repeated throughout the life of an organization.
This rational view of organizational leaders who take action in response to poor
organizational performance seems to accurately represent the reality of rural hospitals,
where the pursuit of system membership is seen as a strategic response to environmental
challenges that negatively affected rural hospital performance and threatened their
survival (Yarbrough & Powers, 2006; Alexander & Amburgey, 1987; Mick et al, 1993;
Reardon, 1996). However, it is important to note that joining a multi-hospital system is
not simply the decision of the rural hospital leadership. In order to form a union, both the
leaders of the system and the leaders of the rural hospital have to be involved, thus it is
most likely the case that not all rural hospitals that want to be part of a system achieve
this goal. Regardless, a rational view of hospital leaders most accurately represents the
reality of their actions, even if those actions are unproductive.
The Concept of Fit
The concept of fit, which is central to contingency theory, does not assume a
universal positive or negative effect for system membership. Previous studies that have
concluded that no consistent or significant relationship between system membership and
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rural hospital performance exists (Mick et al, 1994; Berry et al, 1987), have
acknowledged heterogeneity among rural hospitals and the communities in which they
are located, but have still hypothesized a uniform effect across all rural hospitals. An
alternative approach for studying rural hospital system membership is to consider
economic, structural, and environmental conditions that may determine when system
affiliation is most appropriate (Halpern et al, 1992). As suggested by Smith & Piland
(1990), this may be accomplished by using a contingency theory framework that matches
different combinations of environmental and organizational characteristics and measures
the fit or congruence between them. Then hospital performance is regressed upon the
measurement of fit rather than on an indicator variable representing system membership.
This small, but important, change in analytic methods is driven by the use of
contingency theory for the study’s theoretical framework, and allows the performance
effect of system membership to vary across rural hospitals based on market area
environmental characteristics and hospital / system structural differences. Relating the
measurement of fit to hospital performance also allows for the possibility that similar
system structures may affect hospital performance differently in different situations, or
that different system structures may affect hospital performance similarly in different
situations. Thus the measurement of a fit term will not only identify when an
organization’s structure fits its environment, but will also reveal when a misfit is present.
And, if system membership is not universally beneficial as Halpern et al. (1992) suggest,
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then researchers using contingency theory are more likely to detect this by measuring fit
and misfit.
Identification of Contingent Relationships
As previously mentioned, another advantage of contingency theory is its ability to be
tailored to a specific research question or problem. The primary way that this is done is
through the identification of the contingent relationships that may have the greatest effect
on organizational performance. Each contingent relationship contains two parts: the
contingency and the corresponding organizational structure. Building upon previous
systems research that has focused on local system clusters (Luke, 1992; Kania, 1993;
Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Sikka et al, 2009), the contingencies and organizational
structures of primary importance in this study relate to the location of the rural hospital
and the geographic dispersion and hierarchical order of the system. This leads to the
identification of four contingent relationships that will be measured simultaneously to
determine a fit / congruence score for each rural hospital in the study.
Environmental Munificence and System Membership
Before the specific configuration of a system cluster may be considered, the
presence or absence of system membership must be accounted for. In the case of rural
hospitals, the dominant environmental characteristic that drives system affiliation is
resource munificence. Whether viewed through the theoretical lens of resource
dependence (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989) or that of population ecology (Yarbrough &
Powers, 2006), it is primarily the scarcity of critical resources that has driven the increase
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in rural hospital inter-organizational relationships documented in recent studies
(Moscovice & Stensland, 2002). All else being equal, hospitals would prefer to remain
autonomous (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989), but when faced with increasing resource
scarcity, hospitals will attempt to find a balance between autonomy, uncertainty over
obtaining resources, and dependence on other organizations (Zuckerman, 1983; Cook et
al., 1983). In other words, when resources in the form of investment capital, medical
professionals, and patient reimbursement are readily available, rural hospitals would
prefer to remain autonomous. But when adequate resources are not available in the local
area, system membership allows rural hospitals access to additional resources and ensures
their continued operation (Zuckerman, 1983; Mick et al, 1993). These additional
resources may take the form of investment capital, increased bargaining power, or
administrative expertise which can affect hospital efficiency and financial performance
through increased emphasis on cost containment, the ability to increase prices, and
increased use of health information technology (Mick et al, 1993; Berry et al, 1987; Trinh
& Begun, 1999; Menachemi et al, 2005; Li et al, 2008). Thus system membership will
have the greatest effect on hospital performance when the hospital is located in a market
with low environmental munificence, and the contingent relationship between
environmental munificence and system membership may be depicted as in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 – contingent relationship #1
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Hospital Location and System Configuration
As demonstrated by the mixed results obtained in other empirical studies that use a
dichotomous variable to represent system membership (Rothko et al., 2007), simply
considering the presence or absence of system membership is not sufficient to uncover
system performance effects. The location of the rural hospital and the configuration of
the system to which it belongs are important factors in calculating how well system
membership fits a particular situation. These two constructs may be further decomposed
to produce two contingent pairs.
First, the location of a rural hospital and its proximity to other hospitals represent the
level of direct competition that a rural hospital may face. In many hospital studies,
market level competition is quantified by using a measurement of concentration such as a
Herfindahl Index. The hospital market is often defined as the metropolitan area or the
county in which the hospital is located, and the Herfindahl Index measures the extent to
which a given service within that market is concentrated in the hospitals with the largest
market shares (the Federal Trade Commission uses the four largest hospitals, but the
number could vary depending on the market or the researcher). A score of one indicates
a monopoly, a high score that is less than one indicates oligopolistic competition, and a
low score indicates more open competition that is not dominated by any single
competitor. However, in rural markets, there is generally only one hospital within a
given county, micropolitan area, or non-core area, and Herfindahl scores calculated at the
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market level would not be very useful. An alternative method to assess competition is to
consider how close the rural hospital is to other rural hospitals.
Proximity to other hospitals increases direct competition for patients, but also creates
an opportunity for system membership to provide a performance advantage, through the
creation of local partners. Although some consolidation of administrative functions such
as accounting, claims processing, and patient account management may be accomplished
virtually for widely dispersed system hospitals, other functions such as medical supply
distribution, laundry services, and potentially sharing physicians may only be centralized
for system hospitals that are proximate to each other. This type of centralization allows
multi-hospital systems to achieve economies of scale and reduce duplication associated
with providing these services independently at each hospital (Carey, 2003). Further,
common ownership converts competitors into partners, which should decrease
competition between proximate hospitals, and allows them to coordinate and improve the
efficiency of their marketing efforts (Dranove et al., 1996).
Thus geographic proximity to other hospitals is an important environmental
contingency when considering the structure of a multi-hospital system. If hospitals are
close to one another, then the multi-hospital system has the opportunity to create a
hospital cluster (Luke, 1992), which is defined as two or more hospitals owned by the
same system in the same market. Previous studies of the hospital industry have noted the
development of such clusters (Cueller & Gertler, 2003; Kania, 1993) and their positive
impact on hospital performance (Sikka, Ozcan, & Luke, 2007). In metropolitan areas a

82
hospital cluster may contain several hospitals, but in rural areas where the population
density is lower and hospitals are more widely dispersed, a cluster may consist of just two
hospitals that are located in adjacent or overlapping markets. These pairs of same system
hospitals are often referred to as local system partners (Madison, 2004), and the concept
of cluster management applies in the same way as it does to an urban cluster. Common
system membership may facilitate the centralization and coordination of various services
for hospitals that are located in close proximity to one another. This concept produces
the second contingent relationship shown in Figure 3.

Proximity to
Other Hospitals

+

Local System
Partners

Figure 3 – contingent relationship #2

Rural hospital location also indicates how close a rural hospital is to larger hospitals
that are primarily located in urban areas, but may also be rural referral centers (RRCs).
Proximity to a larger hospital with more comprehensive services and perceived quality
differences between urban and rural hospitals result in rural patients bypassing their local
hospital (Radcliff et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009). Such behavior can negatively
affect rural hospital patient volume and financial performance (Radcliff et al., 2008).
Additionally, due to the small size and limited scope of services in most rural hospitals,
patient transfers from rural hospitals to larger urban hospitals are quite common. The
flow of patients from rural to urban areas links rural hospitals to larger urban facilities
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and forces rural hospitals to expend precious resources to coordinate patient transfers and
try and recapture patients that seek care out of the local area.
Once again, there is an opportunity for system membership to provide rural hospitals
with a significant advantage by the creation of a system hierarchy. Hierarchy implies that
there is a size and service scope difference between a system-affiliated rural hospital and
its local system partner. Such a hierarchy supports the centralization and coordination of
clinical services in addition to administrative and logistic services, and may be achieved
when a rural hospital is in close proximity to a larger urban hospital or to a larger rural
referral center (RRC). When this occurs, low volume specialty and sub-specialty services
may be moved out of the rural hospital and consolidated at the larger system partner. The
rural hospital niche width is reduced and it essentially becomes a specialty center
(Yarbrough & Powers, 2006) focused on outpatient care, emergency room services, and
high volume, low acuity surgical and inpatient services. The larger system partner
becomes the generalist with a large niche width reflecting its wide scope of services.
Such an arrangement capitalizes on the phenomena of out-shopping (Drain et al., 2001)
by controlling the flow of patients from the rural area to adjacent urban areas and allows
the rural hospital to close services where it does not have sufficient patient volume, and
achieve productive efficiency by focusing their resources. Further, hierarchical system
arrangements facilitate the routinization of patient transfers and sub-specialty referrals
from rural facilities to their larger system partner, which should reduce the transaction
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costs associated with each transfer. This logic results in the third contingent relationship
related to rural hospital location and system configuration (Figure 4).

Proximity to
Larger Hospital

+

System Hierarchy

Figure 4 – contingent relationship #3
CAH Status and Proximate Hierarchical System Partner
The fourth contingent relationship specifically considers how rural hospital
conversion to CAH status may interact with system membership. Previous research has
shown that when compared to other rural hospitals, CAHs had greater transfer rates of
ICU and non-ICU inpatients (Wakefield et al, 2006), exhibited greater cost inefficiency
(Rosko & Mutter, 2010), and experienced less bypass behavior by local patients (Basu &
Mobley, 2010). These differences make it logical to assume that CAH status may
magnify the performance benefits of system membership and specifically hierarchical
system configurations. Increased emphasis on cost containment associate with system
membership could restore the efficiency incentive that was lost when CAHs switched
from PPS to cost-based reimbursement. Further, a hierarchical system configuration
which routinizes patient transfers would be most beneficial for CAHs that must keep their
average length of stay less than 96 hours, and have increased pressure to transfer
complex, high-acuity inpatients. Additionally, a hierarchical partnership should allow
CAHs that are proximate to urban areas to further reduce patient bypass behavior,
maintaining their advantage over rural PPS hospitals in this area. This should lead to
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both increased efficiency and cost savings for CAHs that have a proximate hierarchical
system partner compared to those that do not. Thus the contingency of CAH status
should be positively related to having a proximate hierarchical system partner (Figure 5).

+

CAH Status

Hierarchical
System Partner

Figure 5 – contingent relationship #4
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
The four contingent relationships outlined in the preceding paragraphs are
aggregated together to produce the conceptual model for this study (figure 6). Note that
as specified by contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001), it is the fit between the
environmental contingencies and organizational structure that is related to organizational
performance. The calculated degree of fit (or misfit) may be determined for each
contingent pair individually, but a composite measure of fit/congruence may also be
calculated, and some research suggests that a composite measure is more likely to explain
organizational performance differences (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985). In the conceptual
model the fit/congruence box represents both the individual and composite measures of
fit, which facilitates the generation of directional hypotheses for the composite model as
well as each contingent pair.
In addition to the four contingent relationships that determine the degree of
fit/congruence between the rural hospital’s structure and the environment, a lagged
measure of a hospital’s prior performance and hospital and market control variables
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shown to significantly influence efficiency and financial performance are included in the
conceptual model which is graphically depicted in Figure 6. The lagged measure of prior
performance is an important control variable in contingency theory models that controls
for multiple determinants of performance that may not be directly observed (Donaldson,
1995). The hospital and market control variables account for factors that have been
related to hospital performance in previous research.

Contingency Theory Conceptual Model

Environmental Contingencies
- resource munificence
- rural hospital location
- CAH status of rural hospital

This is a lagged model where:
- performance is measured at time t
- prior performance is measured at time t-n
- the fit between the environmental contingencies and system
characteristics are determined at t-n

System Characteristics
- System membership
- Local partner
- System Hierarchy

Hospital
Performance

+

Fit /
Congruence

+
Hospital
Variables

Market
Variables

Prior
Performance

This model addresses the question of performance – why would one rural hospital outperform
another rural hospital – determined by fit between environmental contingencies and system
characteristics.

Figure 6 – Conceptual Model for the Study

Hypotheses
As previously mentioned, the fit/congruence construct in the conceptual model
represents both the composite and individual fit/congruence measures for the four
contingent relationships. In all cases, a higher degree of fit between the environment and
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the structure of the system is positively related to hospital performance. Considering
each contingent relationship individually, four hypotheses may be derived from the
conceptual model.
The first hypothesis is based on the theorized relationship between resource scarcity
and system membership. As previously discussed, system membership should be most
beneficial for rural hospitals that are located in areas with the greatest resource scarcity.
Therefore, system membership allows rural hospitals in these areas to fit their
environment better than if they remained independent. This logic leads to the first
contingent hypothesis:

H1: Under conditions of greater resource scarcity, system-affiliated rural hospitals
fit the environment better and will outperform stand-alone rural hospitals.
The next two hypotheses are based on the environmental contingency of hospital
location and the configuration of the hospital system to which a hospital belongs. For
this study, hospital location is conceptualized as the proximity to other hospitals, and a
distinction is made between proximity to other rural hospitals of similar size, and
proximity to larger hospitals that offer significantly more services. System configuration
is discussed in terms of dispersion and hierarchy, and applied at the market/local level
with the concepts of local system partners and hierarchical system partners. These four
concepts may be paired together to produce two contingent pairs which yield the
following hypotheses:
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H2: When proximate to another hospital, system-affiliated rural hospitals with a
local partner will outperform system-affiliated rural hospitals with no local partner.
H3: When proximate to larger urban hospitals or RRCs, rural hospitals with
hierarchical system relationships will outperform those with non-hierarchical
system relationships.
The fourth hypothesis is based on the environmental contingency of CAH status
which is paired with the system structural characteristic of hierarchy. CAH status is
believed to alter the structure and behavior of a rural hospital in a manner that would fit
best with a hierarchical system structure, and thus CAHs with hierarchical local system
partners would fit the environment better than CAHs without hierarchical local system
partners. Since a better fit should lead to better performance, the following hypothesis
may be generated:

H4: Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) with proximate hierarchical system partners
will outperform CAHs with no proximate hierarchical system partner.
The reality for any organization is that fit is not determined by any one contingent
pair, but by several contingent pairs simultaneously. Often in contingency theory based
empirical work, hypothesis testing based on a single contingent relationship may not
produce significant results, and instead multiple dimensions of fit must be considered
simultaneously before significant results are obtained (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985).
This does not mean that the individual measures of fit are not valid or are not important,

89
but that sometimes there is too much “noise” in the analysis to see a clear “signal” from
one dimension of fit. For this reason, Donaldson (2001) recommends combining multiple
measures of fit into composite measures. Following this advice, the four contingent
relationships outlined in the preceding paragraphs may be considered simultaneously to
create a composite measure of fit/congruence which should significantly influence
hospital performance. This may be stated in a general hypothesis that directly relates the
degree of fit to hospital performance, to produce the primary hypothesis for this study:

H5: Rural hospital performance is positively related to the degree of fit between the
rural hospital’s multi-hospital system structure and its environment.
Summary of Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is based on contingency theory which has
been suggested as an appropriate framework for studying the effects of strategic choices
like joining a multi-hospital system (Smith & Piland, 1990). Rather than relating a
specific environmental or organizational characteristic to organizational performance, a
contingency theory framework emphasizes the fit between an organization’s structure and
its environment, and proposes that performance depends on the degree of fit or
congruence between the dominant environmental characteristic(s) and the structure of the
organization (Donaldson, 1995; Scott & Davis, 2007). Thus differences in organizational
performance among organizations may be explained by differences in fit, and assessing
fit becomes central to empirical work that uses contingency theory.

90
To conceptualize and ultimately measure the fit / congruence between organizational
structure and environment, contingent relationships must be specified. Four such
relationships are specified for this study based on the environmental contingencies of
resource munificence, hospital location, and CAH status. These are paired with the
system structural characteristics of system membership, system dispersion, and system
hierarchy. Combined with control variables that account for hospital prior performance,
significant market characteristics, and other hospital characteristics that are not related to
system membership, these contingent relationships produce a conceptual model that
relates fit/congruence to hospital performance.
From the conceptual model five hypotheses are derived; one for each contingent
relationship and a composite hypothesis which considers all four contingent relationships
simultaneously. Each of these hypotheses will be tested by regressing hospital
performance on the fit/congruence score calculated for the four contingent relationships
in the conceptual model. The identification and measurement of variables that represent
the constructs in the conceptual model and the analytic methods for hypothesis testing are
discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4 – METHODS

This chapter discusses the research design, data sources, study sample, variable
definitions, and analytic methods for the study. Particular attention is paid to the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique used to derive one of the dependent variables as
well as the calculation of the fit / congruence score for each hospital, which is the
independent variable that is directly related to organizational performance in contingency
theory research. Limitations of the study methods are discussed at the end of chapter.
Research Design
This study uses a non-experimental, non-equivalent groups post-test design with
multiple cross-sections. This design is depicted in Figure 7, which also highlights three
additional aspects of the study design and variable measurement. First, the study period
covers 2004 to 2008, with the independent variables measured in 2004 and the dependent
variables measured in 2006 to 2008. In accordance with Donaldson’s (2001)
recommendations for empirically testing contingency theory relationships, there should
be a lag between fit/congruence measures and performance measures. Therefore hospital
observations will be constructed using variables involved in measuring fit/congruence
from 2004 and dependent performance measures from 2006 to 2008. This establishes
temporal precedence between the independent and dependent variables and addresses the
problem of endogeneity. Second, hospital system membership does not change during
91
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Non-experimental Post-Test Design with Multiple Cross-Sections
System
Hospitals

X - O O O

Non-System
Hospitals

X - O O O

Hospitals are already
either part of a system
or not part of a system

Fit / Congruence
measured in 2004

Three years of
performance measures
for each hospital

Figure 7 – Research design for the study

the study period. The rural hospitals in the sample are either part of a system or not part
of a system at the beginning of the study period. Hospitals that change system
membership during the study period are excluded. Third, three years of dependent
performance variables are used to minimize the influence of large, one-time capital
expenditures or other accounting abnormalities that may skew the results. Using three
years of dependent variables does not make this a longitudinal study since longitudinal
analysis methods are not used, but it is an improvement over a simple cross-sectional
design.

Threats to Internal and External Validity
The non-equivalent groups post-test only design used in this study is a common
design in social research where study participants are usually not randomly assigned to
the two groups. However, this study design is subject to some threats to internal validity
that limit its ability to establish causality. Potential threats include selection bias, history,
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maturation, testing, instrumentation, mortality, regression, and various social threats.
Each threat is either eliminated by the study design or may be minimized and controlled
through argument, by measurement, or by statistical analysis (Trochim & Donnelly,
2008). Each potential threat to internal validity and how it will be minimized or
controlled are discussed in the next few paragraphs.
Threats that are eliminated by the study design are testing, instrumentation,
regression, and social threats. Testing and instrumentation threats occur when a pre-test
influences one group differently from the other or when there is a change in the test
instrument for one group but not the other. Neither of these threats apply to this study
because a pre-test is not used, and the instruments used to collect the data (AHA survey,
CMS reports, etc…) are identical for all hospitals. A regression threat, often referred to
as regression to the mean, refers to the tendency of post-test measures to return to
population averages. A regression threat is most likely when the groups used in the study
are selected based on pre-test scores (i.e. low performers are put in the treatment group
and high performers are put in the comparison group). Again, this study does not use a
pre-test and the groups are not selected based on pre-test scores, so a regression threat is
not a concern. Finally, social threats to internal validity arise when the treatment, control,
and/or comparison groups are aware of the study and have knowledge of the treatment
that another group is receiving. Awareness of the study conditions may cause them to
imitate the treatment that another group receives, compete against other groups in terms
of outcome variables, or become demoralized if they are not receiving the most beneficial
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treatment. This is a retrospective study that uses secondary data, and the hospitals
involved were not aware of the study when the data was collected and therefore social
threats to internal validity do not apply.
The threats to internal validity that remain are selection bias, history, maturation, and
mortality threats. Selection bias involves differences between the two study groups prior
to the study period, while history, maturation and mortality threats involve differences
between the two study groups during the study period. The threats that occur during the
study period will be addressed first. A history threat is when a discreet event effects one
group but not the other group, a maturation threat is when one group naturally improves
at a different rate than the other group, and a mortality threat occurs when study
participants are differentially eliminated from one group during the study period causing
the two study groups to become statistically non-equivalent. The use of control variables
to account for performance differences associated with hospital and market
characteristics minimizes the potential of history and maturation threats. Additionally,
unobserved history threats such as changes in state Medicaid policy or regional variations
in economic activity are controlled because both groups contain hospitals from the same
census divisions, states, and local communities. Thus discreet events at the regional,
state, or local level would affect both groups equally. Measuring the dependent variable
over multiple time periods also helps to further minimize any type of maturation threat.
A mortality threat is possible, because hospitals that change system status or CAH
status during the study period are deleted from the study sample. Descriptive statistics
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will be used to compare the hospitals that are deleted from the study sample to the
hospitals that remain in the study sample. Significant statistical differences between the
two groups may indicate if a mortality effect exists, and how it potentially affects the
results of the study.
The final threat to internal validity, the presence of a selection bias, is the greatest
threat to this study and is caused by the fact that hospitals are not randomly assigned to
the system and non-system groups. Because hospitals are not randomly assigned, there is
the possibility that the hospitals that joined systems are systematically different from
those that did not. Often, social science research relies on pre-test measures to establish
the statistical equivalence of the different groups, but in this case the treatment (hospitals
joining a system) is not a discreet event, and the prolonged time period over which rural
hospitals joined systems makes obtaining “pre-test” measures and establishing statistical
equivalence difficult. Without establishing statistical equivalence the threat of selection
bias cannot be completely controlled, but the following aspects of this study help to
minimize the threat. First, this study measures the relationship between fit and
performance not the relationship between system membership and performance. So even
though the study design shows the two groups as system and non-system hospitals, the
hypotheses that are tested actually compare hospitals with good “fit” against hospitals
with bad “fit”, and these groups include both system and non-system hospitals.
Therefore a selection bias based on system membership would affect both the “fit” and
“misfit” groups which are being compared in the analysis. Second, the analysis
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techniques used to test the hypotheses calculates coefficients that show the performance
difference between hospitals in the “fit” and “misfit” categories. Following the logic
presented in the theoretical framework of the study, hospitals in the “fit” category should
outperform hospitals in the “misfit” category, and the leaders of hospitals in the “misfit”
category should take action to improve the fit between their hospital structure and the
environment. However, hospitals that change system membership and CAH status
during the study period are excluded from the sample. Theoretically these hospitals
should be the worst performing hospitals, and their exclusion from the study sample
should raise the mean performance of the “misfit” group, and decrease the size of the
coefficient produced during hypothesis testing. Thus the calculated coefficients used to
test the hypotheses would be attenuated toward zero, making it harder to obtain any
significant results. Finally, descriptive statistics from the first year of the study (2004)
will be used to compare system to non-system hospitals and hospitals with consistent
system membership to hospitals that change system membership. Assuming that there
are not significant differences based on unobserved variables, this supplementary analysis
will help to identify if a selection bias exists based on the study variables and how it may
possibly affect the dependent variables.
The threats to internal validity and control measures employed in this study to
control these threats are summarized in Table 1.
In addition to the threats to internal validity, the generality of the study may be
limited if there are significant threats to external validity. Threats to external validity
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Table 1. Threats to Internal Validity
Threat

Present in the Study

Control if Present

Yes

This study measures the affect of fit on performance,
not the effect of system membership on performance,
so a selection bias based on system membership should
not invalidate the study results. The exclusion of
hospitals that switch system status during the study
period should bias the calculated coefficients downward
and thus make it more difficult to obtain significant
results. Descriptive statistis will be used to compare
hospital groups to help identify if a selection bias exists.

History

Yes

Many history threats are nullified by the use of control
variables. Additionally, both groups contain hospitals
from the same census divisions and states so nonexperimental events that are not represented by control
variables (i.e. changes in state or national policy) should
effect both groups equally

Maturation

Yes

Use of control variables and dependent variables are
measured multiple times

Testing

No - this only applies to
pre/post-test designs

N/A

Instrumentation

No - this only applies to
pre/post-test designs

N/A

Yes

Descriptive statistics will be used to compare hospitals
that drop out of the study to the hospitals that remain

No - groups are not selected
based on a pre-test

N/A

No - this is a retrospective study
performed with secondary data

N/A

Selection Bias

Mortality
Regression to the Mean
Social Threats

usually arise when the study sample, the study setting, or the study time period are not
representative of the population (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). These are not significant
issues for this study. This study uses a national sample of rural hospitals and the
exclusion criteria that are applied strike a balance between maximizing the study sample
and controlling threats to internal validity. The study sample and the exclusion criteria
are discussed more fully in the subsequent section on the study population and sampling
strategy.
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Data Sources
Data will be combined from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals, the Medicare
Hospital Cost Report Information System Minimum Data Set (HCRIS MDS), and the
Area Resource File (ARF) to create the data set for the study. The AHA annual survey
data will be augmented with data on hospital systems collected by Dr. Roice Luke, who
contacts individual hospitals and hospital systems directly to clarify system relationships
that are not clear in the AHA data.
The majority of the variables used in the study are taken from the AHA annual
hospital survey. These include number of staffed beds, ownership type, teaching status,
Medicare payer percentage, Medicaid payer percentage, number of staffed beds, nonphysician FTEs, non-labor expense, and service mix (which is a weighted count of the
services provided by the hospital in the AHA survey). These variables are used in
various ways that include calculating the measure of fit/congruence for each hospital,
calculating the dependent DEA efficiency score for each hospital, and as control
variables. Additionally, the latitudes and longitudes for each hospital listed in the AHA
survey data are used to determine the distance of each rural hospital from other hospitals
and from the closest urban area.
Environmental / market characteristic measures are taken from the 2008 ARF data
set. The ARF contains numerous variables collected by government and private
organizations at the county level. For this study, the variables per capita income and
unemployment rate will be used as measures of resource munificence for the county in
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which a hospital is located. Additionally, in accordance with recommendations for
contingency theory empirical work by Lex Donaldson (2001), these same variables will
also be used as market characteristic control variables in the regression analysis. The
inclusion of these variables as controls demonstrates that the effect of fit on performance
is distinct from any relationship that the contingency or structural characteristic variables
may have with hospital performance (Donaldson, 2001).
Data from the HCRIS MDS are used to calculate the financial performance measure
for each hospital, which is hospital total margin. Total margin is a financial ratio
calculated by dividing hospital net income by hospital total revenues (the sum of hospital
patient revenue and other hospital revenues). The variables required to calculate this
financial ratio are from HCRIS MDS worksheet G-3.
The data elements from these three sources will be merged together using the
hospital ID number, the name of the county and state in which the hospital is located, and
the FIPS / modified FIPS code.
Study Population and Sampling Strategy
The study population consists of all non-federal, acute care rural hospitals within the
United States from 2004 until 2008. For this study, the term “rural hospital” is defined as
all non-metropolitan statistical area hospitals, and includes hospitals located in both
micropolitan and non-core/rural areas under the OMB statistical area definitions. The
sampling strategy for this study is very simple: maximize the size of the study sample.
Since this study uses secondary data which are available for the vast majority of hospitals
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in the United States, there is no cost associated with data collection. Therefore, the study
sample will include all rural hospitals for which data are available, and will be as close to
the study population as possible. The following paragraphs discuss the exclusion criteria
that were applied to construct the study sample, and identify how many hospitals were
dropped from the sample for each criterion. This information is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Sample Exclusion Criteria (number of hospitals excluded)
Number of Hospitals
Efficiency Score Total Margin
Number of Rural Hospitals Consistently in the AHA Hospital Survey 2004-2008

2170

2170

Exclusion Criteria:
Federal Government Ownership indicated by AHA Control Code

(59)

(59)

Other than General Medical / Surgical Hospital indicated by AHA Service Code
Long-term care hospitals indicated by AHA length of service code

(142)
(9)

(142)
(9)

Hospital Staffed Bed Size less than 10
Hospital coded as a Rural Referral Center (RRC)

(20)
(242)

(20)
(242)

Missing Data*
Nonsensical and Extreme Data Values

(243)
(30)

(248)
(30)

Deleted hospitals located in US Territories
Hospitals deleted because AHA measures were estimated not reported

(4)
(235)

(4)
(235)

Final Sample Size

Change in System Membership from 2004 to 2008

(80)

(79)

Change in CAH Status from 2004 to 2008

(96)
1010

(95)
1007

* Five hospitals were missing the HCRIS data required to calculate total margin, so the sample size is slightly
different for the two dependent variables

First, construction of the study sample begins with the total number of rural hospitals
listed in the AHA annual survey from 2004 to 2008 (n=2170). Then federal government
hospitals (those with a control code of 41-48 in the AHA data base), hospitals that were
not general medical / surgical hospitals (those with a service code other than 10 in the
AHA data base), and long-term care hospitals were excluded. Next, the bed size for each
hospital was reviewed and the extremely small hospitals (staffed bed size less than 10)
were deleted from the study sample. These extremely small hospitals may function more
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like outpatient clinics than true hospitals. At the other end of the spectrum are rural
referral centers (RRCs) which are the largest of the rural hospitals. The RRC program
was established by CMS as part of the PPS in 1983, and provides higher reimbursement
levels for large rural facilities that treat patients on a regional or national basis (McCue &
Nayar, 2009). These hospitals operate more like large urban hospitals rather than rural
hospitals; therefore they are deleted from the sample. This left the sample at n = 1698.
The data for the remaining hospitals were examined to identify hospitals with
missing data elements, extreme values, and/or nonsensical data values. When missing
data elements were discovered, they were replaced with data from another source where
possible (i.e., a missing AHA data element was replaced with a HCRIS MDS data
element) in order to retain as many hospitals as possible in the sample. Missing AHA
data resulted in the deletion of 234 hospitals and an additional five hospitals were deleted
due to missing HCRIS data2. However, several of the hospitals in the AHA survey data
were not simply missing one or two data elements, but instead contained only estimated
values rather than reported values for one or more years in the study period. Hospitals
which had estimated values for one or more years of the study period were deleted.
Extreme values were defined as values that were more than three standard deviations
from the variable mean, and were handled on a case by case basis. When an extreme
value was identified, all other information for a given hospital was considered, if the
extreme value did not seem plausible then the observation was deleted from the study
2

Note that this resulted in two different sample sizes for the two dependent variables, since the HCRIS data
was only needed in the analysis involving the financial dependent variable. This is reflected in Table 2 by
the two different columns of numbers – one for each dependent variable.
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sample. Examples of this are when labor expenses for a hospital exceed the hospital’s
total expenses, or when the non-labor expenses for a hospital in one of the study years is
more than 10 times greater than its non-labor expenses in the other study years. Finally,
the data were inspected for nonsensical values, which are letters when the variable is
supposed to be a number or entries such as “999,” which usually indicate missing
information, but none were found. Additionally, when the data was inspected it was
discovered that there were four hospitals from U.S. territories (Guam, American Samoa,
and the Virgin Islands), these were also deleted from the study sample. Application of
these exclusion criteria reduced the study sample to n=1186 short-term, general/acute
care rural hospitals with complete data for the study period (1181 for the dependent
variable total margin).
The final step in the process was to examine the system membership variable for
each hospital from 2004 to 2008. Since fit/congruence is measured in 2004 and
performance is measured in 2008, the system membership for each hospital must remain
constant from 2004 to 2008. The same goes for the CAH status variable, which is also
used in the calculation of the fit/congruence score. If these variables changed during the
study period, then the hospital was deleted from the study sample. Once these actions
were completed, the final sample for the study was n=1010 short-term, general/acute care
rural hospitals with constant system and CAH status during the study period (n=1007 for
the dependent variable total margin).

103
Measurement of Variables
In accordance with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3, this study uses
the constructs of hospital performance and the degree of fit between environmental
characteristics and organizational structure, to analyze the effects of system membership
on rural hospitals. This section explains how these constructs are operationalized into
dependent and independent variable measures, and combined with organizational and
market level control variables in order to conduct inferential testing of the stated
hypotheses. A table at the end of this chapter summarizes all of the variables.

Dependent Variables
Hospital performance is a multi-faceted concept which includes financial
performance, efficiency, the quality of care, and patient safety. This study focuses on
economic performance and uses two dependent variables to operationalize the construct
of performance. The first, hospital total margin is a financial performance measure, and
the second, hospital productive efficiency, is a measure of efficiency.

Hospital Financial Performance
The first dependent variable is hospital total margin. For this study, total margin is
defined as hospital net income divided by hospital total revenues. Hospital total margin
is a financial ratio that measures organization profitability, and is one of the most
frequently used indicators of hospital financial performance (Flex Monitoring Team
Paper No 7, 2005). This measure is calculated using HCRIS MDS data from Worksheet
G-3. More specifically, line 31 (hospital net income) is divided by the sum of line 3
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(patient revenue) and line 25 (other hospital revenue). Because hospital total margin is a
ratio, it may be compared across hospitals of different size. Additionally, it was rated as
the most useful measure of profitability by a sample of hospital CEOs surveyed by the
Flex Monitoring Team (Paper No 7, 2005).
To reduce the influence of accounting aberrations within a given year, three years of
hospital total margin are averaged together to produce the financial performance
dependent variable. This is a common technique in hospital financial analysis (McCue,
2007) and minimizes the impact of one-time accounting events.

Hospital Efficiency
The second dependent variable is a hospital efficiency score generated by Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a non-parametric technique developed by
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) for studying production efficiency among a group
of organizations or other sampling units. DEA considers multiple inputs and outputs
simultaneously, and identifies an efficiency frontier that represents the optimal efficiency
relationships among inputs and outputs for a sample of organizations. It has been used
extensively by health services researchers to study various health care organizations,
including several hospital and multi-hospital system efficiency studies (Ozcan, 2008;
Ozcan & Luke 1993; Ozcan & Luke, 2011; Lynch & Ozcan, 1994; Sikka et al, 2009).
In DEA, the organizations being studied are referred to as decision making units
(DMUs), and linear programming is used to calculate an efficiency score for each DMU.
The most efficient DMUs within a given sample are assigned a score of “1” and the other
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less efficient DMUs within the sample receive an efficiency score between “0” and less
than “1” relative to the efficient DMUs. .
For this study a four input and five output, input-oriented, constant returns to scale
model will be used to generate efficiency scores for each hospital over the five year study
period. Two basic assumptions about the nature of the work that hospitals perform
underlie this model. First, an input-oriented model assumes that inputs are easier to
control than outputs. This reflects the reality of hospitals, where organizational leaders
have more control over the staff and physical resources that they put into patient care
than the volume of the patient care itself. The second assumption, indicated by the
choice of a constant returns to scale (CRS) model, is that the return on a given input(s) is
constant as the amount of that (those) input(s) increases. This assumption is common in
empirical studies which use DEA to study hospital efficiency when there is no evidence
to suggest that variable returns to scale are present (Ozcan & Luke, 2011). Additionally,
CRS models incorporate both scale efficiencies and variable returns to scale, and avoid
inflation of the hospital efficiency scores which is sometimes seen in VRS models (Sikka
et al., 2009).
DEA models for general hospitals generally contain inputs that measure capital
investments, labor, and operating expenses, and outputs that reflect both inpatient and
outpatient production (Ozcan, 2008, pg106). These categories for inputs and outputs
have been consistently operationalized using a mixture of AHA and CMS Cost Report
data in a model with four inputs (Bed Size, Service Mix, non-physician FTEs, and Non-
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Labor Expenses) and two or three outputs (Case-Mix Adjusted Admissions, Total
Outpatient Visits, and sometimes Teaching FTEs) (Ozcan, 2008, pgs 106-108; Nayar &
Ozcan, 2008; Ozcan & Luke, 2011; Ozcan & Lynch, 1992; Sikka et al., 2009).
However, studies involving critical access hospitals use slightly different models because
CAHs do not report DRG information to CMS, so there is no case mix index with which
to adjust the admissions. Therefore multiple efficiency studies involving CAHs use a
mix of total inpatient days, surgical procedures, births, emergency room visits, and other
outpatient visits as a way to overcome the fact that admissions are not case-mix adjusted
(Harrison et al., 2009; Butler & Li, 2003; Rosko & Mutter; 2010). This different mix of
outputs accounts for some of the difference in services and intensity required by different
patients that is usually part of the case-mix adjustment. Additionally, DEA models
involving CAHs usually do not contain teaching FTEs as an output because less than 1%
have residency training programs and only a few facilities have any real teaching output.
Further, studies by Valdmanis (1992) and Ozcan (1992) have indicated that DEA model
results are relatively insensitive to the inclusion of teaching variables as an output. Thus
the model for this study is a four input and five output model using the following
variables:

Input 1 – Staffed Hospital Beds (Beds) – number of staffed hospital beds in the facility
Input 2 – Weighted Service Mix (ServMix) – a weighted count of all clinical services
that the hospital provides. Services are weighted based on their clinical and investment
intensity in accordance with the method developed by Ozcan & Luke (2011)
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Input 3 – Non-Physician FTEs (FTE) – the total employee FTEs for the hospital
Input 4 – Non-Labor Expenses (NLE) – total operating expenses minus payroll expenses
expressed in 2008 dollars

Output 1 – Total Admissions (ADMTOT) – total number of inpatient admissions for the
facility

Output 2 – Births (Births) – total number of live births in the facility
Output 3 – Total Surgical Procedures (SUROPTOT) – total number of both inpatient and
outpatient surgical procedures for the facility

Output 4 – Emergency Room/Department Visits (VEM) – total number of outpatient
visits to the emergency room or department in the facility

Output 5 – Other Outpatient Visits (VOTH) – total number of non-emergency room
outpatient visits
As with the financial performance dependent variable, the efficiency scores for each
hospital are averaged for the three year period 2006 to 2008 in order to reduce the effect
of aberrant accounting data within a given year. Thus the efficiency dependent variable
is the average productive efficiency for the hospital from 2006 to 2008, and will range
from 0 to 1. Chilingerian (1995) points out that the DEA scores are essentially a
censored variable, where organizations that would hypothetically score higher than 1 are
instead assigned a maximum score of one. Following Chilingerian’s example, the DEA
efficiency scores will be transformed ((1/DEA Score) – 1) so they may be analyzed using
a Tobit model, which is a regression model for dependent variables that are censored at
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zero but are roughly continuously distributed over strictly positive values (Wooldridge,
2009).

Independent Variables
The measure of fit/congruence is the primary variable of interest in contingency
theory models and is calculated by matching environmental contingency measures and
organizational structure measures in contingent pairs. As illustrated in the conceptual
model, the environmental contingencies are resource munificence, hospital location, and
CAH status, and the system structural characteristics are system membership, local
partners, and system hierarchy. The following paragraphs detail how these
characteristics are operationalized with variable measures and how the fit/congruence
score is calculated. One important point to note is that in order to calculate the
fit/congruence scores that are essential to this contingency theory based study,
environmental contingency values must be matched with organization structure values in
order to determine how well the organizational structure fits the environment (i.e. are
they congruent or incongruent). Since the organizational structure measures are
dichotomous variables (system membership or independent, local partner or no local
partner, hierarchical system or non-hierarchical system) then the environmental
contingency measures must be transformed into binary variables in order to calculate the
fit/congruence score. Therefore, the measures for environmental munificence and
distance between hospitals which are continuous variables, will be transformed into
categorical variables to correspond to the structural measure to which it is paired.
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Environmental Contingencies
The first environmental contingency is resource munificence, which refers to the
ability of the environment to sustain the hospital and may be represented by the number
of potential patients and strength of the local economy (Mick et al, 1993). For this study
resource munificence is conceptualized in terms of overall economic condition of the
rural market and potential patients. These pieces of the concept of resource munificence
will be measured using the ARF variables per capita income and unemployment rate. Per
capita income and unemployment rate represents the overall economic condition of the
rural area, and unemployment rate is also a measure of potential patient volume since
most people in the United States obtain health insurance from their employer. Factor
analysis will be used to create a single resource munificence variable from these
measures3. This variable will then be divided into quartiles and the hospitals in the top
quartile will be coded as high resource munificence and the hospitals in the bottom
quartile will be coded as low resource munificence. This will exclude the hospitals in the
middle two quartiles from the analysis of the first hypothesis.
As indicated in chapter three, hospital location is decomposed into two proximity
measures that indicate how close the rural hospital is to other hospitals and how close it is
to a larger hospital. Proximity to another hospital is a dichotomous variable coded “1” if
3

Initially a four variable measure of resource munificence was proposed using the variables per capita
income, unemployment rate, population density, and active physicians per capita. However, when factor
analysis was performed in order to produce a consolidated measure of resource munificence, the four
variables would not converge into a single factor solution. Regardless of the rotation technique employed,
the four variables clearly contained two underlying factors of resource munificence. Since a single factor
solution was necessary to calculate the fit/congruence score for hypothesis testing, the number of variables
used to measure resource munificence was reduced to two: per capita income and unemployment rate.
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there is another hospital within 50 miles and zero otherwise. Previous studies examining
local hospital clusters and local system partners have used distances of 60 miles (Luke,
1992) and 70 miles (Young et al., 2000), and the geographic isolation requirement
necessary to qualify for CAH status is 35 miles, so 50 miles strikes an even balance
between these previously used criteria. Proximity to a larger hospital is also a
dichotomous variable coded “1” if there is a hospital with greater bed size and
specialty/sub-specialty services within 50 miles and zero otherwise. The final
environmental variable is CAH status, which is a dichotomous variable indicating the
CAH status of the rural hospital. This variable is coded “1” if the hospital is a CAH and
zero otherwise.

System Configuration / Structure
There are three hospital system structural characteristics that correspond to the four
environmental measures discussed in the preceding paragraph. They are system
membership, local system partner, and system hierarchy. System membership is an
indicator variable coded 1 if the hospital belongs to a multi-hospital system and zero
otherwise. Local system partner and system hierarchy are also indicator variables. A
local system partner is defined as a hospital within 50 miles that belongs to the same
hospital. If there is another system hospital within 50 miles, then the variable for local
system partner is coded 1. System hierarchy means that there is a hospital with greater
bed size and specialty/sub-specialty services owned by the same system within 50 miles.
If a system hierarchy does exist, then this variable is coded 1, otherwise it is coded zero.
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Calculation of the Fit/Congruence Scores
In an approach similar to that of Van de Ven and Drazin (1985), the fit/congruence
scores for each contingent pair will be examined first (H1 through H4), and then a
composite fit/congruence score will be created to test H5. Calculation of the individual
and composite fit/congruence scores are discussed in the remainder of this section.
To calculate the individual fit/congruence scores, four contingent pairs are created.
Resource munificence will be paired with system membership, proximity to another
hospital will be paired with local system partner, proximity to a larger referral hospital
will be paired with system hierarchy, and CAH status will be paired with system
hierarchy. Each pair creates a 2 x 2 matrix (shown in Figure 8), dividing the hospitals in
the sample into four groups (three groups for two of the matrices). A set of indicator
variables will be created for each characteristic pair, and these dummy variables will be
used to test hypotheses one through four.
Each 2 x 2 matrix shows the possible combinations for each pair of environmental
and system characteristics and to the right of each matrix is the set of dummy variables
that will be created to test each hypothesis (H1 through H4). The reference category for
each hypothesis test and the hypothesized group differences are also indicated to the right
of the matrix. One important thing to note about the fit/congruence scores and the
accompanying hypotheses is that there is no assumption of equifinality or isoperformance. Iso-performance implies that all fits are equally as good (Donaldson,
2001). This means that for each value of the contingency there is a value for
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Resource
Munificence

Resource Munificence / System Membership 2 x 2
Four Variables are Created
High

Group 3

Group 4
Group 1 - Low Resources, No System (reference category for H1)
Group 2 - Low Resources, System

Low

Group 1

Group 2
Group 3 - High Resources, No System

No

Yes

System Membership

Group 4 - High Resources, System
H1: Performance of Group 2 > Group 1

Proximity to
Other Hospital

Proximity to Other Hospital / Local Partner 2 x 2
Three Variables are Created
Yes

Group 2

Group 3
Group 1 - Not Proximate, No Local Partner
Group 2 - Proximate, No Local Partner (reference category for H2)

No

Group 1

N/A
Group 3 - Proximate, Local Partner

No

Yes

Local Partner

H2: Performance of Group 3 > Group 2

Proximity to
Larger Hospital

Proximity to Larger Hospital / Hierarchy 2 x 2
Three Variables are Created
Yes

Group 2

Group 3
Group 1 - Not Proximate, No Hierarchy
Group 2 - Proximate, No Hierarchy (reference category for H3)

No

Group 1

N/A
Group 3 - Proximate, Hierarchy

No

Yes

Hierarchy

H3: Performance of Group 3 > Group 2

CAH Status / Hierarchy 2 x 2

CAH Status

Four Variables are Created
Yes

Group 3

Group 4
Group 1 - Not a CAH, No Hierarchy
Group 2 - Not a CAH, Hierarchy

No

Group 1

Group 2
Group 3 - CAH, No Hierarchy (reference category for H4)

No

Yes

Hierarchy

Group 4 - CAH, Hierarchy
H4: Performance of Group 4 > Group 3

Figure 8 – Fit/Congruence 2 x 2 Matrices and Groups for Analysis
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organizational structure that will result in the highest performance. Using the contingent
pair of resource munificence and system membership as an example, this means that the
level of performance produced when a system hospital is in a low munificence area
would be the same as the level of performance of a non-system hospital in a high
munificence area. Although none of the hypotheses specifically identify which groups
should be equal, the concept of iso-performance will be addressed as part of the
discussion of the results of this study.
A combined fit/congruence score will be used to test the overall hypothesis (H5) that
better fit between rural hospital system affiliation and environment positively affects
hospital performance. However, it may be more appropriate to call this a measure of
misfit rather than fit. Due to concerns about iso-performance and the potential for
multiple groups to have the same “fit”, the combined fit/congruence score will be based
on the combinations of the environmental contingencies and the organizational structures
that result in the worst fit or misfit. These are clearly identifiable and are indicated in
Figure 9. Hospitals that fall into one of the misfit areas will be assigned a score of 1 and
all other hospitals will receive a zero. Since there are four contingent pairs, the
maximum score a hospital could receive is 4, indicating that it is a misfit in four
dimensions. The composite misfit scores will range from zero (indicating that the
hospital is not a misfit in any contingent pair) to four, and a lower score should be
associated with greater performance. This composite measure also assumes equal
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High

Low

Misfit

No

Proximity to Larger Hospital / Hierarchy 2 x 2
Proximity to Larger
Hospital

Resource
Munificence

Resource Munificence / System Membership 2 x 2

Yes

• Instances of “misfit” are clearly
identified
No

Yes

No

System Membership

No
No

CAH Status / Hierarchy 2 x 2

CAH Status

Proximity to Other
Hospital

Misfit

Yes

Local Partner

Yes

Hierarchy

Proximity to Other Hospital / Local Partner 2 x 2

Yes

Misfit

Yes

• Hospitals falling into a “misfit”
category are given a score of one
• The scores are added together:
1 = misfit in one area
2 = misfit in two areas
3 = misfit in three areas
4 = misfit in four areas

Misfit

• Assumes equal contribution
from each category to the
“misfit” score

No
No

Yes

Hierarchy

Figure 9 – Calculation of the composite measure of fit/congruence
contributions from each contingent pair, so no contingent pair influences the composite
measure more than another. In reality this may not be the case, and a separate analysis
using the four individual misfit scores will be conducted to test the equal weight
assumption for the composite measure, and potentially adjust the calculation of the
composite fit measure.

Control Variables
Control variables for this study consist of a lagged measure of hospital performance
and two sets of control variables for hospital and market characteristics that have been
shown to affect hospital performance. As Donaldson (2001) suggests in his guidelines
for conducting empirical work with contingency theory, a lagged dependent variable and
the environmental characteristics used in the fit/congruence calculation are included as
controls in the analytic model. The lagged measure of hospital performance controls for

115
unobserved time-invariant factors like political climate and organizational culture which
may impact performance. As with the dependent variables, to minimize the influence of
aberrant accounting information within a given year, the lagged dependent control
variable will be a three year average from 2002 to 2004.
The hospital control variables hospital size, ownership type, teaching status,
Medicare payer percentage and Medicaid payer percentage will be included to control for
hospital characteristics which have been related to hospital performance in empirical
research (Zhao et al, 2008; Chukmaitov et al., 2009; Pervaiz et al., 2008; Shen et al.,
2007; Wang et al., 2001a; Younis, 2006). Similarly, a set of environmental/market
characteristics taken primarily from the ARF will be included to control for
environmental factors that may have an impact on efficiency and financial performance.
The measures of per capita income and unemployment rate will be included as control
variables representing environmental munificence. Additionally, a set of indicator
variables for the U.S. Census Bureau divisions will be included as an environmental
control variable to account for geographic differences identified in previous studies (Pink
et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2001; Younis, 2006; Mick et al, 1993; Reardon, 1996). Where
appropriate, a three year average (2006 to 2008) will be used so the control variables
match the dependent variables (some data are not available for unemployment rate and
per capita income, so a two year average is used). Table 3 summarizes all of the
variables used in this study and identifies their source.
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Table 3. Study Variables
Variable
Dependent Variables
Hospital Total Margin (3 year average)

Measurement

Data Source

Net Income / Total Revenue (2006 to 2008)

HCRIS / AHA

Hospital Efficiency (3 year average)

DEA Efficiency Score (2006 to 2008)

Calculated

Variables Used in Calculating the DEA Efficiency Score
Staffed Hospital Beds
Weighted Service Mix
Non-Physician FTEs
Non-Labor Expenses

Number of staffed beds in the facility
Weighted count of clinical services that the
hospital provides (weighted per Ozcan &
Luke, 2010)
Total number of non-physician FTEs for the
hospital
Total operating expenses minus payroll
expenses expressed in 2008 dollars

AHA
AHA
AHA
AHA

Total Admissions

Number of admissions for the facility

AHA

Births

Number of live births in the facility

AHA

Total Surgical Procedures

Number of both inpatient and outpatient
surgical procedures for the facility

AHA

Emergency Room/Department Visits

Number of outpatient visits to the ER/ED

AHA

Other Outpatient Visits

Number of non-ER/ED outpatient visits

AHA

Independent Variables
Individual Measure of Fit / Congruence

Composite Measure of Fit/Congruence

Set of Indicator Variables (coded as 1 or 0)
indicating which group the hospital belongs
to based on the 2 x 2 matrix for that
contingent pair
Sum of the misfit scores for each hospital
from the four contingent pairs

Calculated

Calculated

Variables Used to Calculate the Fit/Congruence Scores
Per Capita Income

Per capita income for the county where the
hospital is located - for 2004

ARF

Unemployment Rate

Percentage of persons unemployed in 2004
for the county where the hospital is located

ARF

Proximity to Another Hospital

Dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the
hospital is within 50 miles of another
hospital, zero otherwise

Calculated using
Longitude and
Latitude from AHA
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Table 3. Study Variables (continued)
Variable

Measurement

Data Source

Variables Used to Calculate the Fit/Congruence Scores (continued)
Dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the
Calculated using
Proximity to a Larger Hospital
hospital is within 50 miles of another hospital
Longitude and
that has at least 50 more beds
Latitude from AHA
CAH Status

Indicator variable coded as 1 if the hospital is
a CAH, otherwise zero

AHA

System Membership

Indicator variable coded as 1 if the hospital
belongs to a system, otherwise zero

AHA

Local System Partner

Dichotomous variable coded 1 if there is
another hospital that is part of the same
system within 50 miles, otherwise zero

Calculated using
Longitude and
Latitude from AHA

Hierarchical System Partner

Dichotomous variable coded 1 if there is
another larger hospital that is part of the
same system within 50 miles, otherwise zero

Calculated using
Longitude and
Latitude from AHA

Lagged Dependent Variable

The same dependent variables as listed
above, but for 2002 to 2004

HCRIS / Calculated

Hospital Size

Number of staffed beds for the hospital average for 2006 to 2008

AHA

Ownership Type

Dichotomous variable coded 1 if for-profit,
otherwise zero

AHA

Teaching Status

Dichotomous variable coded 1 if the hospital
runs a teaching program, otherwise zero

AHA

Medicare Payer %

Total facility inpatient days / Medicare
inpatient days - average for 2006 to 2008

AHA

Medicaid Payer %

Total facility inpatient days / Medicaid
inpatient days - average for 2006 to 2008

AHA

Per Capita Income

Per capita income for the county where the
hospital is located - for 2006

ARF

Unemployment Rate

Percentage of persons unemployed in county
- average for 2006 to 2007

ARF

US Census Division

Set of indicator variables for the 9 US Census
divisions

ARF

Control Variables
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Analytic Methods
Analysis for this study consists of three phases: calculation of the DEA efficiency
scores, descriptive statistics, and inferential testing using regression analysis.
Calculation of the DEA efficiency scores for each hospital will be performed using
the Excel based DEA software developed by Joe Zhu (2009) for his book, Quantitative
Models for Performance Evaluation and Benchmarking. The four input and five output
variables identified for the model will be imported into the spreadsheet in the format
specified by Zhu and then an efficiency score for each will be generated. This will be
done for each year in the study period, and then the efficiency scores for 2002 to 2004
and the efficiency scores for 2006 to 2008 will be averaged together to create the lagged
dependent control variable and the dependent efficiency variable respectively.
Next descriptive statistics will be calculated for all of the variables used in the
analysis. The mean and standard deviation for each variable will be used to compare the
study sample to the hospitals that were excluded from the study sample in order to
identify any systematic differences between the groups. Additionally, comparisons will
be made between the hospitals in the sample based on ownership status, system
membership, CAH status, and geographic region. This preliminary analysis will provide
information about a priori assumptions related to control variables and possible selection
bias by for-profit systems as reported by Halpern et al. (1992).
Regression analysis will be used to test the hypothesized relationships in the study.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will be used for the models where financial
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performance is the dependent variable, and in accordance with previous DEA analysis
(Chilingerian, 1995) a Tobit regression model will be used where the transformed DEA
efficiency score is the dependent variable. The empirical model is the same for each type
of regression:
 =



+

 +



 

+



 

+



 

+ 

(1.1)

Where  is the average dependent performance variable for hospital i in years

2006 through 2008, Fi 2004 is the fit/congruence score for hospital i in 2004, 
 is the set of control
is the set of control variables for hospital characteristics, 

variables for market characteristics,  is the lagged performance measure, and εi
is the error term. This analysis will be run ten different times, to test all 5 hypotheses for
both dependent variables. For the analysis of the first four hypotheses, Fi 2004 represents
the individual fit / congruence scores for the contingent relationships specified in the
hypothesis. For testing the fifth hypothesis, Fi 2004 represents the composite
fit/congruence score created by summing the “misfit” scores from all of the contingent
pairs for each hospital.
Limitations of the Study Methods
There are three potential limitations to the proposed study methods. The first is the
non-experimental design of the study and the lack of a baseline performance measure
prior to each hospital becoming part of a multi-hospital system. Ideally, the study would
use a quasi-experimental design with performance measures taken before and after rural
hospitals joined multi-hospital systems, and the period when the hospitals joined systems
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would be relatively short and well defined. However, in reality that is not the case. Rural
hospitals joined multi-hospital systems over a period of several years (as much 30 years),
with no clear beginning and no clear end. Over that period, the secondary data sources
available for analysis changed as questions were added and removed from the AHA
survey and the format for the HCRIS and ARF were modified over time. Even if the data
were consistent and available, such a long study period would make it very difficult to
control for the numerous significant environmental and legislative changes that have
occurred. Thus while the study design is not ideal, it makes an acceptable tradeoff
between data availability, statistical control, and the ability to make causal inferences.
The second limitation concerns measurement error associated with the self-reported
data elements in the AHA survey used to classify the health systems. This issue has been
raised by other authors (Mullner & Chung, 2002; Luke, 1996) and was addressed by
Bazzoli et al. (2006). Their answer was simply that the AHA survey does have some
measurement error as does any survey or empirical work. However, how much
measurement error there may be in the AHA survey is not clear, and of greater
consequence is the fact that the AHA survey has been used in a large number of hospital
studies with great success. The most important concern when using the AHA annual
survey, as with any survey, is to understand the data elements that are incorporated into
the study and use them appropriately (Mullner & Chung, 2002).
The final limitation is one of potential selection bias / endogeneity, in that the choice
of a hospital to join a particular health system may not be random. Hospitals with poor
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financial performance or hospitals which need to downsize inpatient services may seek
out a system partner that facilitates this. The possible consequence is that financial
performance or inefficiency, both of which are the dependent variables in this study,
could be the reason why rural hospitals join multi-hospital systems to begin with.
Although the statistical models employed in this study control for several hospital and
market characteristics, they do not control for potential endogeneity. Instead, this
potential problem is addressed through sample selection and preliminary analysis. The
sample for this study contains essentially the entire population of U.S. non-federal rural
acute care general hospitals, and descriptive analysis of variable means will indicate if
system and non-system hospitals are systematically different from one another.
However, this study does not measure the relationship between system membership and
hospital performance, but rather the relationship between “fit” and performance. For
each hypothesis the hospitals in the “fit” and “misfit” categories are different, and both
categories may contain system and non-system hospitals. Therefore the presence of a
systematic relationship between system membership and performance is not as great of a
concern as it would be if system membership was being directly linked to performance.
Additionally, on a theoretical level, the concept of bounded rationality (March & Simon,
1993) indicates that hospital leaders may not always realize when their hospitals are in
trouble, and even if they do they may not discern all of the strategic choices available to
them (like joining a multi-hospital system). Thus there is potentially no clear underlying
logic why some hospitals have joined systems and some have not.
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Summary of the Methods Chapter
This chapter described the methods for this study including the research design, the
definition and source of all variables and the analysis methods used to test each
hypothesis. Calculation of the DEA efficiency scores and the fit/congruence scores for
each hospital were discussed in detail, and limitations of the study methods were
presented. The next chapter will present the results of the analysis in detail.

CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS

This chapter discusses the preparation of the study data set for analysis and presents
the results of the analysis. The first section discusses how the two dependent variables
and the fit/congruence scores for the study were calculated and presents some descriptive
statistics for these variables. The second section reports descriptive statistics for the
study sample and also compares the study sample to hospitals that were excluded from
the study sample due to estimated AHA data or a change in system and/or CAH status.
The third section presents the results of the regression analysis used to test the study
hypotheses, and the fourth section presents a supplementary analysis that was performed
with the hospitals that were excluded from the study sample as well as a simple test of the
equal weights assumption used to calculate the composite fit measure for each hospital.
The chapter closes with a summary of the results.
Data Preparation and Calculation of Study Measures
As discussed in the methods chapter, the data set for the study was constructed by
merging data from the AHA annual hospital survey, the ARF data set, and the CMS
HCRIS files. Although the study period is from 2004 to 2008, AHA and HCRIS data
from 2002 and 2003 were also used in order to construct the lagged dependent variables,
which are three year averages. The AHA data were merged with the ARF data using the
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) codes for the state and the county in
123
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which the hospital was located. Then the HCRIS data were merged with the AHA and
ARF data using the hospital Medicare identification number.
In addition to merging data from different sources together, several AHA variables
were re-coded into dichotomous variables or converted into a set of dummy variables for
the analysis, and the two dependent variables and the fit/congruence scores were
calculated. The following sub-sections discuss the calculation of each of the dependent
variables and the hospital fit scores and reports some summary statistics for these
variables.

Calculation of the Hospital Efficiency Scores
DEA scores were calculated for the 1,421 short-term, acute care, general rural
hospitals that were in the sampling frame (1,010 hospitals in the sample, 235 hospitals
with estimated AHA data, 96 hospitals that changed system status within the study
period, and 80 hospitals that changed CAH status during the study period). These scores
were then used in the analysis of the study hypotheses as well as the supplementary
analysis that examined the effect of including the hospitals with AHA estimated data and
the comparisons of the study sample to the hospitals that were excluded due to a change
in system or CAH status.
DEA scores were calculated for each hospital for the years 2002 to 2008, and then
the scores were averaged together for 2002 to 2004 to create the lagged dependent
variable, and for 2006 to 2008 to create the dependent variable. The most efficient
hospitals within the sample have a score of “1” and the other less efficient DMUs within
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the sample have an efficiency score between “0” and less than “1”. However, the DEA
scores are essentially censored variables Chilingerian (1995), which need to be
transformed in order to meet the distributional assumptions for regression analysis.
Following Chilingerian’s example, the DEA efficiency scores were transformed using the
equation (1/DEA Score)-1, and were analyzed using a Tobit model, which is a regression
model for dependent variables that are censored at zero but are roughly continuously
distributed over strictly positive values (Wooldridge, 2009). Therefore the dependent
variable for the efficiency analysis is an inefficiency score, where efficient hospitals have
a score of “0” and a higher score represents greater inefficiency. Table 4 summarizes the
hospital DEA efficiency scores and the converted inefficiency scores for each year.
Table 4. Summary of DEA Efficiency Scores
DEA Efficiency Scores

Average Efficiency Average Inefficiency

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

02 to 04

06 to 08

02 to 04

06 to 08

Mean

0.591

0.502

0.593

0.566

0.576

0.567

0.589

0.562

0.577

1.086

1.029

Std Dev

0.213

0.202

0.208

0.214

0.204

0.212

0.211

0.193

0.198

1.034

1.099

Minimum

0.091

0.082

0.083

0.076

0.077

0.022

0.038

0.110

0.052

0

0

Maximum

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

8.09

18.31

Efficient Hospitals

80

36

65

52

56

67

74

18

24

18

24

The DEA summary scores reveal that for the period 2002 to 2008, 2003 was the
worst year in terms of hospital efficiency with a mean efficiency score of 0.502 for the
group and only 36 hospitals receiving the maximum efficiency score of 1. Other than
2003, the mean efficiency scores for each year are very similar with between 3.7% and
5.6% of hospitals in each year being rated as efficient. Looking at the average efficiency
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scores, the mean for the 2006 to 2008 period is slightly higher than the 2002 to 2004
period, but this difference is not statistically significant and is largely determined by the
2003 efficiency mean. Eighteen hospitals in the 2002 to 2004 period and 24 hospitals for
the 2006 to 2008 period were efficient (a score of 1) for all three years, indicating that
some hospitals in the sample consistently perform at a high level in terms of efficiency.
The average inefficiency scores reverse the scale and identify the efficient hospitals with
a 0 instead of 1, and the inefficient hospitals are now identified by a high score rather
than a low score. However, unlike the efficiency scores which must be between 1 and 0,
the inefficiency scores can assume any positive number, resulting in a greater range of
scores.

Calculation of Average Hospital Total Margin
The intent for calculating the average total margin for each hospital was very similar
to the calculation of the efficiency scores. Using the HCRIS data, total margin would be
calculated for each hospital for the years 2002 to 2008 and then the values for 2002 to
2004 and the values for 2006 to 2008 would be averaged together to produce the lagged
dependent and dependent variables, respectively. However, this task proved to be much
more difficult than originally conceived. Several problems with the HCRIS data had to
be addressed in order to calculate the three-year averages needed for the study.
The first problem was that the HCRIS data are reported in fiscal years rather than
calendar years, making it difficult to determine what HCRIS reports should be matched
with each calendar year for a given hospital. The second problem (which compounds the
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first problem) is that several hospitals changed their fiscal year during the study period,
causing the length of the time period for their HCRIS reports to vary across the study
period. Some of the reports were very short (as little as one quarter) and some were very
long (over 400 days), and matching these reports to a specific calendar year was very
difficult. Reports which contained less than 270 days were excluded because it was
feared that they represented periods that contained some unusual event requiring a partial
year report. Finally, there was also a problem with missing data or non-reported values
for a given hospital, which are generally reflected as zeros in the CMS cost reports. The
missing data were a combination of non-reported values or the absence of the reports that
were less than 270 days.
To deal with these problems and still retain as many hospitals as possible in the
study sample, total margin averages for each hospital were calculated using the fixed
effect for time for each hospital obtained from a longitudinal regression of total margin
on dummy variables for each year. This is in essence a method of imputation; however,
this method has the added advantage of controlling the aberrant influence of a given year
(i.e. the possibility that the data that are present is the product of a potentially “good” or
“bad” year and simply taking a 2-year average when one year of data are missing would
produce an average that is overly influenced by the aberrant year). A second advantage is
the elimination of the need to match HCRIS fiscal years to calendar years. The year
dummy variables used in the longitudinal regression were calculated based on the
proportion of the HCRIS report days that fell within a given calendar year.
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The first step in the procedure was to assemble all of the HCRIS data into a panel
data set. The observations for each hospital from 2002 to 2008 were put into one data
set, with the AHA hospital identification number identifying the panels and the HCRIS
report year identifying the time periods within a given panel. The panel data set was then
divided into two data sets with the reports that ended on or before 30 June 2005 in the
data set that would be used to calculate the 2002 to 2004 average total margin and reports
that began on 1 July 2005 or later in the data set that would be used to calculate the 2006
to 2008 average total margin.
Next the dummy variables for each year were calculated. If all of the HCRIS reports
started on 1 Jan and ended on 31 December, then the yearly dummy variables would all
equal one. However, that is not the case. For any given hospital, the fiscal year for the
HCRIS reports could or could not match the calendar year. If the fiscal year matched the
calendar year, then the year dummy for that hospital for that year was equal to one. If the
fiscal year did not match the calendar year, then the year dummy reflected the number of
days from the HCRIS report that fell into that calendar year (i.e. if the HCRIS report was
from 1 Oct 2002 to 30 Sep 2003 then the year dummy for 2002 would be .25 and the year
dummy for 2003 would be .75 for that hospital for that report). By doing this, the year
dummies reflected the proportion of each report that fell into each calendar year,
essentially matching the reports to the calendar years.
After calculating the year dummy variables, a fixed effects model was used to isolate
hospital fixed effects for time. This was done by regressing the yearly dummy variables
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upon hospital total margin (equation 1.2 for the 2002 to 2004 average and equation 1.3
for the 2006 to 2008 average) to isolate the hospital fixed effect ( ) and the estimated
coefficients for the influence of each year (
 =  +

 +

 

+ 

(1.2)

 =  +

 +

 

+ 

(1.3)

&

 ).

The fixed effect for each hospital was then added to the sample mean total margin to
generate the three-year average total margin for each hospital. When all three years of
data are present for a given hospital, then the average generated by this procedure is
equivalent to the actual average for the three years. But when one year of data is missing,
this procedure produces a three-year average that is different from the average of the two
years of data that is present, because it controls for time effects (i.e., the year dummy
coefficients). To illustrate the benefit of this technique, consider an example hospital
which has a fixed effect of 0.10; in other words the hospital’s total margin exceeds the
mean total margin of the sample by .10. Suppose that the mean margins for the sample in
the three years were -0.05, 0.0, and 0.05 (so the example hospital’s margins were 0.05,
.0.10, and 0.15). If the first year of data for the example hospital were missing, then its
mean margin would be 0.075; if the third year were missing then its mean margin would
be 0.125. But with calculation of average margin based on estimating fixed effects, the
average margin for this hospital is 0.10 no matter which of the data values is missing.
A summary of the calculated three-year total margin average is presented in Table 5.
Note that hospitals that were missing more than one year of data for a given three-year
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Table 5. Summary of Average Total Margin
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Average Total Margin 2002-2004

0.0158

0.1757

-3.7585

1.7533

Average Total Margin 2006-2008

0.0268

0.0751

-0.3949

0.5437

period were excluded from the analysis. This exclusion results in the slightly different
sample sizes for the analysis of the two dependent variables (n=1010 for efficiency and
n=1007 for total margin). The average total margin mean in both periods was positive,
and although both mean values are relatively small; the mean for 2006 to 2008 is nearly
twice the mean for 2002 to 2004. Additionally, the standard deviation of the mean for the
2006 to 2008 period is much smaller than the 2002 to 2004 period, indicating that there is
less dispersion in the hospital average total margin values for the later period.

Calculation of the Fit/Congruence Scores
The calculation of the fit/congruence scores for the study occurred in two steps.
First, the individual measures used to construct the fit/congruence scores had to be
calculated. This included the generation of a single resource munificence measure, the
identification of hospitals that were proximate to other hospitals, and the identification of
proximate and hierarchical system partners. The second step was combining the
measures for the four contingent pairs identified in the conceptual framework, and
assigning the hospitals to a group based on the 2x2 matrices discussed in the study
methods. The following paragraphs discuss the generation of the variables required to
assess fit/congruence and then report summary statistics for these variables. Then the
2x2 matrices for the individual fit/congruence scores are shown with the number of
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hospitals falling into each category, and the section closes with a summary of the
composite fit/congruence scores.
The resource munificence measure was generated using the principle component
method of factor analysis on the variables per capita income and unemployment rate from
the ARF data set. A single factor was extracted that retained 69.7% of the total variance
of the two variables, and the factor loadings were used to generate a new variable which
was named resource munificence. Percentiles for this new variable were then calculated,
and hospitals which were below the 25th percentile were classified as “low resource
munificence” and hospitals that were above the 75th percentile were classified as “high
resource munificence”. Table 6 contains the results of the factor analysis, summary
statistics for the new resource munificence variable, and a count of how many hospitals
fall into the different resource munificence categories.
The top portion of Table 6 shows the results of the factor analysis on the left and the
factor loadings that were used to construct the new resource munificence variable. In the
center of Table 6 are the summary statistics for the new resource munificence variable
and the percentile scores that were used to identify the high, medium-high, medium-low,
and low resource area hospital groups. At the bottom of the table is a count of the
hospitals in each group. Hospitals in the low munificence group and hospitals in the high
munificence group were then combined with a dichotomous measure of system
membership to calculate the fit/congruence measure for the first hypothesis. The 2x2
matrices showing how many hospitals fall into each group are at the end of this section.
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Table 6. Summary of the Creation of the Resource Munificence Measure
Factor Analysis of Per Capita Income and Unemployment Rate
Factor

Component Matrix

Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative

Component 1

Factor1

1.395

0.790

0.698

0.698

percapincome2004

0.835

Factor2

0.605

.

0.303

1.000

unemployrate2004

-0.835

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(1) = 240.89 Prob>chi2 = 0.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Summary statistics for the new variable: Resource Munificence
Percentiles

Smallest

Largest

Obs

1421

1%

-2.492

-4.651

Mean

0.004

5%

-1.541

-4.486

Std. Dev.

0.991

10%

-1.126

-4.421

Variance

0.983

25%

-0.605

-3.925

Skewness

0.151

50%

-0.005

Kurtosis

7.034

75%

0.658

3.226

90%

1.153

4.339

95%

1.465

4.504

99%

2.459

7.795

Count of Hospitals in Each Munificence Quartile
Low Resource Munificence (below 25th percentile)

253

Medium-Low Resource Munificence (25th to 50th percentile)

246

Medium-High Resource Munificence (50th to 75th percentile)

255

High Resource Munificence (above 75th percentile)

256

The next variables that were generated were the hospital proximity measures that
counted the number of other hospitals, other system hospitals, larger hospitals, and larger
system hospitals that were within 50 miles of a given hospital. The “circnum” command
in Stata, which calculates straight line distance between observations based on the
latitude and longitude for each observation, was used to perform this operation. As
discussed in the methods section, a radius of 50 miles was used for the proximity
measures in this study. However, there is no consensus in the existing literature on how
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close system hospitals need to be in order to centralize administrative, logistic, and/or
clinical services. In fact centralization of administrative services may not require system
hospitals to be proximate to one another, and the degree of proximity required to
centralize logistic services may be different than that required for clinical services. For
this reason, the proximity measures were also calculated using a radius of 35 miles, and
the fit/congruence measures for hypotheses 2 through 5 were calculated using both the 50
mile radius and the 35 mile radius, and then the raw scores were converted to indicator
variables in order to calculate the fit/congruence scores. The scores calculated using a 35
mile radius will be used in a supplementary analysis to determine if the distance on which
the proximity measures are based affects the study results. A summary of the proximity
measure raw scores and the indicator variables is presented in Table 7. The proximity
scores reveal that 98% are within 50 miles of at least one other hospital, and on average a
rural hospital is within 50 miles of 11 other short-term acute care hospitals. However,
only 28% of the hospitals are within 50 miles of a hospital that is within the same system,
and only 16% of the hospitals are within 50 miles of a larger system hospital. As
expected, these numbers are lower for the 35 mile radius measures, with the greatest
difference in the large proximate hospital measure.
The fit/congruence scores for hypotheses one through four were calculated by
combining the resource munificence, system membership, proximity measure, and CAH
status variables in accordance with the 2x2 matrices discussed in the study methods.
Based on the 50 mile radius proximity measures, the number of hospitals falling into each
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Table 7. Summary of the Calculated Proximity Measures
Summary Statistics for Actual Values
Variable

Summary of Indicator Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Mean

Number = 1

Number of Proximate Hospitals 50 miles

11.52

7.11

0

47

0.98

989

Number of Proximate Hospitals 35 miles

5.05

3.40

0

20

0.92

932

Number of Local System Partners 50 miles

0.69

1.37

0

9

0.28

287

Number of Local System Partners 35 miles

0.36

0.83

0

7

0.21

212

Large Proximate Hospitals 50 miles

4.12

4.39

0

28

0.81

818

Number of Large Proximate Hospitals 35 miles

1.62

1.99

0

12

0.60

607

Number of Hierarchical System Partners 50 miles

0.24

0.65

0

6

0.16

161

Number of Hierarchical System Partners 30 miles

0.13

0.41

0

3

0.10

104

group for each hypothesis is shown in Figure 10. For the first hypothesis only the
hospitals in the lowest and highest munificence quartiles are used in the analysis, so the

High

154

102

Low

157

96

No

Yes

H3: Proximity to Larger Hospital / Hierarchy 2 x 2*
Proximity to Larger
Hospital

Resource
Munificence

H1: Resource Munificence / System Membership 2 x 2

Yes

657

161

No

192

N/A

No

Yes

System Membership

Hierarchy

Yes

702

287

No

21

N/A

No

Yes

H4: CAH Status / Hierarchy 2 x 2*

CAH Status

Proximity to Other
Hospital

H2: Proximity to Other Hospital / Local Partner 2 x 2*

Yes

463

87

No

386

74

No

Yes

Local Partner
*The numbers in these matrices reflect the 50 mile radius proximity measures

Figure 10 – Number of Hospitals in Each Fit/Congruence Group

Hierarchy
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numbers in the matrix do not add up to 1010. The other three hypotheses use the entire
study sample, and the numbers in each matrix add up to n=1010.
The composite fit/congruence score was calculated by adding the number of times a
hospital fell into the “misfit” category for one of the four individual fit/congruence
measures. The misfit categories or groups are indicated by the shaded boxes in Figure
10, and Table 8 shows the number and percent of sample hospitals receiving each
composite fit/congruence score. These scores reveal that over 82% of the hospitals in the
study sample fell into the misfit category for at least one of the individual fit/congruence
score measures and more than 68% were a misfit in two or more measures.
Table 8. Summary of Composite Fit Scores
Score

Description

# of Hospitals % of Hospitals

0

Hospital was not a misfit in any individual measure

180

17.82%

1

Hospital was a misfit in one individual measures

141

13.96%

2

Hospital was a misfit in two individual measures

294

29.11%

3

Hospital was a misfit in three individual measures

330

32.67%

4

Hospital was a misfit in four individual measures

65

6.44%

Descriptive Statistics and Analysis
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the regression models are presented
in this section for both the study sample and the hospitals that were excluded from the
sample due to estimation of AHA measures and changes in CAH and system status.
Study sample variable values are compared to the values for the other groups in order to
detect potential mortality threats, and gather information about how the exclusion of
these hospitals may affect the study results. Correlation analysis of the independent
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variables in the regression models that is used to ensure that the assumption of no perfect
collinearity holds for the regression analysis is presented at the end of this section.

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the study sample as well as the hospitals that were excluded
due to AHA estimated values and changing system and CAH status are reported in Table
9. The study sample consists of n=1010 short-term acute care general hospitals located in
either micropolitan (37.3%) or non-core (62.7%) statistical areas. Slightly more than half
(53.9%) are privately owned not-for-profit hospitals, 40.5% of them are owned by a
multi-hospital system, and less than two percent have a GME residency program.
Although the sample contains hospitals from every census division, the majority of
sample hospitals are either in the West North Central (27.2%), the West South Central
(17.1%), or the East North Central (15.3%) divisions. Sample hospitals have on average
59.72 staffed beds and receive over 70% of their payments from either Medicare (50%)
or Medicaid (21.7%), and both their average productive efficiency and total margin
increased from the 2002-2004 period to the 2006-2008 period.
Compared to the hospitals that were excluded from the study sample, there are some
statistically significant differences that are worth noting. First, hospitals that changed
system status during the study period were more likely to belong to a multi-hospital
system than the hospitals in the study sample. This is understandable since the majority
of hospitals that changed system status during the study period (47 out of 80) went from
being independent to being part of a system. Second, hospitals with AHA estimated
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Proportional Variables
Fit/Congruence Groups
Hypothesis 1
Low Munificence - No System
Low Munificence - System
High Munificence - No System
High Munificence - System
Hypothesis 2
No Proximate Hosp - No Local Partner
Proximate Hosp - No Local Partner
Proximate Hosp - Local Partner
Hypothesis 3
No Proximate Large Hospital
Proximate Large Hosp - No Hierarchial Partner
Proximate Large Hosp - Hierarchical Partner
Hypothesis 4
Non-CAH - No Hierarchical Partner
Non-CAH - Hierarchical Partner
CAH - No Hierarchical Partner
CAH - Hierarchical Partner
Hypothesis 5
Misfit in Zero Fit Measures
Misfit in One Fit Measure
Misfit in Two Fit Measures
Misfit in Three Fit Measures
Misfit in Four Fit Measures

Hospitals in Study
Sample (n=1010)
Number Proportion

Hospitals that changed
System Status (n=80)
Number Proportion

Hospitals that changed
CAH Status (n=96)
Number Proportion

Hospitals with AHA
Estimated Values (n=235)
Number Proportion

157
96
154
102

15.54%
9.50%
15.25%
10.10%

10
13
12
8

12.50%
16.25%*
15.00%
10.00%

8
10
11
14

8.34%*
10.42%
11.46%
14.58%

32
29
38
17

13.62%
12.34%
16.17%
7.23%

21
702
287

2.08%
69.50%
28.42%

3
62
15

3.75%
77.50%
18.75%*

0
67
29

0.00%
69.79%
30.21%

8
163
64

3.40%
69.36%
27.23%

192
657
161

19.01%
65.05%
15.94%

13
64
3

16.25%
80.00%**
3.75%**

18
60
18

18.75%
62.50%
18.75%

41
154
40

17.45%
65.53%
17.02%

386
74
463
87

38.22%
7.33%
45.84%
8.61%

42
2
35
1

52.50%**
2.50%
43.75%
1.25%**

77
17
1
1

80.21%**
17.71%**
1.04%**
1.04%**

84
25
111
15

35.74%
10.64%*
47.23%
6.38%

180
141
294
330
65

17.82%
13.96%
29.11%
32.67%
6.44%

7
8
34
29
2

8.75%**
10.00%
42.50%**
36.25%
2.50%

22
18
50
6
0

22.92%
18.75%
52.08%**
6.25%**
0.00%**

44
25
80
69
17

18.72%
10.64%
34.04%
29.36%
7.23%

37.50%
62.50%

28
68

29.17%
70.83%

78
157

33.19%
66.81%

41.25%**
58.75%**

52
44

54.17%
45.83%
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100

57.45%
42.55%

11.25%
56.25%
32.50%

0
58
38

0.00%**
60.42%
39.58%

36
109
90

15.32%**
46.38%**
38.30%

0.00%
100.00%

0
96

0.00%
100.00%

2
233

0.85%
99.15%

3.75%
3.75%
6.25%**
11.25%**
20.00%**
17.50%**
20.00%
15.00%
2.50%

6
2
16
39
1
5
12
8
7

6.25%*
2.08%
16.67%
40.63%**
1.04%**
5.21%
12.50%
8.33%
7.29%

6
7
32
41
28
41
30
26
24

2.55%
2.98%
13.62%
17.45%**
11.91%
17.45%**
12.77%
11.06%
10.21%**

28.75%
27.50%
18.75%
25.00%

18
23
30
25

18.75%
23.96%
31.25%
26.04%

61
64
55
55

25.96%
27.23%
23.40%
23.40%

Other Indicator Variables
CBSA Type
Micropolitan Area
377
37.33%
30
Non-Core Area
633
62.67%
50
System Membership
Non-System
601
59.50%
33
System
409
40.50%
47
Ownership Status
For Profit
74
7.33%
9
Not For Profit
545
53.96%
45
Local Government
391
38.71%
26
Teaching
GME Residency
17
1.68%
0
No GME Residency
993
98.32%
80
Census Divisions
New England
31
3.07%
3
Middle Atlantic
39
3.86%
3
East North Central
154
15.25%
5
West North Central
275
27.23%
9
South Atlantic
95
9.41%
16
East South Central
92
9.11%
14
West South Central
173
17.13%
16
Mountain
100
9.90%
12
Pacific
51
5.05%
2
Resource Munifience Quartiles
Low
253
25.05%
23
Medium-Low
246
24.36%
22
Medium-High
255
25.25%
15
High
256
25.35%
20
* Group proportion is significantly different from the study sample at the p < .10 level
** Group proportion is significantly different from the study sample at the p < .05 level
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables (continued)
Hospitals in Study
Sample (n=1010)
Mean Std. Dev.

Hospitals that changed
System Status (n=80)
Mean
Std. Dev.

Hospitals that changed
CAH Status (n=96)
Mean
Std. Dev.

Hospitals with AHA
Estimated Values (n=235)
Mean
Std. Dev.

Continuous Variables
Control Variables
Resource Munificence
Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)
Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)
Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)
Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)
Per Capita Income - 2006

0.003
59.720
0.217
0.500
4.999
$27,168

1.005
50.519
0.199
0.230
1.772
5148.275

0.003
57.408
0.197
0.553
5.109
$28,300

1.205
45.036
0.186
0.212**
1.890
7036.835*

0.113
42.160
0.197
0.513
4.947
$27,257

0.788
30.886**
0.187
0.224
1.424
3442.024

-0.038
61.043
0.221
0.483
4.969
$27,114

0.926
48.219
0.169
0.177
1.682
5635.245

Efficiency Measures
Hospital Efficiency (02-04 avg)
Hospital Inefficiency (02-04 avg)
Hospital Efficiency (06-08 avg)
Hospital Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

0.557
1.124
0.571
1.057

0.196
1.092
0.197
1.141

0.585
0.938
0.590
0.989

0.164
0.973*
0.184
1.227

0.557
0.981
0.610
0.836

0.162
0.696*
0.195*
0.669**

0.577
1.013
0.588
1.000

0.201
0.898*
0.206
1.000

(n=95)
0.023
0.068
-0.036
0.758**

0.021
0.024

Financial Measures
(n=1007)
(n=79)
Hospital Total Margin (02-04 avg)
0.016
0.176
0.004
0.073
Hospital Total Margin (06-08 avg)
0.027
0.075
0.015
0.066*
* Group mean is significantly different from the study sample at the p < .10 level
** Group mean is significantly different from the study sample at the p < .05 level

(n=235)
0.070
0.078

values are twice as likely to be for-profit than study sample hospitals, indicating that forprofit hospitals may be more likely to not complete the AHA annual survey. Third,
hospitals that changed system status were more likely to be in the South Atlantic or East
South Central census divisions and hospitals that changed CAH status were more likely
to be in the West North Central census division than study sample hospitals. This may
indicate that multi-hospital systems are more actively buying and selling hospitals in the
South Atlantic and East South Central areas and hospitals in the West North Central
census division are some of the last small rural hospitals to convert to CAH status.
Hospitals that changed CAH status were on average significantly smaller (42.16 staffed
beds) than study sample hospitals, but this is not surprising since smaller hospitals are
more likely to convert to CAH status. The most significant differences between study
sample hospitals and the hospitals that were excluded from the study sample are
differences in hospital efficiency and total margin. Hospitals that changed CAH status
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during the study period improved their efficiency during the study period and were
significantly more efficient than study sample hospitals at the end of the study period, but
on average had lower total margins than study sample hospitals at the end of the study
period. Although it cannot be determined using the data in this study, the difference in
total margin may be related to the costs of converting to CAH status, and the difference
in hospital efficiency may reflect initial staff down-sizing and/or service cuts which may
happen when a hospital converts to CAH status. However, these differences are
unexpected and contradict previous studies which have shown CAHs to be less efficient
than comparable rural hospitals (Rosko & Mutter, 2010; Harrison et al., 2009).

Correlation Analysis
One of the primary assumptions of multiple regression analysis is that there are no
exact linear relationships or perfect collinearity among the independent variables
(Wooldridge, 2009, pg 85). A correlation analysis of all of the independent variables was
conducted to ensure that no two independent or control variables are perfectly correlated,
as a violation of this assumption would not produce any coefficient estimates.
Additionally, the correlations were examined to determine if any of the variables were
highly correlated, often referred to as multi-collinearity. Although high correlations
among variables do not violate the perfect collinearity assumption, it is preferred to have
less correlation among independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009, pg 98).
The correlation matrix for the variables included in the regression analysis is shown
in Appendix 1. No two variables are perfectly collinear and the only large correlation
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(over +/- .70) between independent variables is the correlation between Medicare payer
percentage and Medicaid payer percentage (-0.79). Since this correlation is less than one,
the Gauss-Markov assumption of no perfect collinearity required to establish the
unbiasedness of the OLS estimates is not violated. However, a large correlation between
two independent variables increases the variance of the estimated coefficients for these
variables. But Medicare and Medicaid payer percentage are simply control variables in
this analysis and their coefficients are not germane to the hypotheses tested in this study.
Evaluating the Theoretical Hypotheses
The five hypotheses for the study were evaluated using multiple regression analysis
for the financial dependent variable and Tobit regression for the dependent efficiency
score. Because the sample size is sufficiently large, all of the regression models were
estimated with robust standard errors so the standard errors and t statistics associated with
the estimated coefficients are valid for hypothesis testing even if heteroskedasticity of
unknown form is present. The results for each hypothesis are presented in a single table
that contains both the OLS and Tobit regression estimates for the two dependent
variables. For each hypothesis, hospitals were divided into groups based on the 2x2
matrices discussed in the methods section and shown in Figure 8. The groups of
hospitals used in each hypothesis are described beside each matrix and the group that is
used as the reference category in the analysis is indicated. Below the description of the
groups is a simple statement of each hypothesis indicating which groups are being
compared during hypothesis testing. For the convenience of the reader, the reference
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group and the groups being compared will be stated when the results for each hypothesis
are presented.
For hypotheses one through four, a positive group coefficient for the dependent
variable total margin indicates higher performance (i.e., higher total margin) and a
negative coefficient for hospital inefficiency indicates higher performance (i.e., decreased
inefficiency). The opposite is true for hypothesis five because the composite
fit/congruence score sums the number of times a hospital is a “misfit” for each of the four
individual fit/congruence measures. Thus a higher composite fit/congruence score
indicates a poorer fit between environment and organization structure. Coefficients with
a p-value less than .10, .05 and/or .01 are noted as statistically significant, and the level of
significance is indicated in each table. Results which are in the predicted direction with a
statistical significance level less than .05 are considered as support for the stated
hypotheses. Results for each hypothesis will be presented and then general statements at
the end of this section summarize the results from all five hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 Results
Hypothesis one posited that in low resource munificence areas, hospitals that were
part of a system would fit their environment better and outperform hospitals that
remained independent. The reference group for this hypothesis is non-system hospitals in
low resource areas. The hypothesis predicts that system hospitals in low resource areas
will outperform non-system hospitals in low resource areas. Neither the results for
hospital total margin nor hospital inefficiency provide support for this hypothesis, since
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the p-values associated with both coefficients is greater than the .05 alpha level used for
this study (results shown in Table 10). However, it is worth noting that even though the
coefficients for the comparison group in both of the models were not statistically
significant, the sign of the coefficients was consistent with the predicted relationship in
hypothesis one. Further, the regression results for hospital total margin which indicated
that the total margin for system hospitals in low resource areas is .017 higher than the
total margin for non-system hospitals in low resource areas (p = .074), came close to
meeting the .05 alpha level for statistical significance. The same cannot be said for the
Tobit model results using hospital inefficiency as the dependent variable.
Additional significant findings from the models are that not-for-profit hospitals have
lower total margins than hospitals owned by local government entities (p = .075),
hospitals in the South Atlantic (p = .038) and West South Central (p = .055) census
divisions have lower total margins than hospitals in the Pacific division, for-profit
hospitals are more efficient than hospitals owned by local government entities (p = .036),
and hospitals with a higher percentage of Medicaid patients are less efficient (p = .052).
As expected, the lagged dependent variables are significantly related to the dependent
variables in both equations. The results for ownership status, geographic location,
Medicaid payer percentage, and the lagged dependent variables are significant for all of
the regression models and will not be discussed for the remaining hypotheses.
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Table 10. Regression Results for Hypothesis One
Dependent Variable

Total Margin (06-08 avg)

Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

Robust
Coef.
Low Munificence, System Hospital
High Munificence, Non-System Hospital

0.017 *

Robust

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

0.009

-0.064

0.049

-0.004

0.009

0.073

0.085

High Munificence, System Hospital

0.002

0.010

0.061

0.070

Lagged Dependent Variable (02-04 avg)

0.076 *

0.042

0.783 ***

0.085

Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)

4.0E-05

0.000

For Profit

-0.005

0.014

-3.9E-04
-0.173 **

0.000
0.082

Not For Profit

-0.009 *

0.005

-0.035

0.047

Teaching

-0.099

0.099

-0.012

0.012

Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.013

0.023

0.807 *

0.415

Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.023

0.019

0.375

0.300

Per Capita Income 06

5.3E-07

0.000

3.2E-07

0.000

Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)

-0.003

0.002

0.002

0.017

Middle Atlantic

-0.005

0.011

-0.054

0.081

East North Central

0.006

0.011

0.041

0.068

West North Central

-0.005

0.010

0.057

0.087

South Atlantic

-0.023 **

0.011

-0.037

0.073

East South Central

0.001

0.013

0.230

0.170

West South Central

-0.022 *

0.011

0.057

0.078

Mountain

0.014

0.011

0.072

0.100

Pacific

0.002

0.011

-0.037

0.112

Intercept

0.018

0.023

-0.223

0.263

Number of obs = 1007 Number of obs = 1010
F( 20, 986) = 2.52
F( 20, 990) = 41.27
Prob > F = 0.0002
Prob > F
= 0.0000
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Hypothesis 2 Results
The second contingent pair on which hypothesis two is based, relates the proximity
to other hospitals with the presence or absence of a local system partner. Hypothesis two
predicts that hospitals that are proximate to other hospitals will perform better if they
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have a local system partner with which they can centralize administrative and/or logistic
functions. In this model, hospitals that are proximate to other hospitals but have no local
system partner are the reference group and the hypothesis predicts that hospitals with a
local system partner(s), will outperform those without a local system partner. The results
from both models (Table 11) support this prediction.
Table 11. Regression Results for Hypothesis Two
Dependent Variable

No Hospital within 50 Miles

Total Margin (06-08 avg)

Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

Robust

Robust

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

-0.012

0.023

0.109

0.249

System Partner within 50 Miles

0.012 **

0.006

Lagged Dependent Variable (02-04 avg)

0.076 *

0.042

Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)

-0.083 **
0.783 ***
-4.2E-04

0.033
0.084

4.3E-05

0.000

For Profit

-0.004

0.014

-0.172 **

0.000
0.081

Not For Profit

-0.010 **

0.005

-0.018

0.048

Teaching

-0.102

0.101

-0.011

0.012

Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.012

0.023

0.806 *

0.419

Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.023

0.019

0.373

0.301

Per Capita Income 06

4.2E-07

0.000

2.8E-06

0.000

Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)

-0.002

0.002

-0.007

0.016

Middle Atlantic

-0.004

0.011

-0.078

0.067

0.003

0.010

0.047

0.062

East North Central
West North Central

-0.006

0.010

0.076

0.081

South Atlantic

-0.024 **

0.011

-0.032

0.069

0.013

0.240

0.177

East South Central

2.1E-04

West South Central

-0.022 *

0.011

0.053

0.070

Mountain

0.017

0.011

0.046

0.090

Pacific

0.004

0.011

-0.052

0.110

Intercept

0.014

0.023

-0.220

0.266

Number of obs = 1007

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Number of obs =

1010

F( 19, 987) = 2.68

F( 19, 991) =

46.74

Prob > F

Prob > F

= 0.0001

= 0.0000
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Other things constant, rural hospitals with local system partners in a 50 mile radius
have a total margin that is 0.012 higher (p = .044) and an inefficiency score that is 0.083
lower (p = .013) than hospitals in the reference group.

Hypothesis 3 Results
Hypothesis three focused on hierarchical system structures. Hierarchical system
structures are necessary for the centralization of clinical services, and hypothesis three
predicts that when rural hospitals are close to larger, predominantly urban hospitals, rural
hospitals that have a hierarchical system partner will outperform rural hospitals that have
no hierarchical partner. The reference group for this analysis was rural hospitals that are
proximate to large hospitals but have no hierarchical partner, and the comparison group is
rural hospitals with a proximate hierarchical partner. The results for the two models used
to test hypothesis three are shown in Table 12. Similar to hypotheses four and five, the
results for the OLS model using hospital total margin provide support for the hypothesis
while the results for the Tobit model using hospital inefficiency do not. Other things
equal, hospitals with a hierarchical partner have a total margin that is 0.021 higher (p =
.009) than hospitals that are proximate to a larger hospital but have no hierarchical
partner. There is no significant difference between the three groups of hospitals in terms
of hospital inefficiency.

Hypothesis 4 Results
Hypothesis four continued to examine the potential performance benefit of having a
proximate hierarchical system partner by focusing on rural hospitals certified as CAHs.
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Table 12. Regression Results for Hypothesis Three
Dependent Variable

No Large Hospital within 50 Miles

Total Margin (06-08 avg)

Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

Robust

Robust

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

-0.004

0.007

-0.011

0.062

Hierarchical Partner within 50 Miles

0.021 ***

0.008

-0.057

0.039

Lagged Dependent Variable (02-04 avg)

0.076 *

0.042

Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)

0.785 ***

0.084

5.9E-05

0.000

For Profit

-0.003

0.014

-0.181 **

0.081

Not For Profit

-0.011 **

0.005

-0.030

0.048

Teaching

-0.012

0.012

-0.099

0.105

0.012

0.023

Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)
Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)

-4.2E-04

0.000

0.814 *

0.418

0.022

0.019

0.377

0.295

4.1E-07

0.000

3.0E-06

0.000

Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)

-0.002

0.002

-0.005

0.016

Middle Atlantic

-0.005

0.011

-0.083

0.069

0.003

0.010

0.030

0.060

Per Capita Income 06

East North Central
West North Central

-0.006

0.010

0.057

0.079

South Atlantic

-0.025 **

0.011

-0.052

0.069

0.013

0.218

0.173

East South Central
West South Central

8.1E-05
-0.022 *

0.011

0.041

0.069

Mountain

0.019

0.012

0.050

0.085

Pacific

0.003

0.011

-0.057

0.113

Intercept

0.016

0.022

-0.233

0.265

Number of obs = 1007

Number of obs =

F( 19, 987) = 2.84

F( 19, 991) =

Prob > F

Prob > F

= 0.0000

1010

42.54

= 0.0000

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Hypothesis four predicts that CAHs with a proximate hierarchical system partner would
outperform CAHs with no proximate hierarchical partner. For this analysis CAHs with
no hierarchical system partner is the reference category and CAHs with a hierarchical
system partner is the comparison group. Once again the results for the model using
hospital total margin offer support for the hypothesis but the results from the model using
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hospital inefficiency do not (shown in Table 13). Other things equal, CAHs with a
proximate hierarchical system partner have a total margin that is 0.027 higher (p = .015)
than CAHs with no hierarchical partner, but there is no statistically significant hospital
inefficiency difference between CAHs with a hierarchical partner and those without.
Table 13. Regression Results for Hypothesis Four
Dependent Variable

Total Margin (06-08 avg)

Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

Robust

Robust

Coef.

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

Non-CAH, No Hierarchical Partner

0.005

0.006

-0.085

0.113

Non-CAH, Hierarchical Partner

0.019 *

0.010

-0.160 *

0.094

CAH, Hierarchical Partner

0.027 **

0.011

-0.035

0.067

0.076 *

0.042

Lagged Dependent Variable (02-04 avg)
Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)

0.774 ***

0.000

For Profit

-0.004

0.014

-0.174 **

0.085

Not For Profit

-0.011 **

0.005

-0.030

0.048

Teaching

-0.012

0.012

-0.099

0.103

0.013

0.023

Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)
Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)

-1.5E-05

0.095

4.0E-05

0.788 *

0.000

0.440

0.022

0.019

0.387

0.296

3.9E-07

0.000

3.5E-06

0.000

Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)

-0.002

0.002

-0.003

0.017

Middle Atlantic

Per Capita Income 06

-0.005

0.011

-0.062

0.079

East North Central

0.002

0.010

0.031

0.062

West North Central

-0.007

0.010

0.054

0.083

South Atlantic

-0.025 **

East South Central

-3.0E-04

West South Central

-0.023 **

0.011

-0.030

0.075

0.013

0.241

0.157

0.012

0.067

0.081

Mountain

0.017

0.011

0.063

0.103

Pacific

0.002

0.011

-0.052

0.109

Intercept

0.016

0.022

-0.241

0.268

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Number of obs = 1007

Number of obs =

1010

F( 20, 986) = 2.67

F( 20, 990) =

53.92

Prob > F

Prob > F

= 0.0001

= 0.0000
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Hypothesis 5 Results
Hypothesis five aggregates the four individual measures of fit into a composite
measure of fit/congruence, in order to test the fundamental proposition of contingency
theory: organizational performance depends on the fit between organizational structure
and the environment. The aggregate measure of fit/congruence sums the number of times
a hospital was categorized as a “misfit” in the individual fit/congruence measures, and a
lower score indicates better fit with the environment and a higher score indicates worse
fit with the environment. Composite fit/congruence scores range from 0 to 4. Results for
the models that test this hypothesis are reported in Table 14. As with hypotheses one,
three, and four, the results for hospital total margin support hypothesis five while the
results for hospital inefficiency do not. For hospital total margin, other things equal, a
one unit change in the composite fit/congruence score results in a .006 decrease in
hospital total margin (p = .012). In other words, total margin declines as fit between the
hospital and the environment worsens. The results for the Tobit model using hospital
inefficiency were not statistically significant.

Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results
The five hypotheses presented in this study test the general proposition that rural
hospitals will perform better when their structure better fits the environment. Rather than
focusing on the internal structure of the hospital itself, this study focuses on rural hospital
system affiliations and how the structure of the system to which rural hospitals belong
may affect hospital performance. The centralization of administrative, logistic, and
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Table 14. Regression Results for Hypothesis Five
Dependent Variable

Total Margin (06-08 avg)

Inefficiency (06-08 avg)

Robust
Coef.
Composite Fit Measure
Lagged Dependent Variable (02-04 avg)
Staffed Beds (06-08 avg)

Robust

Std. Err.

Coef.

Std. Err.

-0.006 **

0.002

0.023

0.019

0.075 *

0.042

1.3E-05

0.782 ***

0.000

-3.0E-04

0.086
0.000

For Profit

-0.005

0.014

-0.172 **

0.085

Not For Profit

-0.010 **

0.005

-0.027

0.051

Teaching

-0.011

0.011

-0.101

0.103

Medicaid Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.014

0.023

0.806 *

0.423

Medicare Payer % (06-08 avg)

0.023

0.019

0.374

0.303

2.8E-07

0.000

3.4E-06

0.000

Per Capita Income 06
Unemployment Rate (06-07 avg)

-0.001

0.002

-0.007

0.016

Middle Atlantic

-0.004

0.011

-0.080

0.068

0.003

0.010

0.036

0.061

East North Central
West North Central

-0.006

0.010

0.063

0.086

South Atlantic

-0.023 **

0.011

-0.048

0.068

0.013

0.225

0.169

East South Central

0.001

West South Central

-0.023 **

Mountain
Pacific
Intercept

0.011

0.049

0.071

0.013

0.011

0.062

0.095

1.9E-04

0.011

-0.046

0.109

0.034

0.024

-0.298

0.245

Number of obs = 1007

Number of obs =

1010

F( 18, 988) = 2.89

F( 18, 992) =

48.86

Prob > F

Prob > F

= 0.0001

= 0.0000

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

clinical services that are enabled by these system structures are predicted to significantly
affect hospital financial performance and productive efficiency. The results from this
study, summarized in Table 15, support this prediction.
For the five hypotheses, the results for the OLS models with hospital total margin as
the dependent variable are statistically significant at the .05 level and consistent with the
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Table 15. Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results

Hypothesis

Total Margin
Expected
Actual
Comparison Coefficient Coefficient

Inefficiency
Expected
Actual
Coefficient Coefficient

H1: Under conditions of greater resource scarcity, systemaffiliated rural hospitals (G2) fit the environment better and will
outperform stand-alone rural hospitals (G1)

G2 to G1

+

+

-

-

H2: When proximate to another hospital, system-affiliated rural
hospitals with a local partner (G3) will outperform systemaffiliated rural hospitals with no local partner (G2)

G3 to G2

+

+**

-

-**

H3: When proximate to larger urban hospitals or RRCs, rural
hospitals with hierarchical system relationships (G3) will
outperform those with non-hierarchical system relationships (G2)

G3 to G2

+

+***

-

-

H4: Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) with proximate hierarchical
system partners (G4) will outperform CAHs with no proximate
hierarchical system partner (G3)

G4 to G3

+

+**

-

-

-

-**

+

+

H5: Rural hospital performance is positively related to the degree
of fit between the rural hospital’s multi-hospital system structure Misfit to DV
and its environment
** p < .05

*** p < .01

predicted relationships in four of the five hypotheses. Results of hypotheses two, three,
and four indicate that hospital total margin is higher for rural hospitals that have local
system partners, rural hospitals that have hierarchical system partners, and CAHs that
have hierarchical system partners. The results for hypothesis five support the general
proposition that a better fit results in better performance (i.e. higher total margin).
Results for the Tobit models with hospital inefficiency as the dependent variable
provided less support for the five hypotheses, with the only statistically significant results
coming from the test of hypothesis two. These results indicate that rural hospitals with
local system partners are more efficient than rural hospitals that are proximate to other
hospitals but have no local system partners. And although the results for the other
hypotheses were not statistically significant, the direction of the coefficients was
consistent with the predictions in each hypothesis.
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There are additional findings related to ownership, Medicaid patient volume, and
geographic location that are consistent across all of the models. First, not-for-profit rural
hospitals have lower total margins and for-profit rural hospitals are more efficient than
local government rural hospitals. Second rural hospitals located in the South Atlantic and
West South Central census divisions have lower total margins than rural hospitals in the
Pacific census division. Third, rural hospitals with a higher percentage of Medicaid
payers were less efficient.
Supplementary Analysis
Every study involves several methodological decisions regarding study design,
sample selection, and analysis techniques that could potentially affect the results of the
study. This study is no different, and additional analysis was conducted to determine if
some of the decisions made in the study methods affected the study results. Specifically,
supplementary analysis was used to test the equal weights assumption in the calculation
of the composite fit/congruence measure, to determine if changing the radius for the
proximity measures from 50 to 35 miles changed the study results, and to see if the
exclusion of the hospitals with AHA estimated values significantly altered the study
results. Results of the analysis used to assess the effect of these three decisions on the
study are reported in this section.

Testing the Equal Weights Assumption in the Composite Fit Measure
When the composite fit measure was calculated, hospitals received a score of “1” if
they fell into a misfit category in any of the individual fit measures. If a hospital was a

152
misfit in all four individual measures then it received a score of four, and if the hospital
was a misfit in none of the measures then it receive a score of zero. The calculation of
the composite fit measure assumes that a categorization of misfit in any of the individual
fit measures is equivalent, and each individual fit measure contributes to the composite
measure equally. In reality, this assumption may or may not accurately represent the
contribution of each misfit category on hospital performance. A misfit in hypothesis one
may affect performance more than a misfit in hypothesis two (or three or four).
To determine if the equal weight assumption is valid, an F Test was conducted
comparing the restricted model (equation 1.4) which contains the composite fit score
() to the unrestricted model (equation 1.5) which contains indicator variables for
each individual misfit category (1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 ). This tests the
null hypothesis that the coefficients for the individual misfit categories in are all equal
(Ho:  =  =  =  ) versus the alternate hypothesis that at least one of these
coefficients is different.
 =
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(1.4)

(1.5)

The results of this test were insignificant for both hospital total margin (F3, 985 = 0.48,
p = 0.6946) and hospital inefficiency (F3, 989 = 0.78, p = 0.5048), providing no support to
reject the null hypothesis. Thus there is no reason to reject the equal weights assumption
for constructing the composite fit measure.
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Changing the Radius of the Proximity Measures
A 50 mile radius was used to generate the proximity measures for this study. As
discussed previously, this distance is somewhat arbitrary and was chosen because it is in
between distances used in previous studies (Luke, 1992; Desai & Hellinger), and the
geographic isolation requirement necessary to qualify for CAH status which is 35 miles.
It is possible that hospitals that are 50 miles straight line distance apart may not be close
enough to effectively centralize administrative, logistic, and/or clinical services in order
to improve performance. For this reason the proximity measures were also calculated
using a 35 mile radius and the regressions for each hypothesis were run again with the 35
mile proximity measures.
Changing the radius on the proximity measures to 35 miles significantly changed the
results of two of the 10 regression models. All of the results for the regressions with total
margin as the dependent variable remained significant, but two of the Tobit model results
with hospital inefficiency as the dependent variable changed. Specifically the results for
hypothesis three and hypothesis five, which were previously not statistically significant,
were now statistically significant at the p < .10 level indicating that hospitals with
proximate hierarchical system partners were more efficient than hospitals without
hierarchical system partners, and hospital fit is positively related to hospital efficiency.
The results of this supplementary analysis suggest that the results obtained using the
50 mile radius for the proximity measures conservatively estimate the performance
affects of local system partners and proximate hierarchical system partners. These results
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also provide evidence that a 35 mile radius may be more appropriate for constructing
multi-hospital system proximity measures than 50 mile or larger radii.

Exclusion of Hospitals with AHA Estimated Values
Several hospitals were excluded from the study sample because the values in the
AHA annual survey were estimated values rather than reported values. Excluding these
hospitals from the study sample may significantly affect the study results because there
are significant differences between this group and the study sample in terms of ownership
status, geographic location, the likelihood that non-CAHs will have a hierarchical partner
and hospital inefficiency in 2002-04. To determine what the effect of excluding these
hospitals has on the study results, the regression models for each hypothesis were run
again on a sample that contained both the study sample hospitals and the hospitals with
AHA estimations.
The inclusion of the hospitals with AHA estimated values changed the results for
three of the 10 regression models. The results for hypothesis one changed for both
dependent variables and the results for hypothesis four changed for the Tobit model with
hospital inefficiency as the dependent variable. For hypothesis one, the results for the
analysis of total margin changed from statistically significant to non-significant, and the
results for hospital efficiency changed from non-significant to significant. The Tobit
results for hypothesis four also changed from non-significant to significant.
The results indicate that the exclusion of the hospitals with AHA estimated values
produced more conservative results for the analysis of hospital efficiency, and slightly

155
less conservative results for the analysis of hospital margin. However, considering that
seven of 10 results remained the same and two of the other three estimates were more
conservative, there is no reason to second guess the exclusion of the hospitals with AHA
estimated values.
Chapter Summary
This study attempts to analyze the effect of system membership and system structure
on hospital performance using a contingency theory approach. Contingency theory
stresses the relationship between organization structure and environment, and proposes
that a better fit between structure and environment will lead to better performance.
Operationalizing this central proposition requires the identification of contingent
relationships and the construction of fit/congruence measures to differentiate among
hospitals with differing degrees of fit. Organizational performance is then regressed
upon the fit/congruence measure(s) to test the study hypotheses.
This chapter discusses the generation of the fit/congruence measures, the generation
of other measures that were used to create the fit/congruence measures, and the
calculation of the dependent performance measures. Summary statistics were reported
for each of these measures and problems encountered with estimating the average
hospital total margin and the econometric methods used to overcome these problems
were presented.
Regression analysis was used to test the five hypotheses, and statistically significant
results which support the stated hypotheses were obtained from five of the 10 regression
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models. Supplementary analysis examining the decisions to equally weight misfit
categories to construct the composite fit measure, to use a 50 mile radius to construct the
proximity measures, and to exclude hospitals with AHA estimated values was also
conducted. The results of this analysis indicate that these are sound decisions which
produced conservative coefficient estimates for hypothesis testing.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS

The final chapter of the dissertation presents a discussion of the study findings and
relates the findings with the results of previous research. This is followed by a more
general discussion of the potential policy and managerial implications of the study
results, and how the study methods may inform future empirical work that uses
contingency theory. The final two sections present study limitations and suggestions for
future research.
Discussion of the Study Findings
The purpose of this study was to analyze rural hospital performance using a
contingency theory framework to account for differences in fit between organizational
structure and environmental variables. Generally speaking, the analysis tests the
fundamental contingency theory premise that organizational performance is positively
related to the fit between organizational structure and the environment. Four contingent
pairs linking rural hospital system affiliation to the environment were used to
conceptualize fit, and performance was measured in terms of hospital total margin and
hospital efficiency. The study results (summarized in Table 15) offer support for the
fundamental contingency theory premise, but further discussion is needed to better
understand the relationship between the results for hospital total margin and those for
hospital efficiency, and to put the results in context considering the existing literature.
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The Relationship Between Hospital Total Margin and Hospital Efficiency
The first issue that warrants discussion is the relationship between the study results
for hospital total margin and those for hospital efficiency, and why the analysis did not
yield more statistically significant results for hospital efficiency. The conceptual
framework for the study proposes that hospital financial performance and hospital
efficiency are closely related and should both be positively affected by system
affiliations/structures that allow hospitals to obtain scarce resources and centralize
services with system partners. Greater access to resources and increased centralization
could lead to economies of scale and/or scope and greater overall productive efficiency,
which in turn would increase profitability as indicated by hospital total margin.
However, the study results suggest that total margin and efficiency may not be as closely
related as depicted in the conceptual framework, since the majority of the results for total
margin were statistically significant, but only one of the five results for efficiency was
statistically significant. Two potential explanations for this are: that the difference in
total margin is caused by a change in efficiency, but the analysis of hospital efficiency is
flawed, or the statistically significant difference in total margin is caused by something
other than a change in efficiency.
The first possible explanation for the difference between the results for total margin
and those for efficiency is that the analysis of hospital efficiency is flawed. This could be
caused by a problem with the DEA model that was used to calculate the efficiency scores
or a misspecification such as an omitted variable in the Tobit regression model. If either
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of these is the case, then the coefficients for the groups of hospitals used to test each
hypothesis could be biased, and thus the results of the Tobit regression models would be
invalid. Both possibilities will be briefly explored.
The four input and five output DEA model used in this study to calculate the hospital
efficiency scores is based on the models used in previous studies that include CAHs in
their analysis (Harrison et al., 2009; Butler & Li, 2003; Rosko & Mutter; 2010). These
models generally represent the same categories of inputs (capital investments, labor, and
operating expenses) and outputs (inpatient and outpatient production) commonly used in
hospital efficiency studies (Ozcan, 2008, pg106), but have not been refined and tested as
much as the four input and two output model used in studies of non-CAH general
hospitals (Ozcan, 2008, pgs 106-108; Nayar & Ozcan, 2008; Ozcan & Luke, 2010;
Ozcan & Lynch, 1992; Sikka et al., 2009). Thus the possibility exists that the model used
to calculate the hospital efficiency scores in this study may have included something that
should not have been included or excluded something that should have been included,
resulting in biased efficiency scores. If the efficiency scores are biased in some manner,
then this could have affected the results of the Tobit analysis. However, the sensitivity
and robustness of various DEA models were tested in two separate studies by Valdmanis
(1992) and Ozcan (1992), which noted that efficiency scores for a given group of
hospitals were robust and fairly insensitive to changes in the combination of inputs and
outputs in the DEA model. Given this, and the fact that the model used in this study is
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consistent with previous models used to study critical access hospitals (Harrison et al.,
2009; Butler & Li, 2003), the study findings may well be valid.
Another possible problem with the DEA model used in this study is the failure to
account for quality differences among hospitals. The DEA model in this study includes
inpatient, outpatient, and surgical outputs from different hospitals that may or may not be
of equal quality. If these outputs differ substantially in terms of quality, then they may
not be comparable, and it is logical to assume that higher quality outcomes may require
greater resources (inputs) to achieve. Although the vast majority of hospital DEA
efficiency studies do not incorporate quality measures into their models, two recent
studies (Nayar & Ozcan, 2008; Mark et al., 2009) include quality and/or patient safety
measures as outputs in their DEA models. Nayar & Ozcan (2008) included pneumonia
treatment quality indicators in a study of hospital efficiency to determine if there was a
tradeoff between technical efficiency and quality, while Mark et al. (2009) used quality
and patient safety indicators as outputs in a study of inpatient nursing wards. These
studies demonstrate how quality measures may be included in DEA efficiency studies,
however work in this area is still in the early stages and the inclusion of quality measures
in DEA models is still not common place. Further, although the inclusion of quality
measures as outputs in the DEA model may allow a few more hospitals to be identified as
efficient, the results from the Nayar & Ozcan (2008) study do not indicate that there is an
efficiency-quality tradeoff in hospitals. However, more work is needed in this area and
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incorporating quality measures into the DEA model used in this analysis would be
worthwhile future research.
If the DEA model used to calculate the efficiency scores is sound, then another
possible flaw in the analysis of hospital efficiency is that the Tobit model may be
misspecified, perhaps leaving out an important control variable related to hospital
efficiency. Omitting an important variable results in biased coefficients for the Tobit
regression model if the omitted variable is correlated with any of the other predictor
variables in the equation (Wooldridge, 2009, pg 91-92). Thus omitting a variable that is
possibly related to hospital efficiency such as hospital nurse staffing ratio or average bed
occupancy may bias the coefficients for the groups used in hypothesis testing and alter
the study results. While it is possible that an important variable was omitted from the
Tobit model in this study, great care was taken to identify the variables to include in the
Tobit model. The model is based on the conceptual framework of this study, which is
derived from contingency theory, and the variables included in the model were chosen
based on Donaldson’s (2001) advice for contingency theory empirical work and the
results of previous studies that indicate which variables may be important to include in
the analysis. So the Tobit model as specified is believed to be the correct population
model.
The second and more probable explanation for the difference between the results for
total margin and those for efficiency is that the difference in total margin seen in the
study results is caused by something other than a change in hospital efficiency. Total
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margin is calculated by dividing hospital net income by hospital total revenue, and an
increase in hospital total margin means that net income has increased at a faster rate than
total revenue. One way to do this is to reduce hospital costs/expenses while holding
service production and total revenue constant. Previous studies indicate that this may be
accomplished by system hospitals through greater emphasis on cost containment and
more efficient staffing (Berry et al., 1987; Trinh & Begun, 1999, McCue, 2007), but
greater cost containment and more efficient staffing would affect hospital efficiency as
much as they would affect total margin, and the study results indicate that this is not the
case. An alternate way to affect hospital total margin without equally affecting hospital
efficiency is to increase total revenue while holding expenses and the amount of services
provided constant. This could be achieved by raising the price of services and/or
changing the mix of payers to raise the average payment for services. This explanation is
in line with previous research on system membership and market power (Dranove &
Shanley, 1995; Cueller & Gertler, 2005; Melnick & Keeler, 2007) that indicates that
system hospitals are able to increase prices more than non-system hospitals. Further, the
ability to increase prices may be related to the size of the system cluster (Melnick &
Keeler, 2007). Additionally, system membership and affiliation with well-known large
proximate hospitals enhances the reputation of hospitals (Dranove & Shanely, 1995) and
allows them to attract more managed care patients (Cueller & Gertler, 2005), which may
result in a higher average payment rate. So one interpretation of the study results is that
system membership and the presence of local system partners increases the market power

163
and enhances the reputation of rural hospitals, allowing them to increase total revenue by
raising prices and/or attracting higher paying patients. However, given that the results for
hospital efficiency are consistently in the predicted direction, the significant difference to
hospital total margin may be caused by a combination of increased market power and
productive efficiency.

Putting the Study Results in Context
In order to relate the study results to previous research on multi-hospital systems, the
general contingency theory proposition that organizational performance is positively
related to the fit between organization structure and the environment, will be left behind
and each individual hypothesis will be examined separately.

Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis one examines the effect of system membership on hospital performance
while accounting for environmental munificence. Non-system rural hospitals located in
low munificence areas are directly compared to system affiliated rural hospitals in low
munificence areas. The study results indicate that there is not a statistically significant
performance difference in terms of either hospital total margin or hospital efficiency
between system and non-system hospitals in low munificence areas. This is consistent
with previous research which has failed to identify a performance difference associated
with system membership, when system membership is identified with a simple indicator
variable. However, the fact that a performance difference is seen in hypotheses two,
three, four, and five and not in hypothesis one provides some validation for the
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suggestions of Halpern et al. (1992) and Smith & Piland (1990) to use a contingency
theory framework to account for economic, structural, and environmental conditions that
may determine when system membership is beneficial. The analysis for hypotheses two,
three, four, and five accounts for differences in the structure of local system clusters
while the analysis for hypothesis one does not. This mix of results not only provides
support for the use of contingency theory to analyze system membership, but also
indicates that membership in a local system cluster is more important than simply
belonging to a national system.
Unlike the other hypotheses in the study, the results of hypothesis one may be
influenced by a selection bias by multi-hospital systems in the acquisition of rural
hospitals. In hypothesis one system and non-system hospitals are in separate groups, and
if multi-hospital systems systematically select better performing hospitals for acquisition,
then any observed differences in total margin or efficiency could be the result of this
systematic selection. Because the non-experimental study design does not include pretest measures, this potential selection bias may not be ruled out. However, the results of
hypothesis one do not indicate any significant differences between system and nonsystem hospitals in either high or low munificence areas, so no selection bias is apparent.

Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis begins to explore the performance effects of local system
partners or system clusters and the potential benefits of cluster management (Madison,
2004), which emphasizes the coordination of effort among proximate system hospitals.
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Analysis for this hypothesis indicated both a financial and a productive efficiency
advantage for rural hospitals with a system partner within 50 miles versus rural hospitals
with competitors but no system partners within 50 miles. These results are in line with
previous writings that theorized that multi-hospital systems could coordinate and
centralize marketing and hospital services to achieve economies of scale and reduce
duplication among system hospitals that served the same or overlapping markets (Carey,
2003; Dranove et al., 1996), which are often referred to as hospital clusters (Cueller &
Gertler, 2003; Kania, 1993). Although this study relates system structure directly to
performance and does not empirically identify the process which the structure enables,
these results add to the literature that documents the performance advantages of hospital
clusters (Sikka et al., 2009; Trinh et al., 2010).

Hypothesis 3
Continuing with the exploration of local system partners and hospital clusters, the
third hypothesis focused specifically on hierarchical structures among proximate system
hospitals. Hierarchical system structures and the rational organization of clinical services
are part of what was envisioned by the Dawson Report and other early system advocates
(Luke, 1992; Donabedien, 1972), and are thought to affect individual hospital efficiency
and financial performance (Sikka et al., 2009; Trinh et al, 2010). The study results
indicate a clear financial benefit for rural hospitals that are part of a hierarchical system
structure, but failed to identify a statistically significant efficiency advantage. So the
study results neither contradict nor support previous empirical work that found that
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hierarchy among cluster hospitals significantly affected cluster efficiency (Sikka et al.,
2009), but they can be interpreted as support for the work of Trinh et al. (2010) that
indicates that the performance advantages of hierarchical system structures are realized
by the smaller hospital, which receives services from the larger partner.

Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis four examined the potential moderating effect of CAH status on the
performance effect of hierarchical system structure. In the analysis for this hypothesis,
CAHs with proximate hierarchical system partners were compared with CAHs with no
proximate hierarchical system partners, and a clear financial performance advantage was
identified for CAHs with hierarchical partners. And while there is no previous literature
that examines the effects of a hierarchical system structure on CAH performance, this
performance advantage is consistent with the assumption in the conceptual framework
that a hierarchical system structure would be beneficial for CAHs because it would
facilitate their patient transfers that occur at a higher rate than non-CAH rural hospitals
(Wakefield et al., 2006).

Hypothesis 5
The final hypothesis in the study returns to the general contingency theory
proposition that fit between organization structure and environment is positively related
to organizational performance. When organizational performance was regressed upon
the composite fit/misfit score, a clear relationship between fit and financial performance
was observed. These results support the use of contingency theory as the theoretical
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framework for this paper, and demonstrate the relevance of contingency theory as a
means to link multi-hospital system structure to hospital performance. Further comments
on the theoretical implications of the study results are presented in the following section.
Implications of the Study Results
The study results have potential managerial and policy implications related to the
choices that hospital leaders face and the regulations and reimbursement rates for CAHs
under the Flex program. Each of these will be addressed briefly.

Managerial Implications
The results of this study provide useful information for rural hospital leaders as they
face the decision to join a multi-hospital system or remain independent and for multihospital system executives as they try to determine what hospitals to acquire and how to
structure their system. For rural hospital leaders, perhaps the most important results are
those for hypotheses two and three which indicate that there are significant performance
advantages to local system partnerships for rural hospitals. Coupled with the lack of
significant results for hypothesis one, these results imply that rural hospital leaders
should not simply seek to join a system, but should seek to join a local system cluster.
Further, if rural hospital leaders have a choice of more than one system to join, they
should choose a system with other hospitals in the local area (less than 50 miles away)
and preferably one with a larger hospital in the local area. The corollary is true for the
multi-hospital system executives. These results suggest that, all else being equal, they
should seek to acquire rural hospitals that are proximate to other system hospitals and
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manage them as clusters in order to increase the total margin and efficiency of the rural
hospital. However, these results only represent the performance of the rural hospital, and
there may be other system effects which could negate any potential total margin or
efficiency gains in an individual hospital. Thus multi-hospital system executives may
have several other considerations when evaluating rural hospitals for potential
acquisition.

Policy Implications
The policy implications of this study relate to the federal government’s desire to
ensure access to care in rural areas through the continued operation of rural hospitals and
the administration of the Flex program that governs the designation and reimbursement of
CAHs. First, the results of hypothesis one indicate that system membership increases the
total margin of rural hospitals in low resource areas, and this may be one way to ensure
the continued operation of rural hospitals in these areas. Additionally, the results from
hypotheses two and three suggest that incorporating rural hospitals into multi-hospital
system clusters further increases hospital total margin. Thus encouraging the acquisition
of rural hospitals in low resource areas by multi-hospital systems may be an alternative to
the Flex program, which was created to prevent the closure of rural facilities and protect
access to health care in rural communities (Dalton et al., 2003). Second, for hospitals
already designated as CAHs, the results of hypothesis four suggest that requiring CAHs
to form hierarchical partnerships would increase the total margin of CAHs and allow
federal policy makers to reduce the reimbursement rates to CAHs and the total cost of the

169
Flex program, which is currently estimated to cost the federal government $1.3 billion in
Medicare payments each year (Rosko & Mutter, 2010).
The policy implications associated with the results for hospital efficiency are not as
clear. The lack of statistically significant results related to hospital efficiency make the
identification of efficiency related policy implications difficult, and they neither support
nor contradict the conventional wisdom that the rational organization of services by
hospital systems should produce economies of scale and scope and result in greater
efficiency. Previous studies that reported significant results related to system hospital
efficiency examined the efficiency of entire system clusters (Sikka et al., 2009) or
focused on process differences rather than structural differences (Trinh et al., 2010).
Thus the lack of significant findings for hospital efficiency in this study may reflect the
choice to focus on individual rural hospitals rather than entire clusters and/or the failure
to account for variations in the process(es) that link hospital structure and performance.
Regardless of the reason, the results of this study are not particularly informative for
policy makers seeking to increase the efficiency of rural hospitals.
Comments on Contingency Theory
In addition to the managerial and political implications of the study results, the
theoretical framework and methods used in this study offer important lessons on the use
of contingency theory in empirical work.
First, the methods used in this study closely followed Lex Donaldson’s (2001, pgs
239-242) recommendations for using contingency theory in empirical work. Of
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particular importance are his suggestions to use multiple measures of fit, to ensure that
there is a time lag between the measurement of fit and the measurement of performance,
and to control for prior performance by including a lagged dependent variable in the
analysis. All of these suggestions were incorporated into the study design and methods
which produced results that were both statistically significant and consistent with the
predictions made in the hypotheses.
Second, the identification of contingent relationships that are used to measure fit is
perhaps the most important step in contingency theory empirical work. The traditional
formulation of contingency theory focused on the internal structure of a single
organization (Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967), using the
constructs of complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence to describe the work an
organization performs and the constructs of differentiation, centralization, and
coordination to describe organizational structure (Scott & Davis, 2007). These are very
versatile and traditional constructs that have their origins in bureaucracy theory and
industrial organization economics; however, the lack of recent contingency theory-based
health services empirical work means that there are few relevant examples for
operationalizing these constructs in a health care context. Researchers today may need to
put considerable mental effort into indentifying the organizational structures and
environmental contingencies that best apply to the their research question and the type of
organization or organizations that they intend to study. In this study the cooperative
efforts among same system hospitals that result in consolidated administrative and
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logistic services represent the construct of centralization, while the construct of
differentiation is represented by hierarchical system relationships. While these may be
valid operationalizations of these constructs, additional theoretical work on how the
constructs of centralization, differentiation, and coordination can be applied to the
various health services organizations that exist today, would advance the use of
contingency theory in health services research.
Third, measuring fit/congruence is a difficult task that is complicated by the
measurement of the constituent variables in each contingent pair. Calculating
fit/congruence scores for organizations in contingency theory analysis requires matching
the values of the organizational structure variable with the values of the variable that
represents the environmental contingency. This may be done various ways to include
using correlations for continuous variables or simply matching high and low values for
dichotomous variables. The four contingent pairs used in this study contained a mix of
continuous and dichotomous variables, which made calculating the fit/congruence scores
difficult. In order to simplify the process, all of the variable measures were converted to
dichotomous measures and 2x2 matrices were constructed to categorize the hospitals in
the study sample. There is nothing inherently wrong with this technique, but some of the
explanatory power of the continuous variables was most likely lost and the fit/congruence
measures as calculated in this study do not identify an iso-performance line (Donaldson,
2001, pgs 192-193), which identifies different combinations of the structure and
contingency variables which produce the same performance. This may be viewed as a
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limitation to this study, but also serves to illustrate how difficult measuring
fit/congruence may be.
The final comment on contingency theory concerns the importance of focusing on
the relationship between fit/congruence and performance. The central proposition in
contingency theory is that the fit between organization structure and the environment
affects performance. Therefore, in contingency theory research the fit/congruence score
is the primary explanatory variable in the analysis of performance, and the individual
measures of structure and environment used to calculate the fit/congruence score are only
used as control variables in the analysis. Unfortunately, most recent health services
research with a contingency theory framework misses this core idea and applies the
theory incorrectly (Mark et al., 2007; Mark et al., 2008; Bacon et al., 2009) by regressing
performance directly upon the structural variable(s), the environmental variable(s), and/or
an interaction term of the two. Based on Donaldson’s recommendations (2001), the
analysis in this study focuses on the relationship between fit and performance.
Hopefully, the methods in this study offer an example of how to correctly apply
contingency theory in empirical research, and the significant findings obtained will
encourage others to use contingency theory to study organizational performance.
Study Limitations
As with any research study, there are limitations to the design and methods of this
study which should be noted and potentially addressed in future research. Three potential
limitations were mentioned at the end of the methods chapter: non-experimental design,
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possible selection bias/endogeneity, and measurement error in the AHA survey variables.
This section will expand on some of those remarks and then highlight two other
limitations which should be considered.
First, of the three limitations mentioned at the end of the methods chapter, the nonexperimental design of the study is the most important one. As previously stated,
measurement error in the AHA survey variables (Mullner & Chung, 2002) may be
present, but the survey is widely used in health services research and there is a large body
of research that has produced consistent results using the survey data, so AHA survey
measurement error is not a great concern. Additionally, while the existence of a potential
selection bias related to hospital system membership cannot be ruled out in this study, it
would have a minimal effect on the study results. Only hypothesis one compares system
hospitals to non-system hospitals. In the other hypotheses the comparison groups contain
a mix of system and non-system hospitals, so a selection bias related to system
membership would affect all groups equally. Further, the inability to rule out a potential
selection bias is related to the study design, and the inability to gather baseline
performance measures prior to any of the hospitals joining systems. So the primary
limitation mentioned in the methods chapter is that of a non-experimental design.
A non-experimental post-test design limits a researcher’s ability to make causal
inferences (Trochim & Donelley, 2008), and studies which use non-experimental posttest designs are open to threats to internal validity such as selection bias, history threats,
and/or maturation threats. In the social sciences true experiments cannot normally be
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conducted because study participants cannot be randomized to control and treatment
groups. When this is the case, the best study design for making causal inferences and
controlling threats to internal validity is a natural experiment or quasi-experiment which
involves pre-test and post-test measures for both a treatment group and a comparison
group. Modifying this study so a quasi-experimental design could be used would
improve this study and will be discussed further in the next section. As currently
designed, this study produced significant findings that add to the body of literature on the
effects of multi-hospital system membership and hospital clusters. A lagged dependent
variable is used to control for prior performance as well as unobserved hospital specific
characteristics, and the relationship between organization structure / environmental fit
and performance is isolated. However, the study design prevents any causal inference
from being formally associated with this relationship.
The second study limitation is the crudeness of the measurement of fit/congruence in
the study. In the previous section some comments were made about the difficulty of
measuring fit/congruence and the inability in this study to identify an iso-performance
line for each measure of fit/congruence. This difficulty does not invalidate any of the
fit/congruence measures used in the study or the results that were obtained from the
analysis of performance, but it is a limitation of this study which could be improved in
future research. The fit/congruence measures could be refined and improved in order to
improve the fidelity of the analysis. Rather than using categorical measurements of
fit/congruence, if continuous measurements were developed then the analysis of
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performance would produce coefficients that may indicate how close system hospitals
should be in order to gain an advantage or what size of a system cluster is most
advantageous. And perhaps better fit/congruence measurements may be able to refine the
analysis of hospital efficiency enough to produce statistically significant results.
The third and final limitation of this study is its inability to identify the process or
processes that link fit to performance. However, this is really more of a limitation of
contingency theory than it is a limitation of this one study. Contingency theory links the
fit between organization structure and environment to organization performance, but it
does not identify how a better fit results in better performance. In this study it is assumed
that system membership allows rural hospitals in low resource areas to obtain critical
resources to operate their hospitals, and that proximity to other system hospitals results in
cooperative effort to centralize services and reduce duplication. But these are only
assumptions about the processes that underlie the relationship between structure and
environment. None of the empirical tests in this study validate those assumptions, and it
is possible that the performance differences identified in the analysis are related to some
other process. The study results simply show that there are significant performance
differences related to the fit between organization structure and environment. Identifying
the underlying processes that cause that performance difference is an issue for future
research, and will be discussed in the next section.
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Suggestions for Future Research
To close this study, three suggestions for future research are made which are related
to the study limitations previously discussed. The first suggestion for future research is
to alter the design of this study to a quasi-experimental design by selecting a sample of
hospitals that change system membership. The current study used a sample of rural
hospitals with constant system membership and CAH status for the study period. This
sampling strategy maximized the study sample and increased external validity and
generality of the results, but resulted in a non-experimental design that limited the ability
to make causal inference. By focusing on hospitals that switched system
membership/CAH status, the study design can incorporate both pre-test and post-test
measures to better control threats to internal validity and make causal inference. The
fit/congruence measures could be taken one year prior and one year after a hospital
changed system/CAH status, and the change in fit/congruence could be related to hospital
performance. Looking at the current study sample and the hospitals that were excluded
from the sample (Table 2), there were 80 hospitals that changed system membership
status and 96 hospitals that changed CAH status during the period 2004 to 2008.
However, what is not shown in that table is when each of those hospitals changed either
system membership or CAH status. In order to ensure a sufficient time lag between the
change in fit and the measurement of hospital performance, the study period may have to
be expanded to identify a sufficiently large study sample.
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The second suggestion for future research is to refine the analysis of hospital
efficiency, in order to improve the results of this analysis. There are several ways in
which this may be done. First, the DEA model and/or the hospitals in the study sample
may be modified to improve the DEA scores. Although Valdmanis (1992) has shown
that DEA efficiency scores are fairly robust to slight changes in model inputs and
outputs, there may be room for improvement to the current model since CAH DEA
models are not as common as non-CAH general hospital models. Additionally, the
scores produced by any DEA model depend on the organizations that are in the sample.
The sample used in this study contained both CAH and non-CAH hospitals as well as
micropolitan and non-core hospitals which on average are significantly different in size.
Calculating DEA scores and conducting efficiency analysis with these hospitals in one
sample may be incorrect. Separating these hospitals into smaller, more homogenous
groups may produce more accurate efficiency scores and improve the fidelity of
subsequent analysis. Another way to refine the efficiency analysis is to improve the
fit/congruence measures as mentioned in the study limitations. Refining the measures to
use continuous constituent measures rather than categorical ones may improve the
analysis. Finally, the efficiency analysis may be improved by identifying other important
control variables. Qualitative research may be used to more accurately identify the
organizational variables that contribute to hospital efficiency, and then these may be used
to improve the efficiency analysis.
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The final suggestion for future research is to try and identify the processes that
underlie the relationship between fit and performance. Path analysis as employed by
Trinh et al. (2010) is a possible example of how this could be done. Fit/congruence could
be measured at one point in time (t) and then a process like clinical service sharing could
be measured at a point in the future (t + 1) and then organization performance could be
measured even farther in the future (t +2). This would allow the researcher to validate
the assumptions about what process a better fit enables. Clinical service sharing is used
as an example here because it can be calculated from the AHA survey data and has been
used in previous research (Bazzoli et al., 1999; Trinh et al., 2008; Trinh et al., 2010), but
other processes like logistic service consolidation, the creation of central imaging
facilities that service multiple hospitals, administrative service consolidation, and the use
of common IT systems may be other important processes to include in this analysis which
would most likely involve primary data collection.
Conclusion
Given the lack of research focused on the effects of rural hospital system
membership and the infrequent of use of contingency theory in recent health services
research, this study offers important findings and methodological examples to the field of
health services research.
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that system membership offers clear
financial performance advantages and some productive efficiency performance
advantages for rural hospitals in low munificence areas and for rural hospitals that close
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to other system hospitals. These study results do not reflect a universal relationship
between system membership and hospitals performance that is uniformed for all rural
hospitals. Instead they demonstrate that the benefits of system membership are
dependent upon the fit between the structure of the system relationship and the
environment. The significant findings related to hospital total margin and hospital
efficiency may help rural hospital leaders, multi-hospital system executives, and policy
makers concerned with access to care in rural areas understand when and where rural
hospital system affiliation is most appropriate / desirable.
Methodologically, this study is an important example of the application of
contingency theory in empirical research. Contingency theory was specifically
developed to study differences in organizational performance, but it has fallen by the
wayside as newer and more popular organization theories have emerged. Although the
methods contained in this study are not perfect, by following the suggestions of Lex
Donaldson (2001) this study illustrates how significant and relevant findings may be
obtained by focusing on the relationship between fit and performance. This is important
considering the heterogeneity of organizations and environments by which and in which
health services are delivered. Contingency theory could be a very useful performance
analysis tool in this time of fiscal uncertainty and ballooning health care expenditures.
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APPENDIX 1 – CORRELATION MATRIX

H1G1

H1G2

H1G3

H1G4

H250G1

H250G2

H250G3

H1G1

1

H1G2

-0.1387

1

H1G3

-0.1826

-0.1371

1

H1G4

-0.1443

-0.1084

-0.1426

H250G1

0.0331

0.0004

-0.0041

0.0431

1

H250G2

0.2542

-0.3112

0.2627

-0.3364

-0.2209

1

H250G3

-0.2700

0.3176

-0.2670

0.3298

-0.0917

-0.9509

1

H350G1

0.0005

-0.0356

0.0817

0.0800

0.3007

0.0184

-0.1141

H350G1

H350G2

1

1

H350G2

0.1436

-0.1972

0.0751

-0.2224

-0.1986

0.4920

-0.4394

-0.6607

1

H350G3

-0.1875

0.2949

-0.1854

0.2038

-0.0637

-0.6603

0.6943

-0.2117

-0.5938

H450G1

0.1078

-0.0505

-0.0836

-0.1213

0.0428

0.2031

-0.2209

0.0978

0.1826

H450G2

-0.1210

0.2867

-0.1197

0.0568

-0.0411

-0.4263

0.4483

-0.1367

-0.3833

H450G3

0.0328

-0.1676

0.2179

-0.0317

0.0051

0.2877

-0.2953

0.0604

0.2588

H450G4

-0.1322

0.1184

-0.1307

0.2131

-0.0449

-0.4654

0.4895

-0.1493

-0.4186

H5fit50

0.4711

-0.3096

0.1660

-0.2745

-0.1517

0.7762

-0.7444

-0.2307

0.7380

Inefficiency 0204

-0.0467

-0.1499

0.2102

0.1128

0.0441

0.0976

-0.1136

0.1422

-0.0334

Total Margin 0204

0.0130

-0.0138

-0.0514

0.0185

0.0062

-0.0030

0.0011

0.0127

-0.0034

Average Beds 0608

0.0169

-0.0111

-0.0439

0.0118

0.0071

0.0047

-0.0071

0.1348

-0.0583

Medicaid Percent 0608

0.1767

-0.0264

-0.0522

-0.0198

0.1086

0.0147

-0.0494

0.1870

-0.0943

Medicare Percent 0608

-0.0421

0.0801

-0.0457

-0.0630

-0.1002

-0.0100

0.0420

-0.2537

0.1443

For Profit

-0.0476

0.1565

-0.1091

-0.0063

0.0122

-0.0373

0.0343

-0.0107

0.0155

Local Government

0.1079

-0.1520

0.0926

-0.1048

0.0552

0.2017

-0.2235

0.0500

0.1099

Not for Profit

-0.0805

0.0666

-0.0334

0.1056

-0.0603

-0.1776

0.2004

-0.0433

-0.1155

Teaching

-0.0108

-0.0410

0.0122

0.0363

-0.0185

0.0322

-0.0269

0.0192

-0.0065

New England

-0.0766

-0.0575

0.2278

-0.0217

-0.0260

0.0927

-0.0864

-0.0280

0.0586

Middle Atlantic

0.0130

-0.0296

-0.0853

-0.0503

-0.0293

0.0655

-0.0576

-0.0581

0.0720

East North Central

0.0075

-0.0144

-0.1039

-0.0969

-0.0620

-0.0372

0.0577

-0.1009

0.0057

West North Central

-0.1836

-0.1521

0.2226

0.2818

-0.0271

-0.0748

0.0850

0.0146

-0.0262

South Atlantic

0.1067

0.0483

-0.0984

-0.0512

-0.0468

-0.0107

0.0257

-0.1471

0.1070

East South Central

0.1701

0.1945

-0.1243

-0.0943

-0.0460

-0.0177

0.0326

-0.1265

0.0864

West South Central

0.0304

-0.0020

-0.0462

-0.0911

-0.0478

0.0818

-0.0684

-0.0121

0.0403

Mountain

-0.0329

-0.0163

0.0619

0.0316

0.2071

0.0245

-0.0907

0.3375

-0.1806

Pacific

0.0381

0.1114

-0.0981

-0.0475

0.1248

-0.0542

0.0157

0.1300

-0.1435
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H350G3

H450G1

H450G2

H450G3

H350G3

1

H450G1

-0.3425

1

H450G2

0.6456

-0.2211

1

H450G3

-0.4017

-0.7228

-0.2593

1

H450G4

H5fit50

Average Beds Medicaid
Inefficiency
Total
0204
Margin 0204
0608
Percent 0608

H450G4

0.7049

-0.2414

-0.0866

-0.2831

1

H5fit50

-0.7135

-0.1173

-0.4606

0.6391

-0.5030

1

Inefficiency 0204

-0.1089

-0.3098

-0.1833

0.3820

0.0282

0.1689

1

Total Margin 0204

-0.0092

0.078

0.0065

-0.0692

-0.018

-0.0274

-0.0376

1

Average Beds 0608

-0.0687

0.4198

0.0497

-0.3587

-0.1358

-0.1654

-0.0273

0.0227

1

Medicaid Percent 0608

-0.0777

0.0230

-0.0533

0.0348

-0.0518

0.0360

0.3091

-0.0006

0.4655

1

Medicare Percent 0608

0.0841

0.0445

0.0921

-0.1052

0.0242

-0.0029

-0.4311

0.0273

-0.3964

-0.7929

For Profit

-0.0086

0.1393

0.0520

-0.1295

-0.0595

-0.0764

-0.0943

0.0232

0.0622

-0.0639

Local Government

-0.1966

-0.0660

-0.1302

0.2089

-0.1356

0.2407

0.1881

-0.0029

-0.1490

-0.0041

Not for Profit

0.1967

-0.0085

0.1000

-0.1364

0.1637

-0.1952

-0.1345

-0.0094

0.1130

0.0374

Teaching

-0.0121

0.0964

-0.0053

-0.0851

-0.0108

-0.0289

-0.0548

0.0132

0.1675

-0.0388

New England

-0.0464

-0.0216

-0.0282

0.0551

-0.0343

0.0587

-0.0521

-0.1112

-0.0112

0.0232

Middle Atlantic

-0.0314

0.1815

0.0026

-0.1538

-0.0434

-0.0062

-0.0925

0.0052

0.2516

0.0603

East North Central

0.1007

-0.0609

0.0178

-0.0147

0.1149

-0.0158

-0.1032

0.0685

-0.0062

-0.0122

West North Central

0.0184

-0.2426

-0.1214

0.2229

0.1368

-0.0020

0.3045

-0.0315

-0.0884

-0.0821

South Atlantic

0.0184

0.1346

0.0666

-0.1447

-0.0379

0.0106

-0.1329

-0.0153

0.1582

0.0519

East South Central

0.0232

0.1091

0.0838

-0.1234

-0.0476

0.0278

-0.0935

0.0160

0.0902

0.0932
-0.1788

West South Central

-0.0396

0.1272

0.0340

-0.0949

-0.0832

0.0172

-0.0904

-0.0393

-0.1417

Mountain

-0.1267

-0.0009

-0.0681

0.0941

-0.1021

-0.0333

0.1124

0.0642

-0.0325

0.1321

Pacific

0.0475

-0.0881

0.0738

0.0509

-0.0065

-0.0452

-0.0264

0.0140

-0.0630

0.0516

Middle
Atlantic

East North
Central

West North
Central

Medicare
For Profit
Percent 0608
Medicare Percent 0608

Local
Government

Not for
Profit

Teaching

New
England

1

For Profit

0.0923

1

Local Government

-0.0596

-0.2239

1

Not for Profit

0.0099

-0.3047

-0.8601

1

Teaching

0.0366

-0.0053

-0.0521

0.0537

1

New England

0.0220

-0.0502

-0.1181

0.1417

0.0233

1

Middle Atlantic

-0.0018

-0.0368

-0.1385

0.1546

-0.0255

-0.0358

1

East North Central

0.0391

-0.0985

-0.1169

0.1658

0.0784

-0.0757

-0.0853

1

West North Central

-0.0799

-0.1043

0.1075

-0.0505

-0.0244

-0.1092

-0.1230

-0.2604

1

South Atlantic

0.0157

0.1189

-0.0449

-0.0184

-0.0135

-0.0572

-0.0644

-0.1363

-0.1967

East South Central

0.0227

0.1502

0.0054

-0.0839

-0.0400

-0.0562

-0.0633

-0.1339

-0.1932

West South Central

0.1992

0.1048

0.1213

-0.1734

0.0267

-0.0809

-0.0911

-0.1928

-0.2782

Mountain

-0.2005

-0.0172

-0.0050

0.0138

-0.0422

-0.0592

-0.0666

-0.1411

-0.2035

Pacific

-0.0365

-0.0650

0.0395

-0.0045

0.0069

-0.0412

-0.0464

-0.0981

-0.1416
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South Atlantic
South Atlantic

East South
Central

West South
Central

Mountain

Pacific

1

East South Central

-0.1011

1

West South Central

-0.1456

-0.1431

1

Mountain

-0.1065

-0.1047

-0.1507

1

Pacific

-0.0741

-0.0728

-0.1048

-0.0767

1

Key to Variables in the Correlation Matrix
H1G1

Low Resource Munificence, Non-System Hospitals

H1G2

Low Resource Munificence, System Hospitals

H1G3

High Resource Munificence, Non-System Hospitals

H1G4

High Resource Munificence, System Hospitals

H250G1

Hospitals Not Within 50 Miles of Any Other Hospital

H250G2

Hospitals Within 50 Miles of Another Hospital but No Local System Partner

H250G3

Hospitals Within 50 Miles of Another Hospital and A Local System Partner

H350G1

Hospitals Not Within 50 Miles of a Large Hospital

H350G2

Hospitals Within 50 Miles of a Large Hospital but No Hierarchical System Partner

H350G3

Hospitals Within 50 Miles of a Large Hospital and A Hierarchical System Partner

H450G1

Non-CAH Hospital with no Hierarchical System Partner

H450G2

Non-CAH Hospital with a Hierarchical System Partner

H450G3

CAH Hospial with no Hierarchical System Partner

H450G4

CAH Hospital with a Hierarchical System Partner

H5fit50

Composite Fit/Congruence Measure

Inefficiency 0204

Hospital Inefficiency Score Average for 2002 to 2004

Total Margin 0204

Hospital Total Margin Average for 2002 to 2004

Average Beds 0608

Average Staffed Beds for 2006 to 2008

Medicaid Percent 0608

Average Medicaid Payer Percentage for 2006 to 2008

Medicare Percent 0608

Average Medicare Payer Percentage for 2006 to 2008

For Profit

Hospitals with For-Profit Ownership

Local Government

Hospitals Owned by Some Local Government Entity

Not for Profit

Hospitals with Non-Government Not-for-Profit Ownership

Teaching

Hospitals with a Residency Program

New England

Hospitals in the New England Census Division

Middle Atlantic

Hospitals in the Middle Atlantic Census Division

East North Central

Hospitals in the East North Central Census Division

West North Central

Hospitals in the West North Central Census Division

South Atlantic

Hospitals in the South Atlantic Census Division

East South Central

Hospitals in the East South Central Census Division

West South Central

Hospitals in the West South Central Census Division

Mountain

Hospitals in the Mountain Census Division

Pacific

Hospitals in the Pacific Census Division
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